
CIVITAS
BRITANNICA
A THIRTY-YEAR FRAMEWORK FOR
NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND RENEWAL
THO MUCH IS TAKEN,
MUCH ABIDES; AND
THO WE ARE NOW
THAT STRENGTH WHICH
IN OLD DAYS MOVED
EARTH AND HEAVEN,
THAT WHICH WE ARE,
WE ARE;
ONE EQUAL TEMPER,
OF HEROIC HEARTS,
MADE WEAK BY TIME
AND FATE, BUT STRONG
IN WILL:
TO STRIVE, TO SEEK,
TO FIND, AND NOT
TO YIELD.
AURELIAN FROST

Civitas Britannica

A Thirty-Year Framework for National Reconstruction and Renewal

Aurelian Frost

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Preamble

Britain stands deep in the third decade of the twenty-first century, in a condition markedly below that which her history, institutions, and capabilities ought to have secured for her. Across much of public life, her institutions are slower than they were, less equal to the demands placed upon them, and in certain cases reaching a critical state.

That decline has not been sudden, and it has not been inevitable. It is the accumulated consequence of decades of short-term governance, of institutional neglect, of sustained underinvestment, and of political habits that adapted poorly to the conditions in which the country now operates.

The symptoms are visible across the country. At the time of writing, the pound has lost around a quarter of its purchasing power within the last decade. The Crown Court alone has approximately 80,000 outstanding cases, with some defendants waiting three to four years for trial, while fewer than three per cent of recorded rape offences now result in a charge. Prisons remain at effective capacity, with more than a third reoffending within a year of release — a clear majority among those serving short sentences. The NHS continues to rely upon the extraordinary dedication of its staff, yet too often struggles to deliver timely care, and dentistry has become a privilege of the wealthy. Schools function under sustained pressure, with around 40,000 teachers leaving the profession annually and a maintenance backlog approaching £14 billion. The armed forces have been hollowed at a time when Britain stands more exposed, and more alone, than at any point since the Second World War. Property continues to sail beyond the reach of younger generations, and real wages have scarcely grown in fifteen years, pressing young families towards poverty while an ageing population faces grim prospects in an uncertain future.

And yet Britain remains wealthy by international standards, scientifically capable, and durable in important respects. The trajectory is nevertheless downward, both against peer economies and against her own past. On present indicators, the generations that follow will inherit weaker institutions, poorer infrastructure, lower civic confidence, and narrower horizons than the country built for those now living.

This framework begins from an old idea: that one generation holds the country in trust for the next. Britain's institutions, her infrastructure, her constitutional order, her civic traditions — these were built across centuries, by the labour, sacrifice, and patient competence of earlier generations. The obligation of those now living is not to spend that inheritance but to keep it, mend it, and hand it on sounder than it came. A serious country does not knowingly hand her successors a weaker country than she received, and call the leaving by the gentle names of drift and circumstance.

What is proposed is not revolution: it is a staged renewal of the state, subordinate throughout to democratic government, to the law, and to the sovereignty of Parliament.

Most British programmes promise transformation inside a single term and predictably disappoint. The work now required is longer than any one government.

No document governs a country for thirty years, and this one makes no such claim. Will cannot be bequeathed from one government to the next, and few who begin such a work remain to complete it; the horizon is set at thirty years not because any movement expects to hold the field so long, but because that is the span across which institutions are truly rebuilt, and nothing shorter is honest.

The framework is to be read in two ways together. As a roadmap it describes the ideal — one sustained effort, the foundation laid before the house is raised upon it, each reform taken up in the order that those before it allow. That is the better path, and the movement would choose it; but it is also the harder, and, on any sober reckoning of how countries are actually governed, the less likely to come to pass.

The likelier course is the slower one: the same sequence carried piecemeal, by governments of every party and of none, across a stretch of years that none of them sets out to fill. For the order of the work is not the movement's invention but a plain account of what must wait upon what — that revenue cannot be raised before it can be collected, that a service cannot be promised before the means to deliver it are built, that defence cannot be made to outrun the reform of how it is bought. A government that never hears the name, and would refuse it were it offered, will meet that same dependence the moment it turns in earnest to renewal, and be bound by it whether it consents or not. The roadmap is the ideal; the dependence is the floor; and the framework is written to stand upon both.

Taken at speed, the compressed path makes the first parliament the hardest stretch of the whole long horizon, for it asks the state to build the instruments of its own competence before that competence exists. The difficulty is not wished away. It is met, by the means set out in Section V, with capability borrowed for a bounded term while the home supply is slowly grown — and it is set down here, in the open, rather than left to be discovered. The compressed path is the ambition. Its price is paid first, and paid in full, in the years before there is yet much to show.

The deepest claim of this document is that Britain's affliction is not, at root, economic or ideological, but institutional. The country has lost the instrument capable of delivering renewal at scale — coherently, competently, and without interruption across the changing of governments. Every other reform, in health and housing, defence and justice and education, waits upon an instrument that can carry it. The first work of reconstruction is the reconstruction of the state itself.

From this follow six priorities, taken strictly in their order:

1. To rebuild the capacity of the state.
2. To reform the recruitment and retention of those who serve in it.
3. To restore the long horizon to British governance.

4. To steady the sectors on which the country's strategic position depends.
5. To rebuild the productive and technological strength of the economy.
6. And, once competence and resilience are recovered, to widen the country's social ambitions to match.

The first parliament is conceived, accordingly, as a Capacity Parliament: its labour is the machinery of government, the institutional strength and the fiscal base on which all that follows must rest. The second begins the reform that a competent instrument can at last deliver. The third and fourth complete what their predecessors began.

The cost of refusing this work is the argument for doing it. Institutional decline is gradual, and that is its disguise: a society slips from prosperity, cohesion, and competence not in a single fall it would resist, but by degrees familiar enough to be mistaken for the settled order of things. Maintenance missed compounds into decay; trust broken and broken again grows harder to restore; professions lose their standing, and their memory drains away with the people who held it. What is endured too long ceases to be a problem and becomes a condition. The greater disruption is not reform but its postponement — until what might have been mended in good order must instead be rebuilt amid crisis, with less strength left to do it.

The framework rests on a judgement about what survives beneath the exhaustion of the present: that enough institutional competence remains to be rebuilt rather than wholly replaced; that some part of the administrative class is still equal to real reform; that the public retains patience enough for work that outlasts a single cycle; and that civic trust and national confidence, though worn, are not yet spent. None of this is certain, and the document does not claim certainty of delivery. Will cannot be manufactured by argument, and a country may always choose drift over the harder road. The judgement offered is only this: that a difficult correction, attempted while strength remains, is to be preferred to the reckoning that waits if strength is spent first.

What is set down here is a route, not a guarantee — a means by which a democratic country in long decline might undertake its own renewal, restore its sovereignty and its standing as a leading middle power, and leave its children a better inheritance than this generation received. A people that built durable institutions once is not condemned to be incapable of renewing them now.

Lastly, on the names themselves. The movement is called Civitas Britannica because the citizen is whom it exists to serve — not faction, class, or donor — and the Latin is kept for its lineage: *civitas*, the Roman word for citizenship and for the body of citizens as one, kin to civic and civilian and civilisation. The same form recurs across the institutions that follow, in deliberate echo of a republic whose example endures. But the names are not load-bearing; it is the policies, not the names, that ask to be judged. The method is set out before the substance: diagnosis first, then disciplined sequence, capacity built before it is called upon, and candour where there is cause for concern. The principles that order the framework, and

the values that follow from them, are set out below. The call is *Fight Forward*: renewal pursued neither by rupture nor by the managed administration of decline, but with patience, discipline, and civic confidence restored.

I. The Condition

The failures named in the preamble are not isolated problems but symptoms of a single structural condition: a state that has not kept pace with the world it governs. Its administrative architecture, procurement, digital systems, regulatory frameworks, and workforce models were built for conditions that no longer exist, and the relationship between state and citizen, and between state and business, has aged with them. The political tradition treated these as separate questions and answered each one badly, because none could be answered properly without answering all.

Three failures recur across institutions, regions, and sectors: *institutional decay*, *elite detachment*, and the *erosion of civic confidence*. They compound one another. Institutions that lose competence and legitimacy become easier for narrow interests to capture; systems shaped around those already inside them grow less responsive to everyone else; and citizens, watching, lose confidence that reform is either possible or sincerely meant. The result is a slow drift in which decline is normalised even as the capacity to reverse it weakens.

Institutional Decay

British institutions remain internationally significant and historically influential. Many were among the most effective administrative and civic systems ever developed by any state — the modern civil service, the Bank of England, the NHS, the BBC, the common law, the apparatus of local government. None were natural features of the landscape. They were built by people, in time, against resistance, and they worked because a coherent political culture sustained them.

That sustaining culture is not optional equipment. Institutions depend upon competence, public trust, professional discipline, sustained investment, and willingness to adapt. In too many cases, those conditions have weakened.

The outward forms of institutions persist while the inner capacity rots. Courts continue to exist, but justice delayed beyond reasonable timescales weakens faith in the rule of law. Schools continue to function, but mounting pressure on teachers, parents, and pupils strains the relationships education depends upon. The NHS retains extraordinary staff commitment, yet struggles under growing demand, workforce pressures, ageing infrastructure, and decades of uneven reform.

The pattern is consistent: systems built for one era can no longer meet the demands of another. A planning system designed for a slower country cannot deliver housing at the required pace. A regulatory framework written before the internet cannot govern artificial intelligence. A civil service built for the imperial era cannot procure modern technology. Layers of bureaucracy slow adaptation while weakening accountability.

These pressures have a clear geographic dimension. Many of the civic institutions that once anchored Britain's industrial regions — technical colleges, cooperative societies, regional banks, locally rooted civic infrastructure — were lost or left to wither in the economic restructuring of recent decades. Renewal cannot mean simply strengthening the South East further. It must involve rebuilding civic and economic capacity across the country as a whole.

Elite Detachment

Every complex society has its orders, and its health depends on each of them remaining bound to the whole. Detachment can occur at any level — a working population that withdraws from the obligations of common citizenship is as real a failure as a governing class that floats free of the country it governs. This section examines the detachment of the elite because power makes it the most damaging, not because it is the only kind; the concord of the orders fails from either end. The question is not whether elites exist, since every society produces them, but whether they remain connected and answerable to the society they govern.

In Britain, too much power has become concentrated within increasingly narrow professional, educational, political, and geographic networks. Senior politics, media, regulation, consultancy, finance, and parts of the civil service operate within overlapping social and institutional circles that reinforce one another's assumptions and incentives. This does not require conspiracy or conscious coordination. Shared environments produce shared instincts that nobody examines carefully enough. Members of these circles often move between them sideways, with the failures of one phase rarely producing consequences in the next.

Economic structure has reinforced this pattern. Over recent decades, Britain's economy has become increasingly concentrated around finance, property, and high-value service sectors clustered heavily in London and the South East. Regions and sectors that lost industrial capacity often lost political influence alongside it. The result is a governing culture that can become disconnected from the experiences and priorities of large parts of the country while still believing itself broadly representative.

The consequences are visible across public life. Planning systems often protect existing asset holders at the expense of younger generations. Regulatory systems become overly intertwined with the industries they oversee. Procurement systems encourage consultancy dependence while weakening long-term institutional capability. Tax structures frequently reward passive asset appreciation more favourably than productive work or investment. Welfare systems police low-income claimants while tolerating a tax gap several times greater than all claimant fraud combined.

The framework has no quarrel with success itself — successful societies require successful individuals, institutions, and industries alike — only with success that slips its obligations to

the country that produced it. The question is whether the systems that distribute power remain broad-based, accountable, and balanced enough to hold the orders in concord — and that obligation runs both ways. What the framework asks of the elite, to remain answerable and to contribute in proportion to what it holds, it asks of every order in its own measure: the covenant that binds the country is reciprocal, or it does not bind at all.

The Erosion of Civic Confidence

No democratic society functions through law and administration alone. It also depends upon habits of cooperation, shared expectations, local participation, and a basic sense of mutual civic obligation between citizens who may otherwise disagree strongly about politics, culture, religion, or class.

For much of modern British history, those habits were sustained through a combination of institutions and traditions: local associations, unions, churches, clubs, libraries, cooperatives, working men's institutes, neighbourhood organisations, civic rituals, local journalism, voluntary service, and the social infrastructure through which people participated in public life together.

Much of that fabric has frayed or fallen away in recent decades. The destruction was concentrated, not evenly distributed: civic life still functions reasonably well for the educated middle class, who retain universities, professional associations, and the cultural infrastructure of their own class. It has been hollowed for everyone else. The cohesion crisis the political class tends to discuss in cultural and identity terms is also, and primarily, this — the institutions through which working-class citizens did the work of citizenship have largely gone, and nothing has grown to replace them. It is doubtful that the old forms can be rebuilt; the conditions that produced the union hall and the working men's institute, the chapel and the friendly society, have themselves passed, and a state that set out to manufacture civic fellowship by statute would most likely produce only its hollow imitation. What can be said plainly is that this is real, that it matters, and that it lies largely beyond the direct reach of government.

Into the vacuum have emerged weaker substitutes: algorithmic outrage, tribal media ecosystems, performative online politics, nostalgic grievance, and forms of identity politics that often fragment more effectively than they unify. None provides the durable civic foundation on which a stable democracy depends — and the recognition that the state cannot simply supply that foundation itself is a real limit on what any reform programme, this one included, can honestly promise.

This is not a moral failing of ordinary citizens. It is the predictable result of decades in which institutions that once sustained civic participation were neglected and allowed to fail. The task ahead is therefore not simply administrative reform. It is the reconstruction of civic capacity itself.

The Long Economic Transition

Underlying all three failures is a long economic transition Britain never fully reconciled politically or socially. The restructuring that accelerated from the late 1970s onwards produced major gains in some sectors and regions, but imposed deep and lasting costs elsewhere. Deindustrialisation transformed the North, the Midlands, South Wales, Scotland, and many coastal communities. Industries, institutions, and forms of civic life that had anchored entire towns and regions disappeared more quickly than viable replacements emerged. Too often, the consequences were treated not as national problems requiring long-term reconstruction, but as unfortunate side-effects of modernisation to which communities were expected simply to adapt.

This history cannot be ignored. Britain's present condition is not the result of a single government, ideology, or event. Nor is it irreversible. But neither can it be addressed through managerial adjustments alone. The country requires institutional renewal, economic reconstruction, and the rebuilding of civic confidence serious enough to sustain reform over decades rather than electoral cycles.

II. The Failure of Familiar

Britain's condition has produced understandable anger, frustration, and political distrust. Across the political spectrum, many citizens correctly recognise that major institutions are struggling to function effectively, that democratic legitimacy has weakened, and that successive governments have often failed to address long-term structural problems seriously enough. Not all responses to decline are equally capable of producing renewal. Three broad tendencies dominate public life, and each ultimately fails for related reasons.

Reactionary politics identifies many of the symptoms correctly — institutional dysfunction, weakened trust, economic insecurity, lost civic confidence — and fails in its solutions. Capacity cannot be rebuilt through outrage, nor modern problems solved through nostalgia, scapegoating, or the concentration of power around charismatic figures. But the rise of such politics is not mere irrationality: populist movements grow when institutions lose credibility and appear unable to address visible problems. The answer is not rage but the slow restoration of competence that earns credibility back.

Activist politics, increasingly influential on the progressive left, treats politics as moral performance and identity expression rather than governance. Its concerns are often legitimate; its method is not. Politics conducted through denunciation, symbolic positioning, and ideological policing cannot build the durable majorities or governing coalitions that require compromise, prioritisation, and the acceptance of partial progress.

Centrist politics has governed Britain, with brief interruptions, for a generation. It is the administrative liberalism of focus groups, strategic reviews, green papers, and lessons-learned exercises, speaking in the flat reassuring register of the well-paid consultant. It believes the country's problems are essentially technical — that with the right levers, pulled by the right credentialed hands, the machine can be returned to function. The model was wrong: built on assumptions about a country that no longer exists, by people who move continuously between government, think tanks, and corporate boards, and whose failed forecasts are forgotten as new ones are produced by the same method for the same clients. The centre is not malign — many of its members are decent and able, which makes them harder to dislodge — but managerial liberalism is not the solution to Britain's structural failures. It is the form under which they entrenched themselves.

The common thread is that each prefers symbolic conflict or technocratic management to the patient work of institutional repair. Britain's renewal will not come from nostalgia, moral theatre, online combat, or managerial pretence. It will come from the slower work of rebuilding institutions, restoring trust, and renewing the civic life on which a competent democracy depends.

That work is neither left nor right in the tribal sense in which modern politics increasingly understands those terms. It is the work of governing a country responsibly under present conditions.

There is a deeper point beneath the quarrel, and it concerns what it means to love a country at all. True love of country lives far from the battlefields and the jeering crowds. At its root it is an affection for something real — for the particular fall of light on a cloudy day, the names of small places and the rolling hills behind them, the church bell carrying over sleepy villages at evening, half-remembered tales from grandparents long gone, and the long, stubborn argument over liberty that has run through this island for a thousand years. That affection is worth honouring, and there is no shame in holding it. The error lies in what such love is taken to require. It mistakes the preservation of a form for the protection of a thing, and the two are not the same.

Consider HMS Victory, the British flagship at Trafalgar. In her day she was the fearsome pinnacle of Georgian naval power — a first-rate ship of the line of a hundred guns. Since those days of glory she has watched the world change and her own time recede ever further over the horizon. Her age of timber and canvas, of crow's nest and broadside, has given way to an age of iron and turbine, of radar and the guided missile. Her officers and crew might argue among themselves where to apportion the blame for her condition — but it would change nothing, and the bottom line would not move: in any modern engagement she would be sunk within minutes. What, then, are the options for a divided ship? To sail into battle as she is — inadequate, outmatched, and doomed — or, while the chance remains, to come into dry dock and begin the long work of rebuilding her for the age she actually inhabits. What endures is never the timber; it is the thing the timber served — the power to keep the seas, carried forward by replacing every plank and every gun as the age demands. That is custodianship: not the refusal of change but the management of it, so that what matters survives the centuries that would otherwise take it. The patriot, properly understood, is not the one who stands on the deck insisting nothing be touched while the hull fills with water. It is the one who does the unglamorous work of the refit, and so keeps the fleet at sea.

III. First Principles

This framework is built on five convictions. Each is given as a maxim and then a plain account of what it asks, because they are meant to be acted on rather than admired, and everything that follows is an attempt to act on them.

Acta non verba — deeds, not words. The work must stand on its own merits. Integrity is the standard this document is held to, and, more than a standard, it is a condition of success: a programme this demanding can only be carried by people who hold to it. A state that does not work has failed an obligation, not merely an efficiency target. Announcement is never counted here as achievement, and every commitment in these pages is to be measured by what it delivers rather than by what it declares.

Concordia ordinum — the concord of the orders. No society on record has done without its orders: rich and poor, governing and governed, the elite and the many. There is no working example of one that abolished them, and a long catalogue of great civilisations that fell trying — dispossessing one pole, or letting another grow unaccountable, until the balance that held the whole together gave way. The aim of this framework is therefore not to eliminate these tensions, which cannot be done, but to hold them in concord: a society in equilibrium between its parts, where no order is dispossessed and none placed beyond accountability. This is the principle from which the framework's moderation flows. It is why the levy asks much of wealth without seizing it, why the settlement on migration is firm without being cruel, why the powerful are bound rather than broken. The orders are natural opposites, and they are held in balance or not held at all.

Non nobis — not for ourselves alone. To inherit a country, maintain it, and hand it on sounder than it came is the floor beneath which a civilisation does not decline but ends. A society that stops doing this has not fallen short of an aspiration; it has surrendered the one duty that keeps it in existence. This is the oldest obligation here, and the one the rest depend upon, because every commitment in these pages is made on behalf of people who cannot yet vote, and some not yet born. The cathedrals were raised across centuries by people who never saw them finished, and built well anyway. That is the disposition the framework asks the present generation to recover.

Per aspera ad honorem — through hardship to honour. Standing is earned by contribution, at every level. What a person puts in is the ground of their belonging: the worker, the citizen, the newcomer, and the holder of great wealth measured by the same rule, and none by birth, by fortune, or by how loudly they make themselves heard. This runs further through the framework than any other principle — it is the logic of the welfare covenant, of the settlement offered to those who would join the country, and of what is asked of wealth in the rebuilding. Belonging given for nothing is held cheap; belonging earned is worth defending, and earning it is meant to cost something.

Si vis pacem, para bellum — if you would have peace, prepare for war. Strength is the condition of every good thing's survival. A society that is decent but cannot defend its decency does not keep it; the good that cannot protect itself is taken by those who can, and the world is left poorer for the loss. To be a force for good therefore requires the means to hold that ground — a purpose defensive in intent and real in capacity. It is the oldest form of the framework's own method: a promise without the power to keep it is overrun by the first hard thing it meets, and capacity built before the promise is made is this principle applied to the state itself.

These run beneath everything, and they are read through a long view. Britain is the better part of two thousand years of continuous inheritance — Roman roads and Saxon law, the slow invention of a parliament and a common tongue. It has weathered conquest, plague, and fire, and come out altered but itself. In the last century it spent the wealth of an empire and a generation of its young in defence of something worth defending, and was the poorer for it, and arguably the more honourable. It has survived worse than the present many times. What it faces now is not ruin but neglect — a country grown miserable and divided over things that need not divide it, and deserves better from the generation that holds it in trust. That is the lens through which the rest of this framework is meant to be read.

These principles decide who the framework serves, and on what terms. The state's first duty is to its own citizens — the border, the law, the services, the honest ledger — because a state that fails its own people has nothing left to offer anyone else's. Beyond that inner covenant stand real obligations to those outside it: protection for the persecuted, honesty in dealing, the keeping of commitments made. The obligations are concentric, and where they conflict the inner one governs; that is what it means for a state to be anyone's in particular. Membership follows the same logic as everything else here — it is earned, not granted for having arrived, and it is the polity's to extend, not a stranger's to claim.

Beneath all of it lies one floor that binds absolutely, on every side of every line the framework draws: no cruelty used as an instrument, no person used as a means, no one returned to harm or left without the law's protection. This is what dignity means in these pages — not a possession the state hands out, nor a precondition every claim must satisfy, but the minimum of decent treatment owed to any person the framework touches, citizen or not, and never breached however hard the case. It is the reason protection is owed even where membership is declined, and the reason the hardest settlements in this document — the closure and the island, the levy and its relief, the card and its limits — are bounded as they are. The circles decide what the state owes first; the floor decides what it may never do in the owing. A reader who holds both will find the framework's answers follow from them, rather than being asserted against them.

The Conditional Grant

One mechanism recurs throughout the framework, and it carries a name: the conditional grant. Where the framework extends power, freedom, or relief, it extends more than the present settlement would allow — a deeper relief than the Treasury would dare, a wider medical supply than any pilot has tried, an intelligence capability broader than any now licensed, a regional government with real weight — and attaches that grant to conditions rather than shrinking it to a safe size. The relief rises as enforcement is certified; the island grows as capacity is proven; defence rises towards three and a half per cent as procurement earns it; medical supply widens as the evidence licenses each stage. The grant is generous, the conditions are real, and reversion is built in before the first step is taken. It is the framework's answer to the oldest argument in government, between those who trust and are betrayed and those who withhold and are right: to trust further than caution would, on terms that make betrayal expensive and failure recoverable. What is earned stays earned; what is granted stays conditional; and the difference between them is always written down.

IV. The Method of Reconstruction

A programme this large requires careful planning and disciplined execution, even with a generation in which to do it. The things that make everything else possible are built first. The method matters more than any single policy, because it is what decides whether anything is delivered at all.

The Capacity Parliament

The first parliament of any government acting on this framework is conceived as a Capacity Parliament. Its principal work is to rebuild the machinery of governance. Substantive policy reform begins in the second parliament when there is a competent instrument to deliver it.

This is the answer to the central practical question every reform programme of this scale must face: how can a state in the condition described in Section I deliver the transformation Section III would require? It cannot. No British government in living memory has delivered four or five major reforms in a single parliament, let alone the fifteen or twenty simultaneous transformations that the country's accumulated needs would suggest. The pattern of overcommitting and underdelivering is one of the principal sources of the cynicism the framework exists to address. It is also a trap the framework could fall into itself, and says so. Repeating it would compound the problem.

The Capacity Parliament does not mean nothing else happens. It means the centre of gravity of the first parliament's work is institutional rebuilding, with reform limited to commitments that either fund the programme, address acute human need that cannot in conscience wait, or unlock everything that follows. The tier structure set out below makes this discipline operational. The reader can see, for each commitment, when it arrives and what it depends on.

The Capacity Parliament's discipline is also what makes the framework politically credible. A movement that promises fifteen transformations in five years shows only that it has not understood the problem. A movement that promises five years of foundations, then real reform across the decade that follows, has understood it — and offers the country what it has not had in a generation: a true account of what the work takes.

Sequencing Principles

Four principles guide the sequencing across parliaments.

The country cannot do everything at once. Implementation capacity is finite. State capacity rebuilding takes a parliament before subsequent reforms become deliverable at scale. Workforce expansion across multiple services cannot all be delivered simultaneously without breaking the institutional capacity to absorb new entrants. Capital programmes have natural absorption limits beyond which additional investment produces waste rather than capability.

Many initiatives will underperform or fail. British government delivery of major programmes has documented patterns of underperformance — IT projects, infrastructure programmes, workforce reforms, institutional change. The pattern is partly Treasury optimism bias, partly implementation difficulty, partly real unpredictability about what works. The architecture builds this reality in rather than discovers it through serial disappointment. Each major commitment carries a defined review milestone, typically two or three years after implementation begins, at which delivery against committed targets is assessed publicly by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) and scrutinised by the relevant parliamentary select committee. If commitments are underperforming, options include adjusted targets and timescales, major reform to the implementation approach, reduction in scale to match what is being delivered, or termination with reallocation of resources to commitments that are working. The commitment is to review and a willingness to act on findings, not to stubborn persistence in approaches that are not delivering.

Capacity-building and capital generation come first. Commitments that build the country's ability to function and that generate fiscal capacity must take precedence over commitments that consume capacity and capital. State capacity rebuilding makes everything else deliverable. The tax architecture and the periodic reconstruction levy create the revenue base. Procurement reform releases waste. These foundational commitments enable subsequent reforms; reversing the order produces commitments that exceed the capacity to deliver them.

Foundational state functions take precedence over service improvement. The polity must be able to defend itself, maintain public order, deliver justice, manage its borders, sustain critical infrastructure. These foundational functions take priority over service improvements that, however valuable, do not affect the polity's continued capacity to operate. A country with sub-optimal NHS service can recover; a country that has lost its defence capacity, public order, or critical infrastructure cannot.

The Tier Structure

The four principles produce a tier structure. Each commitment is placed in one of four tiers reflecting its priority position. The fiscal architecture honours the tiers — Tier 1 commitments are funded first, Tier 2 next, Tier 3 conditional on the programme working, Tier 4 aspirational, not programmatic. The tiers are the ordering of priority and conditionality: they govern what is funded first and what is gated on what. The parliaments are the indicative ordering in time: they show when, on a realistic reading, each commitment is expected to fall. The two are deliberately not a one-to-one map. A commitment can be high in priority yet slow to mature — the skills pipeline is Tier 1 because everything depends on it, yet its first cohorts begin early and its full scale arrives parliaments later — and a commitment can be lower in priority yet quick to enact. Where the two diverge, the rule is simple: the tier governs what is funded and in what order, the parliament governs when delivery is expected. The tiers are the commitment; the

parliamentary timeline is the plan for realising them, held to the same conditional discipline as everything else.

Tier 1: Foundational capacity and revenue. These commitments come first because they create the conditions for everything else.

- State capacity rebuilding including the Royal Institute of Statecraft, the Government Architecture and Integration Authority (GAIA), and the Cura Custodum Authority.
- The tax architecture providing the recurring revenue base, sequenced across the parliament, not front-loaded.
- The periodic progressive wealth tax, a once-in-a-generation reconstruction levy, providing capital revenue for rebuilding.
- Procurement reform releasing waste.
- The Constitutional Convention convened in the first parliament with its outputs implemented in the second.
- Asylum policy consolidation as the political precondition for the programme as a whole.
- The National Fraud Agency, established in the first parliament as a fiscal exception to the Capacity Parliament discipline: the Agency's presence here is justified solely because earlier establishment produces earlier net revenue, not because it is institutional rebuilding in the foundational sense.
- Pension and capital architecture reform — legislative foundations in the first parliament, with implementation deferred to subsequent parliaments — addressing what is potentially existential across the demographic horizon and unlocking domestic capital for the programme.
- Regional skills academies and technical institutes — legislative and institutional foundations in the first parliament, with first cohorts beginning in the priority strategic areas (nuclear and grid, advanced engineering) and full scaling deferred to subsequent parliaments — because the skills pipeline has the longest lead time of any commitment and must be started first if domestic capacity is to arrive on any realistic horizon.
- Artificial intelligence governance foundations — the legislative base, algorithmic decision-making brought under GAIA, and the AI Security Institute placed on a statutory footing — placed in Tier 1 because the capacity to govern and harness artificial intelligence is foundational to the state's ability to scale everything that follows.
- Within the first parliament these Tier 1 commitments are themselves staged into an immediate and a consolidation phase, set out in Section VII.

Tier 2: Foundational state functions. These commitments prevent acute failure of the polity's core capacities.

- Defence rising towards 3.5% of GDP in core spending on the alliance timeline, conditional on procurement reform demonstrably working.
- Nuclear power as a strategic pillar of British energy.

- Renewables and grid integration as the complementary pillar.
- Industrial strategy at scale, Britain's Renewal of Advanced Industrial Development (BRAID) — the Catapult Network expanded towards Fraunhofer levels, public R&D restored, strategic-sector support, and the strategic-asset retention test that keeps what the country builds.
- Technological sovereignty in artificial intelligence — sovereign compute, an open-weight fallback, and the Arm chokepoint secured by jurisdiction.
- The life sciences settlement, anchored by the British Medical Institute, with NHS data put to work on the licence-not-ownership principle.
- Space — a committed floor of position, navigation, and timing resilience, set beside energy security and defence.
- NHS baseline reform addressing the most acute failures.
- Cura Custodum baseline across military and NHS clinical workforce.
- Crime and public order capacity at appropriate levels.
- Legal reform baseline.
- Climate transition baseline.
- Drug policy reform, deferred from Tier 1 to here because it is policy reform rather than institutional rebuilding and need not be front-loaded.

Tier 3: Substantial reform delivering high value. These commitments produce significant benefits but are not foundational.

- Universal childcare rolled out across the second parliament, with the contingency path extending coverage into a third.
- Universal Credit operational reforms.
- Personal allowance increase to £16,000–£18,000, sequenced to the second parliament once recurring revenue from the tax architecture is arriving and the fiscal headroom for the foregone income is established.
- Social care workforce transition.
- Sectoral bargaining and labour market reform with employer association capacity-building.
- Planning reform.
- Civic identity card.
- NHS expansion above baseline.
- Cura Custodum extension to other emergency services.
- Education reform across parliaments.
- The scaling of the regional skills academies and technical institutes to full regional coverage.
- Comprehensive legal reform.

Tier 4: Aspirational horizon. These commitments are stated as aspirations rather than promises. They are the country the framework hopes to build, conditional on the programme working and on fiscal performance permitting.

- Higher education funding restoration.
- Universal Credit adequacy benchmarking to minimum income standard.
- NHS expansion to full mental health parity.
- Climate ambitions above the nuclear-led baseline.
- Universal elder care at full Dilnot scope.
- Comprehensive cybercrime response.
- Regional renewal infrastructure beyond what wealth tax allocation funds.
- Take-up of unclaimed entitlements raised towards full delivery, on the same population and axis as the Universal Credit adequacy benchmark, conditional on the recurring cost the productive economy must first afford.
- A National Academy of Leadership — the programme's capstone, forging leaders for a renewed country, placed last and held as aspiration.

Failure Protocols

The conditionality holds. Failure at lower-numbered tiers constrains commitments at higher-numbered tiers, and the polity is told when and why.

Failure of Tier 4 commitments produces no wider programme failure. Tier 4 is discretionary by design; the polity can decide that a particular Tier 4 commitment is not delivering and reallocate without breaking subsequent commitments.

Failure of Tier 3 commitments produces partial programme contraction. Tier 3 failure is more consequential because these are significant reforms from which the programme expects much of its productivity, social, and civic return. Failure produces policy review and possible scaling back, but the foundational programme continues.

Failure of Tier 2 commitments threatens the programme's integrity. These are foundational state functions; failure produces wide review across the programme because the conditions for everything else are not being established.

Failure of Tier 1 commitments constrains the forward programme proportionally;*it does not erase what has been built.*

The forward sequence is conditional on the foundations: the social commitments of the later tiers were always contingent on the capacity and revenue existing to deliver them, and if the foundations fall short, what follows is constrained in proportion. But the value of what is built is not conditional on the whole being completed. A procurement system reformed in part is better than the one it replaced and endures regardless of what comes after; a Royal Institute stood up, an HMRC rebuilt, a school estate renewed, capital already deployed — none of these un-build because a later tier stalls. The framework is a sequence in its ambitions and modular in its achievements. The modularity answers more than the risk of a missed forecast. A thirty-year horizon cannot assume thirty years in the same hands, and the government that begins the work may not be the one that completes it or collects its

return. The reformer pays the bill; the gain is often banked by whoever governs next. Built for those odds, each contribution is made to be worth doing alone and to endure under whoever inherits it, so that the programme does not depend on one party holding power across a span no party can secure. Within Tier 1, one element is closer to binary: the recurring tax architecture and the revenue floor. If the floor fails, the capital and recurring programmes contract to match it, through the conditional mechanism set out in the fiscal architecture — this is handled by design, not by hope. The remaining foundational work — state capacity, procurement reform, the institutions — is incremental, and partial delivery is partial good rather than programme failure. Nothing stands or falls on a single first-parliament gate; but the first parliament is the hardest stretch of the whole horizon, and the programme is more front-loaded than most precisely because it refuses to commit what it has not yet built the capacity to deliver.

One thing in the sequence cannot be varied, and it is the sequence itself. Capacity, a working revenue base, and the asylum settlement the rest depends upon must be built first, in that order, because the remainder cannot function without them — a requirement dictated by what depends on what, not by any party's preference. The foundation must be laid whole, because a foundation laid in part carries nothing; the social settlement raised upon it can be taken up in pieces, by different hands and at different times. The design belongs to no tribe, and may be carried by whoever holds office; but its order holds for everyone who would build on it.

Visibility

The tier structure, the conditional chains, the failure protocols, and the actual delivery against them are made publicly visible through annual fiscal reviews, OBR scrutiny, parliamentary oversight, and direct citizen-facing reporting on what has been delivered and what has slipped. The architecture's discipline depends on the polity being able to see what is happening rather than having delivery information filtered through political communication. The Treasury Select Committee's role is strengthened to provide this scrutiny; the OBR's mandate is expanded; the public reporting is made comprehensive.

Seriousness here is not a matter of vision or theatre: it is the patient, disciplined sequencing of difficult things, done in the order that makes sense, accounted for as it happens. The country has been promised everything at once for a generation and delivered very little. The framework proposes the opposite — a smaller number of things delivered properly, in the right order, with the working shown.

V. The Royal Institute of Statecraft

The institutional design and oversight function that British government has lacked is established as a standing body with explicit constitutional authority. The Royal Institute of Statecraft is the central instrument of the Capacity Parliament's work. The name is an intention, not a presumption: the Institute is to be chartered, with the Sovereign's consent, under the Crown — deliberately, and as the first instance of a principle the framework holds throughout. The Crown is the head of permanent Britain, as it already heads the Royal Society, the Royal Colleges, and the regiments: the institutions that do not change desks with the election cycle stand under the symbol that does not change with it either, while the politicians head the Britain that does. An institute built to outlast every government that staffs it belongs in that lineage, and asks to join it in the proper way.

Function

The Institute performs four functions, each separate but reinforcing.

First, training. Senior civil servants and parliamentary staff are trained through structured programmes that build technical capability and shared institutional culture. The British absence of comparable capability is unusual among advanced democracies. France has the Institut national du service public; Singapore has the Civil Service College; Germany has the Bundesakademie für öffentliche Verwaltung. Britain's administrative tradition has historically relied on informal cultural transmission and on-the-job formation, which worked tolerably when the civil service was small, cohesive, and homogeneous, and which does not work in modern conditions.

Second, ongoing oversight of institutional performance across government. The Institute measures effectiveness, identifies failures, and proposes reforms. This is not a substitute for ministerial accountability or parliamentary scrutiny. It is institutional infrastructure that gives ministers and Parliament better information and the analytical capability to act on it. The Institute reports to Parliament, not the executive, with protected funding through statutory mechanism, not the annual budget vote that political pressure can manipulate.

Third, the design work for new institutions and major institutional reforms. The Frontline Advisory framework, GAIA, the National Fraud Agency, the Law Reform Commission, the Cura Custodum Authority, and other institutions established under this framework benefit from being designed under standing institutional design capability, not the ad hoc Cabinet Office arrangements that have produced inconsistent results.

Fourth, the keeping of institutional memory. The documented knowledge by which institutions are built — the procurement standards that hold, the design of an authority that endures, the transferred practice the international contracts already require in writing — is kept by the Institute as a standing record, not left to depart with the people who carried it. The preamble names institutional memory draining away as a cause of decline; an institute

that designs institutions is the natural place to keep the memory of how, so that the circulation the framework demands of its own members costs the state none of the knowledge it would otherwise lose.

Constitution

The Institute is established by Charter and primary legislation. Its constitution carries several explicit safeguards against the failures that comparable institutions in other countries have produced.

- **Cross-party governance** — senior appointees from multiple parties, alongside academic, judicial, professional, and civic representation.
- **Term limits** of seven to ten years for senior positions, with no consecutive reappointment — continuity without capture.
- **Reporting to Parliament,** not the executive.
- **Protected funding,** insulated from the annual vote.
- **A fixed statutory remit** the Institute cannot vary unilaterally.

The Institute is subject to the same constitutional discipline as any other British institution. Parliamentary sovereignty is preserved. The Institute's recommendations are advisory; ministerial decisions remain ministerial decisions; the Institute's authority is intellectual and institutional rather than executive.

Against Elite Detachment

The principal risk of an institution of this kind is that it produces the very elite detachment Section I diagnoses. France's École Nationale d'Administration (ENA) produced exactly this outcome — so completely that the school was abolished in 2021 and refounded under another name. The risk is recognised here and addressed through several reinforcing mechanisms.

The Institute does not select its own membership unilaterally. Entry pathways are multiple: from the civil service, from the military, from the professional regulators that have functioned, from academia, from industry, from the judiciary, from local government, from the institutions named earlier as having retained capability. The membership is not drawn predominantly from any single educational, professional, or geographic background. The Institute is required to report on the demographic and institutional composition of its cohorts annually, with parliamentary scrutiny of patterns that suggest drift towards narrowness.

The Institute is geographically distributed. Its principal site is outside London, in a city with existing institutional and educational capability. Manchester, Edinburgh, Birmingham, and Leeds are candidate locations. Branch operations exist in other regional centres. The framework rejects the pattern by which central institutional infrastructure concentrates in London and reinforces the geographic imbalance already diagnosed.

The Institute's graduates do not enjoy permanent privileged standing. Membership of cohorts is institutional rather than personal — the graduate carries credibility from the training and the standards demonstrated, but holds no ongoing entitlement to position, deference, or accelerated promotion that has not been earned through subsequent service.

The Institute is forbidden, by statute, from cultivating a dynastic or hereditary character. Benefits, honours, and institutional standing within the framework are tied to service, competence, and contribution. No generational entitlements exist. Children of Institute graduates have no privileged access to admission or to subsequent positions; admission is on merit assessed by the standards published and reviewed externally.

These safeguards are necessary but not sufficient. ENA had safeguards of its own on paper and produced a detached administrative caste regardless. Formal safeguards fail when they police process instead of outcome, and when their breach carries no consequence. The Institute is therefore made accountable for outcomes, not merely for holding the right rules, and three enforcement mechanisms give the safeguards teeth.

The composition commitments are published floors, not aspirations. Minimum proportions of each cohort are drawn from state education, from outside the South East, and from the non-graduate and mid-career pathways; a sustained breach triggers mandatory remedial action and external review of admission itself — on the recognition that a meritocratic test can entrench advantage as surely as an explicit one when the preparation it rewards is unequally available.

Continued membership is conditioned on circulation, not granted for life. Membership confers no lifelong privileged standing; continued association requires service in frontline and regional roles, closing off the sideways movement within a single charmed circle — the mechanism of detachment diagnosed earlier.

The charter is subject to external review with power to dissolve. An independent body reviews the Institute on a statutory cycle and may reform or, in the last resort, dissolve it where the anti-detachment safeguards have failed in practice and not merely on the page. The institution's survival is conditional on its not becoming the thing it was built to prevent.

The Military Pathway

The framework recognises that the British military retains institutional capabilities the civil service at large has lost — strategic planning at operational scale, procurement discipline within service-level functions, logistics planning that delivers complex operations under time pressure, institutional culture that values long tenure and technical mastery, training systems that develop capability across decades, personnel systems that build broad institutional competence through varied assignments.

The former military population is sizeable, with approximately 15,000 leaving service annually and a senior tier of officers and NCOs representing institutional formation that

includes the capabilities the rebuilding requires. Many transition into consulting, private security, or work that does not use the institutional capability they built. The country is not currently using this capability for civilian institutional renewal.

Senior officers approaching retirement (typically in their mid-50s with deep institutional experience and fifteen to twenty years of further productive career available) are offered structured transition into civilian institutional reform roles through a dedicated programme. The transition includes additional training in democratic governance, civilian administration, and the specific institutional contexts they will be working in. The pathway includes positions within the Institute, within reformed civilian institutions, within parliamentary technical staff, and within the wider civic infrastructure.

The scale is meaningful but not transformative on its own. The first parliament might bring 200–500 former senior military personnel into structured roles. By the second parliament, 1,000–1,500. By the third parliament the pathway is mature and producing senior cadre for the institutional reform programme. The military contribution complements the wider institutional development rather than substituting for it.

The framework does not become a militarised institution. The cadres include former military but also former judiciary, professional civil service, academic specialists, and senior figures from successful civilian institutions, ensuring the resulting institution is governed by democratic norms.

The International Recruitment Pathway

The military pathway and the domestic recruitment effort do not, on their own, solve the implementation capacity problem. Senior institutional builders capable of establishing the new institutions at pace do not exist in sufficient numbers within the existing British state. The Royal Institute's own production of senior-ready cadres begins arriving in the second parliament at earliest. The first parliament therefore requires a third pathway: targeted international recruitment of senior institutional builders from peer democracies on time-limited contracts with explicit knowledge transfer obligations.

This is the diagnosis carried to its conclusion, not an indulgence added to it. A state that has lost the capacity to build cannot will that capacity back into being; it must borrow the capability long enough to grow its own. To name the incapacity and then refuse the one means of repairing it at the pace required would be the contradiction — not the recruitment that repairs it.

This is treated as the highest government priority within the Capacity Parliament. The state recruits the ablest by any legitimate means. The British tradition of treating senior public service compensation as a moral question rather than a recruitment question is rejected: if the polity wants the people who can build institutions, it pays the rates such people command. Singapore's principle holds that senior public service compensation cannot be a

fraction of private sector or international alternatives if the state wants the people who will build durable capability. The framework adopts it for the duration of the institutional rebuild.

The target populations are people who have actually built institutions rather than people who have written about building them. Singapore's Civil Service College, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and Economic Development Board. Canada's Privy Council Office, Treasury Board, and senior regulatory institutions. Australia's Productivity Commission and Treasury. The Nordic states across multiple domains of institutional design. Germany's KfW, Fraunhofer, and regulatory architecture. Estonia's digital government leadership. Israel's defence technology and procurement institutions. The recruitment is targeted at named institutional capabilities each peer democracy has developed and Britain currently lacks.

Contracts are typically five to ten years, structured around the building of specific institutions, not open-ended advisory roles. Every senior international recruit operates under contractual obligation to develop domestic successors: two or three high-potential British staff shadowing each senior international role from the outset, structured knowledge transfer through documentation and training programmes, embedded mentoring. The arrangement is not to import senior leaders permanently; it is to import senior leaders to build the domestic capability that replaces them within a decade. The knowledge transfer obligation is contractual and enforceable, and persistent failure to deliver against it is grounds for non-renewal.

Compensation is competitive with private sector and international alternatives. The base compensation matches senior peer-democracy public service. Relocation, family support, schooling, and tax treatment are set to remove the friction that typically deters senior international moves. The Royal Institute's programme office handles the administrative and pastoral arrangements so recruits arrive into a working support environment, not a bureaucratic obstacle course.

The compensation structure includes two tiers of performance-conditional bonus, measured against documented outcomes. The state pays for delivered capability that persists, not for presence.

Individual completion bonus. A defined portion of total contract value, typically 20–25%, is held back and paid on fulfilment of the contracted remit at the end of the engagement. Partial payments tied to defined milestones release during the contract as those milestones are achieved. The criteria are published in advance and assessed against documented outcomes: the institution built, the domestic successors developed, the documented capability transferred, the institutional architecture operating effectively. Failure to develop domestic successors — the heart of the arrangement — is grounds for partial or full forfeit of the completion bonus, because knowledge transfer is what the contract is for.

Group milestone bonus. A second bonus pool is awarded on collective achievement against institutional-level outcomes. The Royal Institute reaching its target cohort size and demonstrated graduate placement across government. GAIA delivering defined infrastructure milestones. The Cura Custodum Authority achieving operational maturity across the covered workforce. The National Fraud Agency reaching its target prosecution and recovery thresholds. Group bonuses spread across the international cadre attached to each institution, structured so that individual contribution matters and the group shares interest in collective success. This addresses the pattern in which individual recruits optimise their own outputs at the expense of the institution they are building.

Both bonuses are assessed by an independent panel with parliamentary representation, Royal Institute leadership, and senior institutional figures from peer democracies. The criteria are weighted towards outcomes that compound, with a final tranche of the completion bonus deferred to the third year after departure: institutions operating effectively three years after the recruit leaves count for more than institutions operating effectively while the recruit is still there. Domestic successor development is measured against successor performance after the recruit's departure, not just successor appointment. This prevents the pattern in which recruits build institutions that look good on completion but degrade rapidly once they are gone.

The recognition structure includes Cura Custodum-style civic recognition for international institutional builders who complete multi-year contracts, including guaranteed citizenship pathways comparable to those offered to Cura Custodum military and clinical recruits. Service to the polity establishes standing for membership of it. The framework competes for international talent on terms that recognise contribution to British institutional rebuilding both materially and civically.

Throughout, the framework rejects the consultancy pattern in which expertise is rented permanently instead of genuinely transferred. The point of importing a builder is to leave behind the people and the practice that make the import unnecessary.

Paying imported builders well above domestic public-service norms invites an obvious objection, and the pathway is built to answer it. The compensation is published in full and never buried in operational budgets. The appointments are time-limited and contract-bound: fixed-term builders with an exit date and a duty to develop the domestic successors who replace them, so the pathway exists to make itself redundant, not to install a standing caste. A significant share of pay is held against verified delivery, so the headline figure is earned rather than awarded. Accountability is at full parity with domestic senior officials, with no special status and no exemption from scrutiny.

The expense exists because of institutional decay, not in spite of it. The country can pay what serious builders command to rebuild the capability it let erode, or hand the rebuild to a bureaucracy that on this framework's own diagnosis was not equal to far less; the first is costly and visible, the second cheaper and already failed. At full deployment senior

international recruitment runs approximately £200–400 million a year, funded from the wealth tax allocation and defended on the ground that reform attempted without the capability to deliver it wastes that sum several times over. The cost is named, the contracts published, the case argued in the open, which is the transparency the method commits to throughout.

There remains the sharper objection: premium pay for outsiders while the citizen on the frontline waits. The objection mistakes the relationship. The imported builder is paid in the only currency that moves a non-citizen with no career stake and a fixed exit date — cash now, against a bonus held back for delivery. The citizen who serves is offered something different in kind and richer by nature: the accrual covenant of Cura Custodum, compounding across a career and a life through recognition, pension enhancement, family provision, and care for the conditions that service exacts. Citizenship is what the contractor must work towards; the citizen already holds it. The citizen is not behind the outsider in a queue for the same reward — the citizen is in the better relationship, and that relationship is part of what the outsider is paid to help build. The magnitudes settle the order of priorities: a few hundred million a year for the imported premium against a Cura baseline of twelve to fifteen billion in the same parliament. The builder is hired so the covenant is delivered competently, not in its place.

The architecture assumes modest yield. The international pool of senior institutional builders willing to work in Britain at any compensation level is finite. The framework is competing with other countries also trying to recruit the same people. Some target recruits will refuse; some will leave before contracts complete; some will not perform as expected. The planning case is approximately 100–200 senior international recruits across the first parliament, supplementing rather than replacing the 200–500 military-pathway cadres and the wider domestic recruitment.

The constraint having been stated, the consequence of its biting must be faced too. If the three pathways together underdeliver — the military transition yielding fewer, the international pool proving shallower, the Institute's own cadres arriving later than planned — the response is not to staff the new institutions thinly and watch them fail, but to stand up fewer at once and extend the sequence across more parliaments. An institution built late and well can be waited for; one built early and understaffed discredits the enterprise and cannot be recovered. Capacity sets the pace, and where it falls short the pace slows rather than the standard. This is the discipline the fiscal floor applies to money, applied here to people: under a shortfall the programme arrives late, not broken.

Fiscal Architecture

The Institute's annual operational cost is approximately £200–400 million at full implementation. The international recruitment programme adds approximately £200–400

million annually at full deployment. Capital cost approximately £150–300 million for one-off establishment of the Institute itself.

The Institute develops institutional capability across decades. The first decade is establishment and initial cohort development. The second decade is the cohort reaching senior positions across government. The third decade is the Institute's effects on institutional quality becoming visible.

The timescale is patient by design. The framework commits to it knowing results come over generations — serious civic reform is the work of decades, not electoral cycles.

VI. Cura Custodum

Britain depends on a specific population of citizens whose work is structurally different from ordinary employment. The soldier who deploys, the nurse who works the night shift on a stroke ward, the paramedic responding to a cardiac arrest, the police officer entering a property where violence has occurred, the fire crew running into the burning building, the prison officer working in places most citizens would never enter — these are the people who guard the polity. They run towards danger when others run away. They staff the institutions civic life depends on. They do work most citizens could not or would not do.

Britain currently treats this population as a collection of separate institutional workforces with separate institutional schemes. The Armed Forces Covenant exists for military service. The NHS has its own arrangements. The police, fire, and ambulance services have theirs. Each scheme has different terms, different thresholds, different administrative arrangements. A former soldier who becomes a paramedic loses access to military-specific recognition and begins again as a new entrant in the NHS. A nurse who joins the police starts a new accumulation of recognition instead of continuing what she has already given. The institutional silos perversely penalise exactly the inter-service mobility that would help all of them. The polity treats its frontline servants as employees of separate institutions, not as a coherent category of citizens whose service to the polity differs in kind from ordinary work.

The unified framework — Cura Custodum, the care of those who guard — treats the frontline workforce as the coherent category they are. Several integrated elements work together.

The Covered Population

Cura Custodum applies to citizens whose work is physical or psychological frontline service in roles where the polity depends on people doing dangerous or demanding work. The core population is military service members and veterans, NHS clinical staff (doctors, nurses, midwives, paramedics, allied health professionals in clinical roles), police officers, fire and rescue service personnel, prison officers, and the operational staff of Border Force, Coast Guard, and equivalent frontline services. The principle, not the institutional employer, defines the boundary: the work itself qualifies, not the uniform. These define the population in full; the tier structure governs the order of their introduction, with the military and NHS clinical workforce as the baseline and the other frontline services following as the scheme extends.

Teaching, civil service, wider public sector employment, and other forms of public service are addressed through their own appropriate frameworks. The boundary is not arbitrary. The Cura Custodum population shares the specific characteristic that the work involves direct exposure to physical danger, traumatic experience, or sustained psychological burden

in service of the polity's most fundamental functions. This is what distinguishes it from other public service, valuable as that other service is.

The Substantive Package

The package does not match private-sector pay pound for pound, and does not need to; it is not private. What it makes competitive is the total proposition of service — compensation, covenant, and purpose together — because the comparison the recruit actually runs is not salary against salary but a life against a life. The scale, concretely, is benefits accruing with service to perhaps fifteen to twenty-five thousand pounds annually in equivalent value at career-stage peak for long-service members, with the average across the covered population materially lower, since housing support, pension enhancement, and the deeper provisions compound with tenure. Less than this produces a framework that exists on paper but does not change the recruitment and retention calculations that drive workforce decisions in practice. The fiscal commitment is set out in full under Costs and Risks below.

- **Housing support that accumulates with service.** Deposit assistance available after five years of qualifying service. Generous mortgage support including guaranteed favourable rates after ten years. Comprehensive home ownership support after twenty years of career service. The principle is that those who serve the polity should not be priced out of the housing market by virtue of having chosen public service over private sector careers, and the support compounds instead of triggering at a single point.
- **Lifelong specialist healthcare access calibrated to role-specific risks.** Military trauma support, clinician-specific mental health services, police post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) provision, fire service occupational health, and equivalent role-appropriate support, available to anyone with qualifying service in the relevant roles. Universal in coverage, calibrated in content. The current postcode lottery and inter-service variation is replaced with guaranteed access to specialist provision adequate to the demonstrated need.
- **Educational and professional development funding through career, with structures appropriate to each role.** Service members transitioning from military to civilian careers receive funding on the GI Bill model. NHS clinical staff receive extensive continuing professional development support and funding for advanced qualifications. Police and emergency services receive equivalent provision for the qualifications and training their careers require. The principle is that the polity invests in the development of those who serve it, on an ongoing basis, not as transition support alone.
- **Pension arrangements generous enough to make career service competitive with private sector alternatives.** The current pattern of Cura Custodum workers retiring on markedly worse terms than equivalent private sector workers is reversed. The

pension represents the polity's reciprocal commitment to those who have given their working lives to civic service, and is calibrated accordingly.

- **Citizenship earned by service, as a real offer, not a passive provision.** The polity makes a clear proposition to international talent willing to serve in Cura Custodum roles: serve the country in frontline work for a defined qualifying period, and the country grants you British citizenship. The qualifying service required is concrete — typically five to seven years of full-time qualifying service in covered roles — and the standard requirements apply (English language at appropriate level, absence of serious criminality, knowledge-of-Britain assessment, oath of allegiance). The pathway is published, transparent, and the polity binds itself to delivering on it when the requirements are met. This is service-based citizenship in the British tradition, modernised for current conditions and applied across the frontline workforce. The country competes confidently for international talent willing to serve, and recognises that service to the polity directly establishes standing for membership of it, regardless of national origin. The Roman auxiliary precedent stands behind this — those who served the polity earned membership in it — applied to the modern equivalents who serve civic life through medicine, military service, policing, and emergency response.
- **Specialist support for service-related conditions.** Where the work has caused conditions — combat injuries, occupational illness, trauma-related psychiatric conditions, the cumulative effects of physically demanding careers — the polity bears the obligation to provide appropriate care for life. This is recognition of a direct causal relationship between service rendered and care required, and is not subject to the variations of NHS resource availability or social care means-testing.

The Portability Mechanism

It is administered as a unified scheme, not separate institutional schemes that happen to share terms. A common service record tracks qualifying service across all covered roles. Years served as a soldier, as a nurse, as a paramedic, as a police officer accumulate towards common benefit thresholds. The former soldier who becomes a paramedic continues accumulating rather than starting afresh. The nurse who joins the police preserves what she has already given. Multi-service careers are recognised as service to the polity, regardless of which institutional employer paid the salary in any given year.

Accrued standing is permanent once earned. A participant who moves into a role outside the covered population — into the Royal Institute, the wider civil service, or any work that does not meet the qualifying test — does not lose what they have accrued: the record is held intact, dormant rather than erased, and resumes the moment qualifying service resumes. This protects the cross-domain career the framework encourages elsewhere, including movement between frontline service and institution-building, rather than

penalising it. Continued service in the Life Skills programme and equivalent youth and educational work accrues in its own right, so those who move into it after a frontline career keep the clock running rather than merely holding what they earned. The one circumstance in which accrued standing is forfeited is conviction of a serious criminal offence.

The administrative architecture sits with a dedicated authority within the Cabinet Office structure, not each employing institution administering separately. The Cura Custodum Authority maintains the unified service record, administers the benefits package, handles transitions between services, and ensures consistent application across the covered workforce. The cost of administration is modest and is more than offset by the operational simplicity of unified administration replacing fragmented institutional schemes.

Each Cura Custodum participant receives a single document recording accumulated qualifying service across all covered roles, transferable between employers, recognised as the legal instrument that establishes entitlement. The bureaucratic friction of moving between services — currently a real deterrent to mobility — is replaced with a unified service record that follows the person.

The unified record earns its keep a second time over. A single account of who serves across the covered workforce — who is accruing, who is moving between services, who is leaving and from where — is the clearest picture of the frontline workforce the state has ever held, and the services that most need it have never had it. Read in aggregate and as a pattern rather than as a file on any person, it shows attrition gathering in a particular trust, region, or trade before the vacancy opens and the premium is paid to fill it. That intelligence belongs to the oversight the Royal Institute is built to provide (Section V) and to the workforce planning of the services themselves, never to any watch kept on the individual: it tells the polity where to act, not whom to suspect. The distinction is the same one the civic identity card draws, and it is kept for the same reason — the architecture that joins a service history for the citizen's benefit is held apart by design from any that would score the citizen. Britain hires back at a premium each year the people its own services trained and lost; a workforce it can see is one it can begin to keep.

The Reciprocal Obligation

Britain faces simultaneous workforce crises across all the covered services — military, NHS, police, fire, prisons. These are manifestations of a common pattern in which public service has become uncompetitive with private sector alternatives. The unified framework addresses the common pattern through a common solution: a package generous enough to compete, portability that removes perverse incentives against inter-service mobility, recognition of career-long service, and administrative consolidation that reduces fragmentation.

Cura Custodum is a covenant rather than a benefit programme. The polity binds itself to real recognition of those who serve in frontline roles. The serving citizens bind themselves to the

work. The relationship is mutual rather than unilateral, expressing the principle that the polity owes specific recognition to those whose service makes civic life possible, and that the obligation is structural rather than discretionary.

No Act can bind a future Parliament, and this one does not pretend otherwise; what it does instead is make the covenant expensive to break. The core elements of Cura Custodum are placed on a statutory footing that a later government can alter only by express and deliberate legislation, not by quiet neglect, so that weakening it is a named act owned in the open. The Authority answers to Parliament, not the executive, which puts any retreat on the floor of the House. The protections attach to standing already earned, closer to a pension promise than a policy — changeable going forward, but costly and conspicuous to strip from those who have earned it. And the deepest protection is structural: a covenant woven so far into how the military and the health service recruit and keep their people that gutting it breaks the very thing a government needs to work. It is built to outlast the moment of its making, not because a clause forbids repeal, which nothing can, but because repeal would cost more than keeping it.

Integration with Existing Commitments

The military service-and-mobility pathway set out in this section becomes the military implementation of Cura Custodum rather than a standalone scheme. The veterans provisions integrate into Cura Custodum as the post-service implementation for military members. The NHS workforce reforms reference Cura Custodum as the scheme through which NHS clinical staff receive real recognition. The police, fire, and emergency services commitments reference Cura Custodum as the route through which their workforce challenges are addressed. Cura Custodum integrates and supersedes the fragmented current arrangements.

Costs and Risks

This is a large fiscal commitment. Cura Custodum operates as one umbrella of civic recognition: a baseline that applies across the covered workforce — career-stage recognition, pension enhancement, family and transition support, and the portability mechanism that counts service across the umbrella as cumulative — with service-specific provisions added on top, calibrated to what each role demands. Military service carries provisions for combat risk and the disruption of postings; NHS clinical work for training cost and the emotional load of sustained clinical work; police, fire, prisons, Border Force, and ambulance services for high-risk operational service and trauma exposure. Every covered service sits within the same civic architecture, the specific benefits reflecting what the work requires, not a hierarchy of which service matters more.

Full implementation costs approximately £18–23 billion annually, with the baseline framework at military and NHS clinical scope (£12–15 billion) sequenced through the first parliament and extension to other emergency services (£6–8 billion) phased through the

second and third parliaments as the institutional architecture matures. The accrual structure is, in plain terms, a pension promise: standing earned today is a commitment paid across decades, carried on a pay-as-you-go basis, with the long tail on the books from the first year.

Cura Custodum will be administratively complex to establish. Unified administration replacing fragmented institutional schemes requires the Cura Custodum Authority to be built carefully, with proper staff and proper systems, before benefits can flow consistently across the covered workforce. The first parliament establishes the Authority and begins implementation; full operational maturity probably takes a parliament and a half to achieve.

It does not solve the underlying workforce questions on its own. Better pay, better working conditions, structural reform of how the covered services operate, the wider institutional support that makes service viable — all of these matter alongside the benefits framework. Cura Custodum is essential but not, on its own, enough. The core commitment is to address the workforce crisis through this framework alongside the institutional reforms across military, NHS, and emergency services.

The principle that those who guard the polity deserve real reciprocal recognition has been honoured rhetorically in British political tradition for generations. The reality has been fragmented institutional schemes, perverse mobility incentives, and benefits packages inadequate to the work being recognised. Cura Custodum makes the principle operational. The covenant is mutual. The polity owes the recognition, and provides it.

One relationship runs naturally from this. The Life Skills programme — the national scheme, set out in Section IX, that teaches young people the practical skills the school system has stopped reliably providing — draws its instructors disproportionately from this population: the veteran, the retired nurse, the former police officer, whose working lives were spent in demanding service and who have a great deal left to pass on. It draws too on the retired and semi-retired more widely, for whom the end of formal work has too often been treated as the end of being useful at all. A society that retires its experienced people wholesale loses the use of what they know; the programme treats that knowledge as the asset it is and puts it where it is most needed.

The role runs on two tracks. For those who want it as work there is an employed pathway, on proper terms and proper pay, into which the veterans' route feeds. For those who want the connection without it being their job there is a lighter civic role, carrying a modest stipend that recognises the contribution rather than paying a wage. Either way it is freely entered rather than required, and valued on both sides: the young gain the steadying presence of people who have already done what they are setting out to do, and their elders keep a place in the common life rather than being set aside from it. It is among the oldest of human arrangements, and its passing has been a loss to the whole society. The framework proposes to begin restoring it.

VII. The Frame: The First Parliament

State Capacity Rebuilding

The first parliament's work is not, as one might expect, to embark immediately upon the full breadth of ambitious reforms. Despite the scale of the agenda before it, its attention is directed almost entirely towards Tier 1 — the work that funds the programme, addresses acute human need, or unlocks everything that follows. The instinct towards fifteen simultaneous transformations is resisted, and that discipline is what makes the subsequent parliaments' work possible. Even within the first parliament, not everything can begin at once, and the framework stages the work with that in mind. The senior-capability pipeline is finite, and the real constraint is that a state rebuilding its own competence cannot stand up every institution at once. Two phases run inside the parliament.

The immediate phase carries what has the longest lead time and what everything else waits upon: the regional skills academies and their first cohorts, core state-capacity recruitment and the Royal Institute, the tax architecture, and the rebuilt HMRC that makes the revenue collectable. The announcement of the periodic reconstruction levy belongs here too, at the very start — not because the money is collected early, but because the residency position that determines who is liable is taken at announcement, and the valuation date is set a short, fixed period after it. Fixing the operative moment at announcement is what stops wealth, or its holders, from rearranging around the charge before it lands.

The consolidation phase, later in the parliament and dependent on the immediate work being under way, carries procurement reform at scale, the National Fraud Agency, the build-out of the Cura Custodum Authority, the assessment and collection of the reconstruction levy against its already-fixed date, and the later work of the Constitutional Convention. Asylum consolidation sits in the immediate phase, as the political precondition the rest of the programme rests upon. The staging is not a hedge. It is the capacity-first discipline applied to the first parliament itself, the hardest stretch of the whole horizon under the compressed path — the price, named in the Preamble, of driving the work at speed rather than letting it fall to the slower hands of successive governments.

Despite its designation and Tier 1 focus, the Capacity Parliament's agenda is still intimidating, with many of the hardest tasks in the entire programme resting in this window. Three verbs do different work throughout this section, and the reader should hold them apart. The first parliament delivers a short list: the asylum closure, the Cura Custodum baseline, the welfare remedies, the land value tax switch, two reactors completed. It founds a small number of institutions whose maturity belongs to later parliaments: the Royal Institute, GAIA, the Cura Custodum Authority, the regional academies, the National Fraud Agency. And it legislates foundations whose implementation is explicitly deferred: the pension architecture, AI governance, the outputs of the Convention. A critic who counts

every verb as a transformation will find fifteen; the framework's claim is that it delivers few, founds several, and legislates the rest.

Most of those foundings, moreover, are not raised from nothing, which is what makes five or six of them in a single parliament credible rather than reckless. GAIA consolidates the government technology the state already runs in fragments; the Cura Custodum Authority unifies a frontline administration that exists today only in scattered schemes; the National Fraud Agency draws together counter-fraud work already dispersed across departments. To reorganise capacity that exists is a faster and surer undertaking than to build it from the ground, and the distinction is what separates a credible plan from a boast. The one genuinely new body, the Royal Institute, is stood up first and on purpose — it is the instrument that raises the senior people the others will need — and the framework accepts that bootstrap in the open rather than pretending the capacity to build is already in hand.

The first parliament, where possible, also begins the pipelines with the longest lead times. Chief among them is the supply of teachers in the subjects the country is shortest of — mathematics and the sciences above all — for the curriculum spine that the later parliaments complete is governed entirely by whether the teachers exist to carry it. A teacher recruited and trained in the Capacity Parliament is a teacher in the classroom by the second; begun any later, the supply arrives a parliament behind the ambition it is meant to serve. The cohort cannot wait a generation for the system to catch up, and so this single thread of the education reform is pulled forward into the foundational years, while the settlement that surrounds it waits its proper turn. The cost of doing so is modest and recurring — the bursaries and training places that draw able graduates into the shortage subjects — and is carried within the institutional-rebuilding envelope of the Capacity Parliament rather than as a new claim on the capital programme; it is among the cheapest of the framework's foundational commitments, and among the most consequential.

The work begins with the machinery of the state itself: technical recruitment into the civil service, reformed pay for the regulators, parliamentary technical capacity, an overhaul of procurement, and the foundations of digital government services. The Royal Institute of Statecraft takes its first cohort into training. GAIA begins designing the architectural framework for government technology. The Cura Custodum Authority begins building the unified administrative architecture for the frontline workforce.

The Government Architecture and Integration Authority (GAIA)

GAIA is the least familiar of the three and the most consequential for the daily business of government. For decades the state's systems — tax, courts, asylum, benefits, licensing — have been built in isolation: slow, costly, unable to share what they know, and replaced wholesale every decade because nothing was built to last or to connect. The Authority exists to end that. But it ends it not by building the systems itself, nor by gathering the nation's data into one place. The lesson of every failed government megaproject, at home and abroad, is that the centralised build is the thing that fails, and the single store is the thing

that leaks. GAIA is therefore a standards authority, not a system-builder, and its architecture is distributed by design: many systems, each kept and run by those who own them, connected through a common spine rather than collapsed into one.

That spine is not invented here. A proven, open standard for secure data exchange between government systems already exists and is run as common infrastructure across some two dozen states, and its pattern is the one Whitehall's own identity and data-exchange work has begun to move towards. GAIA takes it as the floor and builds upwards — the identity, payments, and data-exchange standards every government system must meet, so that a citizen proves who they are once rather than to each department in turn, and a caseworker sees a joined-up picture rather than a dozen disconnected screens. Only the smallest core is shared and central: the single identity, the single payments layer. Everything else stays where it is and is made to interoperate.

The principle that makes this work, and the one that decides whether modernisation ever reaches the front line, is to connect first and modernise behind. An estate need not be rebuilt before it can join the spine. A forty-year-old system can be wrapped in a modern interface that speaks the standard, made interoperable now, and replaced on its own clock afterwards. The interoperability the country needs arrives early and cheaply; the deeper rebuild each department owes in any case follows at its own pace, against its own budget. The strategy thus separates two things long confused: connecting a system, which GAIA drives and which is cheap, and replacing it, which the department bears and which is not.

The Authority's harder work is the cascade: turning the common direction into concrete requirements an actual NHS trust or tax division can build to, rather than a principle each interprets for itself. The expertise for the building is drawn from industry and from the estates themselves, which know their own systems as no central body can; what GAIA owns is the translation of strategy into directive, and the conformance that follows it down. Conformance here is not the inspector's verdict but the protocol's: because interoperability is testable, a system either speaks the standard or it does not. GAIA publishes the tests, the reference patterns, and the certification gates, and a branch proves itself by passing them rather than by satisfying an assessor. Conformance cascades by construction.

What the cascade asks differs by the kind of system it meets, and the country's critical estates fail in three broad ways:

- **The old.** The tax and benefit systems built decades ago on mainframes — sound in function but unable to connect or share. The directive is not to rip and replace, the approach that has failed before, but to wrap the legacy core in a modern interface that speaks the standard: interoperable now, rebuilt later, on the estate's own clock.
- **The fragmented.** The health service above all — hundreds of systems that cannot talk to one another, so that a record does not follow the patient. Here the standard is the whole remedy: each system kept where it is and made to interoperate through the common spine, rather than collapsed into one.

- **The secret.** The most secure systems, where open exchange over the public network is neither possible nor wise. Here the standard is mirrored inside the security boundary rather than run across it, conformance held to the same principle by a different road.

One direction, three methods, each matched to the fault it meets.

Where a system's core is decades-old code in a language few still write — the COBOL that still runs much of tax and benefits — the answer is not the wholesale rewrite that has failed so often, and so expensively, elsewhere. It is to wrap that core so it speaks the standard now, to capture what its retiring authors know while they are still here to teach it, and to retire it module by module behind a working interface, never in a single bet on a day of cutover. The discipline is permanent, not a backlog to be cleared once: today's new system is tomorrow's legacy, and a state that modernises in one heave and then stops has only set the clock running on the next crisis. GAIA therefore owns not merely the standard but the transition itself — the orderly passage of systems from build through wrapping to retirement — as a standing function, so that the country need never again accrete a decade of systems it cannot connect and dare not replace.

Where an estate cannot yet meet the standard by any of these roads, GAIA's mandate is to carry it there — the capability and the patterns brought to the branch that lacks them — as a national priority, not an inspection. The power to refuse non-compliant procurement remains, and it is real; but it is the backstop for the estate that will not engage, not the instrument of first resort against the estate that cannot. The framework builds capacity rather than demanding it, and GAIA is held to that rule like all the rest.

Its remit extends to the governance of algorithmic decision-making, so that automated systems affecting citizens meet defined standards of transparency, contestability, and human oversight.

The standard is proven; its adoption at British scale is not. No state near Britain's size or legacy complexity has yet carried the full pattern across its whole estate, and retrofitting clean interfaces onto systems built decades ago to expose nothing is genuine work with genuine risk. That the work is hard, though, is not the same as untried: the Department for Work and Pensions has already replaced the infrastructure beneath eleven benefit services — mainframe code over forty years old, paying out more than a hundred and fifty billion pounds a year — and did it in-house, without losing a single day of payments. The largest such programme in Europe was carried by the British state itself, on the hardest estate it holds. The connect-first principle reduces the risk further by making each connection small, independent, and useful alone rather than staking everything on one build. It does not abolish it. This is the largest delivery risk GAIA carries, and it is carried in the open.

What decides whether any of this succeeds is who builds it. The Authority is led by a builder rather than an administrator — someone who has shipped infrastructure at national scale and can hold a room of the country's strongest engineers, the kind who would otherwise be

at a frontier laboratory or a leading financial-technology firm. Government technology fails when it is run by managers of vendors and succeeds when it is run by people who could write the system themselves; the small, elite units that have outbuilt the megaproject model elsewhere were led, without exception, by engineers of the first rank. Its core is drawn from that world — the principal engineers and architects who have built identity systems, payment rails, and data platforms serving tens of millions — with academic depth alongside them, the strongest university departments in formal methods, cryptography, distributed systems, and the human side of design, brought in for rigour and the long view rather than for command. Industry stature sits at board level, where a respected name lends credibility and, more valuable still, the recruiting pull by which the first exceptional hires draw the next hundred. The expertise is held inside the state rather than rented from the vendors the Authority must regulate, paid and empowered accordingly and renewed over time through the Royal Institute; the aim is not only to end the era of failed government megaprojects but to make the state a place the best technologists want to work, and in doing so to anchor a wider national technology revival.

Security and the hardest engineering draw on the country's intelligence agencies — the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), part of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), foremost among them — whose remit here is precise and protective: to make the architecture as resistant to external attack as the state can make it, and to give government a secure and trustworthy means of communicating with itself. Their task is to keep the state and the people who use it safe from the rest of the world, not to watch the people the system serves. This is central to the design rather than incidental to it: a system that carries the nation's civic data is only worth building if a hostile power cannot open it, and a foreign penetration that reached that data would be among the gravest failures the state could suffer — so the agencies that exist to defend the country against precisely that threat are the right ones to harden it. What stays separate is control, not contribution: GAIA owns and governs the systems, the intelligence world gains no standing access to citizen data by virtue of having helped secure them, and independent civilian oversight judges how the architecture treats the public.

The full cost of this work is set out in the fiscal architecture in Section XI. Four costs must be told apart. The first is GAIA itself — the standard, the shared spine, the central body — and because the standard is adopted rather than invented, this is modest: a matter of hundreds of millions, not billions, and the only part that is wholly new. The second is the wrapping of the few estates the early commitments depend upon, so that they can speak the standard and the levy and the settlement can function; this too is modest, because connecting a system costs a fraction of replacing it, and it is the spend that connect-first is designed to keep small and early. The third is the deep replacement of the legacy systems themselves — tens of billions across the horizon — but this is money the state already spends, year upon year, to keep failing systems alive; GAIA does not add it, but turns it towards a common standard rather than letting it drain into incompatible silos. The fourth, the cost of carrying

estates that cannot reach the standard alone, is real, new, and honestly uncertain, and it falls in the later parliaments as the work widens — by which time the wealth levy has begun to meet it.

The point for the first parliament, when liquidity is tightest and the levy has not yet filtered in, is therefore plain. Only the first two costs fall on the new and borrowed envelope, and both are modest; the largest cost is not new, and the most uncertain cost is not yet due. The single exposure is the question of whether wrapping the tax systems will suffice to assess whole estates, or whether deeper replacement must be brought forward — and that question is settled early, by GAIA's first technical survey, which is why the levy's own collection is timed to follow it rather than precede it.

Tax Architecture Reform

The revenue architecture is built to a single target. *The British tax take rises from its current level of roughly 37–38% of GDP to around 40%, and towards 42% as productivity recovers* — the envelope within which the whole programme is funded. This is the size of state the rebuild requires, not a permanent settlement, and it is moderate by Western European standards. Measured consistently, as taxes and social contributions against GDP, Germany and the Netherlands tax at around 40%, Sweden, Finland, and Italy at 42–43%, and France and Denmark at 44–46%. Britain at 40 to 42% would sit mid-table, in the Nordic–Italian band and below France and Denmark. The full case for it is set out in Section XI; what follows is the means of reaching it.

Land value tax. Council tax is replaced by a progressive land value tax (LVT), raising roughly £8–15 billion during the transition and £15–25 billion at maturity as the transitional protections phase out — the near-term figure held down by the deferral and capping arrangements for asset-rich, cash-poor households. Where the revenue goes is half the reform: the tax is collected locally and equalised nationally, each council keeping the yield of its own land up to a need-assessed baseline, with a published arithmetic formula moving the surplus of land-rich areas towards the land-poor — giving local government what council tax never gave it, a base that grows with the prosperity it helps create, without the postcode lottery that pure localisation would write into law; the wider repair of local government is set out with the regional renewal in Section IX.

Capital gains tax. Reformed primarily through base broadening, not rate alone, it raises approximately £4–8 billion. The revenue is led by closing the leakages that make the headline rate largely moot — chief among them the uplift that wipes accrued gains on death, which is the principal route by which the largest gains escape the charge entirely and which interacts directly with the inheritance tax (IHT) reform below. Alongside it, rates move towards income-tax levels on passively held gains — the principal private residence protected, and, the distinction that matters most for growth, the risk-capital channel deliberately carved out rather than swept up — and gains are rebased so that real rather

than nominal appreciation is taxed. The line is the one the whole architecture draws: the rate-alignment falls on accumulation that merely sits, the property held for appreciation, the listed equity bought and kept, the gains the death-uplift would otherwise wipe; while the gain on genuinely new investment into a growing company, on equity in a business actively built, and on the shares an employee earns in one is preserved at the preferential, and in the earliest and riskiest cases the exempt, treatment such risk already attracts. The reform hunts passive escape without taxing the equity that funds the next British champion. That protection is conditioned and not blanket: it turns on genuinely new capital, real holding periods, and the anti-abuse tests that stop passive gain from dressing itself as enterprise, the same discipline the channelling relief enforces and the reason the looser entrepreneur reliefs have rightly been narrowed. Rate alignment without base reform would yield little and could lose revenue, because realisations are highly elastic and unrealised gains can be deferred indefinitely; the yield is anchored in the base reform, not the rate.

Inheritance and trusts. Inheritance tax and trust structures are tightened, including reform of agricultural and business property relief above defined thresholds, raising approximately £5–10 billion. One relief is converted rather than closed: agricultural relief becomes an earned relief on the conditional-grant pattern — full where land passes to a successor who continues to actively farm it, clawed back where the land is sold or converted out of agriculture within a defined period — so that the family farm that keeps feeding the country passes whole, and the land held as a tax shelter pays like any other asset.

Corporate taxation. Loophole closure beyond the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Pillar Two implementation already enacted — which sits in the baseline and is not recounted — raises approximately £8–15 billion.

It has two sides, and the framework sets them in deliberate opposition. One side closes the leakages and applies the global minimum, as above; the other is held deliberately competitive, because the corporate rate is treated not as a revenue lever to be maximised but as an instrument of investment to be kept attractive. The principle is the one that governs the capital taxes — tax what sits, reward what builds — carried into the corporate field, where it reads as profit extracted against profit reinvested. The headline rate is therefore held steady at a competitive level rather than raised, the lower small-profits rate kept for the firms still finding their feet, and — the cheapest and most valuable commitment of all — the whole regime is locked for the length of the programme. Where the convention is to steady the corporate rate for the span of a single Parliament, this framework steadies it for the span of the reconstruction, because for a firm weighing a twenty-year investment the knowledge that the rules will not be re-cut each year is worth more than a point or two on the rate, and it costs the Exchequer nothing to give.

What competition there is runs through the effective rate rather than the headline, and it is aimed at the behaviour the framework wants. Full expensing — the immediate deduction of

new productive investment — is entrenched as a permanent feature and not a favour renewed at each budget, so that the firm that builds pays little while the firm that merely extracts pays the full rate; and the framework binds itself against the recent British habit of announcing full expensing with one hand while quietly cutting the allowances on everything it does not cover with the other. The reliefs for research and for patents are pointed at the chokepoint layer this programme prizes, and the patent-box rate is conditioned on intellectual property developed and kept in Britain, so that the tax system reinforces the retention test rather than standing neutral beside it: the profit from a chokepoint held here is taxed lightly, and the fiscal incentive to sell it abroad is blunted along with the legal one. For the largest arrivals, binding advance certainty on tax treatment is offered before they commit, so that the firm bringing significant capital is met with clarity rather than the customary fog. The cost of these reliefs is real and is carried in the ledger as the productive expenditure it is; the framework has chosen not to make the corporate rate a major source of revenue, falling instead on profit extracted rather than profit reinvested.

Higher-rate income tax. An additional 50% band above £150,000 raises approximately £1–3 billion at the central case, after realistic behavioural assumptions.

National Insurance. Uncapping National Insurance (NI) contributions above the upper earnings limit raises approximately £8–12 billion.

Value added tax. Broadening the base — financial-services intermediation and certain discretionary categories, with the already-enacted private-school-fees measure sitting in the baseline and claimed by no line here — raises approximately £5–12 billion; the politically sensitive categories of food, children's clothing, and domestic energy are excluded.

Channelling relief. Across the capital taxes — capital gains, inheritance, and the periodic reconstruction levy — the architecture applies a channelling principle examined in full in Section XII (The City as Partner in Renewal). Capital genuinely deployed into qualifying national-priority productive investment receives favourable treatment, reducing the relevant liability by up to a capped share — never to zero, and rising to a maximum of roughly two-thirds only as enforcement capacity is certified, the relief opening at one-third (the phasing is set out in Section XII). This productive-deployment relief is deliberately narrower and better policed than the agricultural and business property reliefs it partly supersedes, which have functioned as poorly targeted shelters. Eligibility turns on genuinely new capital deployment in defined categories tied to the national pipeline — nuclear and grid, offshore wind and the energy transition, the defence-industrial base, designated infrastructure, certified scale-up equity, and qualifying productive business assets — subject to additionality tests, minimum holding periods, and clawback. The purpose is to draw idle capital into the renewal rather than drive it abroad, mobilising private wealth behind the national pipeline. The same line governs the capital-gains charge above: the channelling relief rewards the building on the way in, the risk-capital carve-out rewards it on the way out, and between them the architecture is generous to capital at both ends of its productive

life and ungenerous only to capital left idle. The fiscal effect is design-dependent and treated in full in Section XII; the central revenue case set out below assumes the relief is well designed, with the partial floor protecting the integrity of the revenue floor established in Section XI.

Personal allowance. The increase from £12,570 to approximately £16,000–18,000 sits in the second parliament rather than the first. It costs approximately £20–30 billion in foregone income tax revenue and provides meaningful relief for lower earners. The Capacity Parliament discipline holds: the personal allowance increase is distributional policy and not foundational, and it is sequenced into the second parliament once recurring revenue from the tax architecture is arriving and the fiscal headroom is established.

The Yield and Its Discipline

The named tax reforms yield, at mature steady state, a gross uplift of approximately £46–85 billion, falling to a net £36–71 billion once cautious dynamic and behavioural assumptions are applied. Near-term yield is lower, since the land value tax and several measures phase in behind their transitional protections, so the first parliament collects the lower part of this band and the steady state is reached only as the second parliament matures. From that net band the framework sets its central planning case at the conservative lower-middle — approximately £45–52 billion of additional recurring revenue from the tax architecture — with a favourable case around £75 billion once the named reform-driven contributions and fuller behavioural retention are counted, an upper stretch of £90–100 billion it does not plan on, and a floor of approximately £40 billion. This central figure is stated before the personal-allowance increase: that increase, costing £20–30 billion and arriving in the second parliament, is not a prior charge on the base but a distributional commitment funded from headroom as revenue and growth arrive — and, as Section XI sets out, the last household-facing commitment to be staged if the floor binds, never the first. At the planning case the committed programme is deliverable, as Section XI demonstrates; the wider 42% of GDP envelope — which from today's roughly 37–38% requires additional revenue of the order of £100–125 billion in total — is reached by the land value tax, the named reform-driven sources, and productivity recovery on the existing base, not by the tax architecture alone, the later conditional tiers sequencing behind that recovery. The framework plans at 40% of GDP and treats 42% as the prize for the programme working rather than a figure spent in advance, the shortfall handled through Tier 3 sequencing rather than deficit financing. The full scenario-by-scenario construction is set out in Section XI.

Working people at lower incomes see net relief through the personal allowance increase from the second parliament. Middle earners are broadly neutral. Higher earners face the 50p band and NI uncapping. Wealth holders face LVT, capital gains tax (CGT) reform, and IHT changes. The architecture is progressive across the income and wealth distribution.

The cumulative behavioural effects of multiple simultaneous tax reforms are not independent. The Wealth Tax Commission's central retention assumptions were built on

flat-rate modelling that did not account for several measures hitting the same population concurrently. The combined effect of LVT + reformed CGT + tightened IHT + corporate measures + 50p band + NI uncapping + the periodic reconstruction levy (below) produces compounding behavioural sensitivity at the top of the distribution. Stated at its bluntest, the combined marginal rate on the highest incomes approaches sixty per cent once the 50p band and uncapped National Insurance stack — a figure the framework states before its opponents compute it, prices as a combined response rather than measure by measure, and defends as the going rate among the higher-taxing peer economies whose services Britain proposes to match. The combined figure is layered onto the 2025 non-dom abolition, whose early emigration indications, contested in scale, are treated cautiously here rather than projected away. Any shortfall against the floor is absorbed through the contingency menu and Tier 3 sequencing, not deficit financing.

The revenue figures throughout are set to survive independent scrutiny rather than to require favourable assumptions from it. The framework commits every fiscal element to full Office for Budget Responsibility scoring, and the central cases are pitched at levels an independent scorer would be expected to confirm — behavioural elasticities, emigration responses, and realisation effects taken at honest values rather than convenient ones. A revenue case that depends on the referee being generous is not a revenue case the framework will rest on; where a measure's credible yield is contested, the lower, defensible figure is the one carried into the planning case.

The Periodic Progressive Wealth Tax

A general annual wealth tax is rejected; the international record (France, Germany, Sweden) is poor. *A periodic reconstruction levy, raised no more than once in a generation, is different in kind.*

The levy is tiered, each rate charged annually for five years:

- 1% on individual wealth above £2 million.
- 1.5% on wealth above £5 million.
- 2% on wealth above £20 million.

Threshold and Yield

The threshold is set where the wealth of the median liable individual ceases to be dominated by a home and a pension and becomes financial assets, business equity, and investment property — roughly the top one to two per cent of individuals, the population for whom wealth at rest is a description rather than a slogan. A lower threshold reaches the housing equity and retirement savings of millions of ordinary households, and a rolled-up charge against the family home, collected at death, is a political structure with a known fate in Britain; the framework declines to rebuild it. Should the smaller base require it, the recovery lever held in reserve is rates rather than threshold: modestly higher rates on the

genuinely wealthy are cheaper, politically and economically, than a threshold that reaches the mass of homes and pensions. The channelling relief converts a further share of assessed liability into productive deployment rather than Treasury cash, reducing the charge on wealth placed into qualifying national-priority investment by up to the prevailing capped share, never to zero. This is the mechanism working rather than failing: the levy yields cash from holdings that merely sit, and turns the rest, from those who would sooner build than pay, into capital deployed in the national pipeline. But the framework does not pretend this controls the proportion. The wealthy choose individually, by liquidity and by motive, and they sort into three groups, not two. The anchored — asset-rich, business and land, life and family here — stay and pay, because their wealth cannot leave without dismantling the thing it is, and for them the relief and the recognition that attends it make a grudged charge into something closer to a willing investment. The genuinely mobile, for whom Britain is one address among several, largely leave whatever is offered; the levy reaches the wealth they held on a fixed past date, and reaches no further. Between them sits the cohort that decides the yield: mobile on paper, rooted in fact, who would stay if staying were neither humiliating nor open-ended. The instruments that follow are built for that middle, because it is the only part of the base whose decision the design can change.

The realised yield is therefore stated honestly and low. Gross assessed liability before behaviour is in the order of £65–95 billion. Against that, valuation dispute and the illiquidity of large estates stretch collection across eight to ten years and shave the top; the 2025 non-dom departures have already removed a portion of the most mobile wealth; and the channelling relief routes a further share into deployment rather than cash. Net Treasury cash at the central case is approximately £35–50 billion over the collection period. The planning floor is set lower still, at £30 billion — approximately the sum collectable from the immobile base alone, on the assumption that the mobile tier leaves in full and the lockout is read down to its narrowest reach. The framework plans the state capital programme against that floor, not the central case, and treats both the channelled private deployment and any yield above the floor as additional rather than assumed. A levy of this concentration cannot honestly be planned any other way: roughly four-fifths of the assessed sum rests on a few thousand people, and a plan that spent the central case as though it were secure would be spending money a dozen departures could remove.

The Builders of the Renewal

Those who contribute to the reconstruction are honoured as what they are: builders of the country. The honour is owed to the contribution itself, however it is made — whether the levy is paid in full to the Treasury or its relieved share deployed into the national works, the country is rebuilt either way, and the one who put in is a builder of it. What distinguishes them is not how they contributed but that they did, when they might have left and paid nothing.

The recognition is public, by the contributor's consent, and it is open to all who build the renewal — the pension fund and the institution as readily as the great estate. It touches the levy not at all: a person's tax is private and stays so. What is recognised is the plain and creditable fact of having helped raise the country, recorded where such things should be recorded, in its account of how it recovered itself. There is no account kept of those who did not; they are not marked or named, only absent from the company of those who did.

The purpose is plain, for it is the strongest thing the framework can offer the very wealthy and the one the rate-competing jurisdictions cannot offer at all. At this level money is not scarce; standing is — the legitimacy of one whose wealth helped rebuild a serious country, and who is remembered for it. History is long-memoried about great fortunes: kind to those that built something lasting, indifferent to those that merely kept themselves. A lower charge elsewhere buys nothing of this. A share in the rebuilding of Britain, and a place among those who raised it, is the one coin the havens cannot mint — and it is earned by the plainest act there is, which is to put in rather than to leave.

Collection and Safeguards

None of this is administrable on the machinery the Revenue holds today, and the levy's deliverability rests on the same spine the rest of the architecture builds. The common identity record that the Government Architecture and Integration Authority establishes — one verified person, to whom the federated registers already attach financial assets, business equity, and property — is what allows a periodic charge to be assessed against a whole estate rather than reconstructed from scattered returns, allows liability to be tracked and instalments reconciled across the eight to ten years collection takes, and allows the channelling relief to be certified against qualifying deployment actually made rather than merely claimed. The levy is therefore sequenced deliberately behind the first-parliament rebuild of HMRC and digital-government capacity, not set ahead of it. The hardest instrument to collect is the one that leans most on the capability the framework insists on building first; that dependence is named rather than left to be discovered later.

A pre-announcement residency lockout provision is included, anchored in instruments that already exist in British law rather than proposals that exist nowhere: residency determination for liability purposes is set at the announcement date, not the assessment date, on the architecture of HMRC's temporary non-residence rules and the five-year rule that already governs capital gains — leave after the announcement and the liability follows for the statutory period. This materially reduces post-announcement flight without being watertight. Two caveats attach. The announcement-date operation will itself be litigated — retrospective reach is the ground on which it will be tested under the Convention's protection of property — and the architecture is built to survive a reading-down to Royal Assent, since the prospective valuation date, not the announcement, carries the revenue. And liability fixed is not cash collected: enforcement against wealth that has left the

jurisdiction is hard, treaty cooperation for an instrument of this kind does not yet exist, and the net cash floor absorbs non-collection from emigrants alongside behavioural response.

Implementation is sequenced after first-parliament HMRC capacity rebuilding, with the levy itself coming in late first or early second parliament once collection can be competently administered. Deferral provisions for asset-rich, cash-poor households extend the realistic revenue arrival rate to approximately eight to ten years, not five.

Across the wealth measures taken together, no household's combined annual liability exceeds a defined share of its income and realisable assets, so that the package can never compel the sale of a home or the breaking-up of a working business to meet it. The cap is the guarantee, in the individual case, of what the deferral provisions promise in the aggregate.

A Bounded Instrument

The gravest objection to any wealth levy is not its rate but its precedent: that a charge raised once is raised again, and that the rational response to a state which has reached for wealth once is to leave before it reaches a second time. No promise answers this, because no parliament binds its successor, and a generation of taxes called temporary and grown permanent has taught the wealthy to discount such promises entirely. The framework answers it not with a promise but with a structure.

The levy is a project, not an institution. The apparatus that assesses and collects it — the periodic-charge methodology, the dedicated valuation cadre, the certification of relief against whole estates — is purpose-built, sunset in statute, and disbanded on completion. What persists is only the ordinary identity and asset spine that GAIA maintains for the recurring business of government; the machinery specific to a one-off whole-estate charge is stood up for the task and stood down when the task is done. This is not capability destroyed for show, which the framework would rightly distrust, but capability matched to purpose and not outliving it — the same discipline applied to the levy that the framework applies to every standing body that forgets why it was made.

The credibility this buys is structural and therefore believable. A future government wishing to repeat the levy could not reach for a machine left running; it would have to re-establish, openly and accountably, an apparatus the state had formally closed — naming it, funding it, and owning the full political cost of rebuilding the thing the country was told was finished. That is an act no government could perform quietly or quickly, and one the wealthy would see years before it could touch them. The levy is thus what it claims to be: a once-in-a-generation instrument, bounded not by the word of a parliament that cannot bind the next, but by the deliberate absence of the means to repeat it.

What the Proceeds Fund

The cash proceeds are committed to the capital that the fiscal rules say must be cash-funded: the non-yielding social capital that produces no direct return to borrow against. The

commitments are sized to the planning floor of approximately £30 billion, not to the central case, and sequenced to the pace at which the cash actually arrives:

- NHS estate backlog elimination and the most urgent modernisation (£12–18 billion). The recorded backlog alone approaches this figure, so the floor-funded allocation buys the elimination of disrepair and the most urgent works; fuller estate transformation draws on the blended instruments across the longer horizon as the cash matures.
- Court estate renewal (£2–3 billion).
- School estate renewal, begun within the floor and completed from the blended programme as proceeds arrive (£10–15 billion in all, charged against the floor as proceeds arrive, the balance sequenced behind it).
- Contingency reserve (£6–10 billion), held inside the floor rather than added to it.

These commitments are sized to sit within the £30 billion floor, with the contingency held inside it rather than beyond it. Anything the levy yields above the floor — the central case runs to £35–50 billion — advances the school and estate programmes that are otherwise sequenced into the blended capital envelope, so a better outcome buys faster delivery rather than a wider promise. The framework commits only what the floor secures, and treats the rest as the upside it may turn out to be. The return-generating capital that stands beside them in the national pipeline is funded through the blended capital programme sized in Section XI — a productive-capital borrowing envelope of approximately £2.5–4 billion annually over fifteen years, an explicit recurring capital allocation of £3–5 billion annually, and crowded-in private finance — with the levy contributing seed capital where sequencing requires it, and with delivery across the second to fourth parliaments, not at first-parliament pace:

- Catapult Network expansion (£8–14 billion)
- Industrial strategy investments (£8–15 billion)
- Defence equipment modernisation (£8–15 billion)
- Regional infrastructure (£6–10 billion)
- Housing programme capital (£4–8 billion)

Tier 4 capital commitments (the British Medical Institute's flagship campus and similar flagship projects) are excluded from this allocation and proceed only if revenue exceeds the central case.

There is a circularity here that the wealthy should be invited to see rather than left to suspect. What the levy funds — the competent revenue service, the courts that work, the institutions rebuilt, the social fabric mended — is the stability that makes Britain worth remaining in for those with most to protect. The deepest fear of great wealth is not taxation but disorder: the breakdown in which wealth itself becomes unsafe. The levy is, in part, the wealthy funding the conditions of their own security across the generations — buying, through a bounded charge, the stable and lawful country that the rate-competing jurisdictions, for all their lower rates, conspicuously cannot guarantee. This is not an

immediate return; it is the slower and larger one, the Britain a contributor's children inherit, and it is offered as such.

The Generational Levy

What distinguishes the levy from a one-off capital raid is that it is conceived as a *periodic* reconstruction instrument: assessed once, on a prospective valuation, and capable of being raised again — but no more than once in a generation, and only ever to fund capital reconstruction of defined national magnitude, never recurrent spending. The anti-flight machinery and the bounding rules are as set out above; what matters here is the character the periodicity gives the charge. Its force, as with any such rule, is political and economic rather than legal — no statute binds a future Parliament — which is one further reason the capital programme is planned against the conservative net-cash floor rather than the gross assessed figure.

One lever against departure remains, and it is lawful precisely because it punishes nothing. The state cannot forbid a person to leave, nor should it; emigration is a liberty the framework holds absolute. But the privileges of continued access — settled residence, the standing of a UK taxpayer, the open door for oneself and one's children — are the state's to grant, and may be conditioned on obligations lawfully owed. For the person who leaves to escape the charge yet wishes to keep the access, the unmet liability becomes the price of the door, and the door is one many value more than the charge. This reaches not the wealth, which may be beyond recovery once gone, but the desire to return, which is often the stronger tie. The same principle has its sharpest later expression in the National Academy of Leadership, whose doors are closed to the heirs of families that did not keep faith with the levy: across the framework, access is made contingent on contribution, and the standing that contribution earns cannot be had by those who refused it.

Procurement Reform

Defence procurement is reformed first, then extended across government by stages. Defence Equipment & Support is given real technical capacity rather than another round of bureaucratic restructuring. Programme managers need engineering backgrounds, capable of informed judgement on a contractor's claims rather than dependent on taking them on trust. Contracts carry real consequences for performance failure. The pattern of permanent reorganisation ends.

The same reform extends across the rest of government, where the waste is larger and less scrutinised. The pattern recurs everywhere: a buyer without the technical capacity to judge what it is being sold, contracts that carry no real consequence for failure, and systems designed to lock the state into a single supplier. The heaviest losses are in digital and IT contracts — which is why the procurement of major systems sits under GAIA's standards and its power to refuse what will not interoperate or what creates lock-in — and in the large

outsourcing, services, and construction contracts where the same buyer-side weakness recurs.

The remedy is the one applied first to defence and then carried across government, and it is specific:

- **Technical capacity on the state's side of the table.** A standing cadre of engineers and commercial specialists embedded in the major programmes, with programme managers drawn from the relevant disciplines and paid at rates that retain them, so the buyer can test a supplier's claims rather than take them on trust. It is the same principle that holds GAIA's expertise inside the state rather than renting it from the firms it must judge.
- **Consequences written into the contract.** Milestone-linked payment, performance bonds, and clawback where delivery fails, with suppliers that repeatedly under-deliver excluded from future competition, so that failure carries a cost to the contractor and not only to the taxpayer.
- **Lock-in designed out from the start.** Open standards, interoperability, and data and code portability mandated on digital systems and enforced through GAIA; bundled contracts broken into modular lots that can be recompeted; and a costed exit plan required before signature, so that no supplier can make the state a hostage to its own systems.
- **Competition restored.** The largest monolithic contracts broken into lots that challengers and smaller firms can bid for, reducing the dependence on a handful of prime contractors and the pricing power that dependence hands them.
- **Open-book transparency.** Open-book accounting on major contracts, published performance data, and a single cross-government capability to analyse what the state buys and what it pays, so that waste is visible and comparable rather than buried department by department.
- **Buying for capability, not incumbency.** Award decisions weighted to demonstrated capability and whole-life value rather than the lowest headline bid that fails in delivery or the convenience of the established supplier.

The sequence is deliberate. Defence and the major digital systems — where the losses are heaviest and the GAIA spine already reaches — are reformed in the first parliament, alongside the building of the central commercial and engineering capability the rest depends on. Outsourcing, services, and construction follow as that capability matures and contracts fall due for renewal, since a contract is most cheaply reformed at the point it is re-let rather than broken mid-term.

Reform releases roughly £5–10 billion a year now lost to waste across government, redirected into capability. Set against the hundreds of billions government spends on procurement each year, a recovery of this order is a low single-digit efficiency: conservative rather than heroic. The release is gradual rather than immediate: the first parliament establishes the reforms, and the results compound across the parliaments that follow.

The National Fraud Agency (Fiscal Exception)

The National Fraud Agency is established in the first parliament as an explicit exception to the Capacity Parliament discipline. It is not foundational institutional rebuilding. It earns its early place on one ground only: established sooner, it contributes to the public finances sooner. The exception is open, not disguised.

Fraud is the largest single crime category by volume — perhaps forty per cent of all reported crime — and the response to it is inadequate. The Agency consolidates a fragmented effort into one body with real resources and statutory authority, taking over functions currently scattered across Action Fraud, the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC), regional police fraud units, the relevant Financial Conduct Authority enforcement, and HMRC's fraud response.

Every pound the Agency recovers flows to the Treasury, which in turn funds it generously from general revenue, to the scale the problem warrants — several hundred million pounds a year and rising as it grows — and the Agency is therefore measured on the fraud it clears, the deterrence it builds, and the burden it lifts from the courts.

Public sector fraud and error is estimated at £33–58 billion a year. Even modest recovery rates yield a sizeable return. The conditional architecture reflects this: the Agency contributes little while it is being built, rising to a net £2–4 billion a year by the second parliament and £3–7 billion by the third as it matures. It carries no weight in the first parliament's fiscal arithmetic; from the second parliament onwards it becomes a meaningful contributor.

Migration Architecture

Immigration, both irregular and regular, has bedevilled British politics for more than thirty years — arguably the single biggest contributor to Brexit — and, left unaddressed, it will go on absorbing the political oxygen the reform programme requires. To grip it is to resolve a generational issue: to draw a polarised politics back towards the centre, and to open the space in which the wider reconstruction can proceed. The framework treats it not as a grievance to be managed but as the question on which the rest depends — the one that ends governments, and that no falling number alone has ever settled. The message is simple: *Britain is open for business, but on its own terms.* The polity — not the smuggling network, not the employer claiming shortage to suppress wages, not the loophole — decides who comes. On that principle the migration architecture rests on two binding commitments, not a headline figure. The first is control of the irregular route, set out in the asylum architecture below: closed absolutely, because the anxiety that corrodes public consent is uncontrolled arrival, not contribution. The second is integration capacity — housing, school places, GP provision, English language provision, the civic infrastructure through which arrivals become participants — which is the real constraint on how many

people the country can absorb well. Net migration that ran for several years in the high hundreds of thousands, peaking near a million in 2023, was incompatible with both.

Within those commitments the country is deliberately, and without apology, open to those it chooses and who contribute: the skilled, the qualified, the genuine student at a reputable institution, the senior researcher, the engineer the national rebuild requires. An open economy competes for global talent permanently; this is a standing strength to be sustained, not a dependence to be cured. What is closed is the abuse — the irregular route, the suppressed-wage model that claims shortage rather than raising pay, the low-quality-education route used as cover. Openness to genuine contribution is credible precisely because the framework is ruthless about its abuse.

Command

The hardest lesson is that the number, by itself, settles nothing. Net migration has already fallen towards this band under the present arrangements, and the politics did not settle — because the anxiety was never the arithmetic. It is the sense that the state has lost command: that decisions are not executed, that some rules go unenforced, that no one is ever actually removed. Most of those most troubled by the numbers do not know they have fallen at all, which is the proof of it: the wound is the loss of control, not the figure. The high numbers, when they came, came not from open policy but from drift — a care-visa route and a student-dependant route opened without limit, a post-2020 settlement that let low-wage sectors import labour rather than pay for it. Closing those is the easy part. Restoring the belief that the state governs its own border is the hard part, and the part that consolidates.

Command is made of working parts, not slogans. An immigration or protection decision is made once, properly, on a fixed clock — a single substantive decision with representation at the start and one onward review, not the present ladder of serial appeals that turns months into years. Lawful status, carried on the civic identity credential established in Section VIII, becomes the precondition for working and renting, so that a person with no right to be here cannot dissolve into the informal economy — the enforcement aimed at the employer and the gangmaster who profit from that dissolution, not at theatre against the individual. Where a person's claim is refused or their leave has lapsed and removal is in train, monitoring may attach to the individual while the case is resolved — but as the least restrictive means to a legitimate end, not as a mark of the class. The alternatives are worse on both sides: detention, which deprives liberty more heavily and at greater cost, and which monitoring exists precisely to avoid; or disappearance into the informal economy, where the person passes beyond all protection into the hands of the gangmaster and the illegal employer, and where the lawful route loses its meaning because living unlawfully becomes viable. Monitoring keeps a person both findable and out of that shadow, under less constraint than a cell, while their case reaches its definite end. It is applied to those within the process whose status is unresolved or whose departure is being arranged — people the

state has encountered and must account for — not as a blanket condition imposed on a status, and not on the strength of unlawful presence alone, which a court would rightly refuse. The civic credential proves status when it is presented; it neither tracks the holder nor serves as the tether. The two are separate instruments and are kept so: one establishes who a person is, the other, where applied, where they are. Returns agreements are treated as a first-order aim of foreign policy rather than an afterthought — which a state that keeps its alliances and stays within the Convention is positioned to strike. And every case ends somewhere definite: returned where return is possible, settled where it is not, never left in limbo.

The people already here are not one question but three. Citizens are citizens, born or naturalised, and closed: nothing in this architecture touches them. The lawfully settled non-citizen is a question of the civic bargain, not of removal. Only those here unlawfully or on lapsed terms present a live question of status. Much of that group has lived in the country for years, working and raising children born on British soil; removing them wholesale is neither lawful nor humane, and no state could accomplish it in any case.

So the existing stock is resolved once, honestly, at implementation, and never as a standing offer that would simply rebuild the drift. The long-resident — taken as seven years or more of continuous presence — may put themselves forward: establish identity and residence, submit to a criminality check, and meet a civic standard set for the purpose. Those who clear it are granted lawful leave, not citizenship — a footing and a fair path, from which they naturalise on the same terms as any other lawful migrant, the membership still earned and still crossed into at the end. This is not amnesty: nothing is waved through; the door is opened, and they must walk through it and qualify. The household moves as one — a dependent child follows the parents in both directions, included when they regularise and departing with them when they do not, so that the child is neither a separate standard to be gamed nor a wedge that splits a family. Those who do not come forward, or come forward and fail, join the recently irregular: returned where return is possible, settled on Saint Helena where it is not, the settled residual numbered in the low thousands against a population of sixty-nine million. The door is shut prospectively, the clock and the credential keep it shut, and a stock that took years to accrete is cleared once and not permitted to form again.

The Target and the Levers

Net migration in the order of 150,000 to 250,000 a year is where a managed system of these commitments lands once the capacity to absorb it exists, bounded by integration capacity and held within it by visa policy levers. Because that capacity is the binding constraint, and because housing, school places, and primary care are themselves multi-parliament rebuilds, the figure is not flat across the horizon: it sits below the band through the first and second parliaments, when integration capacity is lowest and still under construction, and rises towards it only as that capacity comes online. The legitimate routes — the skilled worker

route, the family route, the student post-study route, the legal asylum route, and the Cura Custodum service-based citizenship pathway — are managed within that consequence, so that where one route is properly expanded another is adjusted accordingly. The figure is reported to Parliament annually and managed against integration capacity and labour-market need.

The visa policy levers are these:

- **Skilled worker thresholds set against genuine labour market need.** Salary, qualification, sponsorship, and sector allocations set against actual shortage rather than the convenience of business models built on suppressed wages. The framework will not accept the pattern by which sectors built on low pay claim labour shortage to demand the immigration that sustains their model.
- **Sector allocations where the strategic interests of the country require them.** Critical infrastructure — energy, water, transport. Strategic technology — AI safety, advanced engineering, biomedical research. Frontline service — the Cura Custodum-qualifying roles. These receive allocations that reflect their importance. Sectors that have used immigration in place of wage growth do not.
- **Student post-study work set against the value of the education being provided.** The framework treats serious international students as contributors to the British knowledge economy and provides routes that recognise their contribution, while resisting the use of student visas as cover for migration through lower-quality educational provision.
- **Family route requirements set to ensure that family unification is what it claims, rather than a way around the rules.** Financial, language, and procedural standards set against genuine family relationships.

Integration and the Demographic Arithmetic

School capacity, GP capacity, housing capacity, English language provision, the civic infrastructure through which new arrivals become participants — these have limits, and where they are constrained in particular regions, allocations are reduced accordingly. The framework will not calibrate migration to labour demand alone, without reference to whether the country has the means to absorb the people that demand would bring.

The strategic-skills inflows on which the national rebuild depends — nuclear and grid engineering, AI research, senior institutional capability, the defence-industrial base, and the Cura Custodum clinical workforce — are a protected component of this openness, welcomed as the contribution they are. They do not taper to zero as domestic capability grows; an open economy continues to attract the world's talent on principle. What the domestic skills programme reduces is dependence born of our own failure to train — importing because Britain did not build the pipeline — not openness itself. The regional skills academies and technical institutes established in the first parliament are the instrument of that, with their first cohorts in the priority strategic areas; but the lead time is long, and the first home-grown cohorts reach the strategic sectors late in the second

parliament at the earliest. Britain grows its own talent and welcomes the world's; the two are complements, not substitutes.

The demographic arithmetic is acknowledged. Even at the upper end of the target range, the working-age to dependent ratio of the country narrows across the horizon as the population ages. Migration cannot close it on its own; the scale required would be incompatible with integration capacity and with the cohesion the country requires of itself. Productivity recovery and the pension architecture set out below are the real responses to demographic ageing, to which migration contributes without being the answer.

The legislative architecture is established in the first parliament; its operation is continuing work across parliaments, not a single settlement.

Where cohesion strains, the strain is named honestly and located precisely: in pace and scale outrunning the capacity to integrate, never in who people are. The public's concerns are answered by moving them off the axis of culture and group and onto the axis of rights and conduct, enforced equally and individually. The law applies in every community the same — and the failure to enforce it equally, for fear of giving offence, betrays the very people it should protect. Every individual's rights are guaranteed inside every front door: coercion is a crime acted upon as a crime, because the state owes that person its protection. What is freely chosen — in dress, in faith, in custom — is liberty, and no business of the state's. The state acts on the coercion, never the costume; on the act, never the group.

Settlement by Contribution

Behind the question of who comes lies a second the country has rarely answered honestly: how membership is earned once here. The framework treats protection, residence, settlement, the welfare contract, and citizenship as distinct stages, none flowing automatically into the next. Each is granted by the polity on its own terms, not a status that accrues by the mere passage of time.

Lawful residence, for work or study, is conditional: the resident supports themselves, meets the terms of their route, and draws on the National Health Service through the existing surcharge, not the income-replacement safety net, which is not yet theirs. Settlement — permanent membership of the welfare contract, with the full safety net and the social housing that members hold — is earned rather than awarded for presence: through a qualifying period of lawful residence, a record of contribution, good character, and the integration the polity is entitled to expect. Citizenship, with its political rights, sits a stage beyond that again. This is roughly where Australia and Canada already stand; it is firm, and it is meant to be.

Two things about that final stage are absolute. A citizen is a citizen, born or naturalised, and origin, faith, sex, and belief bear upon membership not at all; once held, citizenship is inviolable, never revoked for the convenience of the state, the naturalised standing exactly where the native-born stands. And citizenship is crossed into deliberately, never accrued by

presence: earned by allegiance — meaning conduct, not sentiment, obedience to the law and no foreign loyalty that overrides it — and by a civic standard set higher than today's, expedited for those who have served through Cura Custodum, and for the care and priority-industry work the polity has equal reason to value. Everyone who has not crossed is a visitor, long-term or otherwise: lawfully here, owed the duties owed to a guest, but not yet a member.

The contribution test is the same for everyone, and that is the point of it. It is the skilled-migration logic already applied at the border — the capacity to contribute is welcomed, the low-wage model that suppresses wages is not — carried through to membership. Contribution is counted broadly, not as a narrow demand for waged work alone: the caring, military, and public service the polity recognises through Cura Custodum count towards it.

What the test will not do is make disability the criterion. Skill and contribution are assessed in everyone the same way, and disability is neither a bar nor an exemption: a disabled person who is skilled and contributes earns membership exactly as any other contributor does, and a person who cannot contribute to the level set is in the same position as anyone else who cannot, neither selected against for disability nor passed because of it. The one thing the framework refuses is to convert inability to contribute into an automatic claim on the welfare contract, because that would make the contract something other than earned. Like the asylum edges, this will be challenged as indirect discrimination, and the answer is the same: a single standard applied to everyone, with the misfortune provision below as its equitable safeguard, is the defensible ground.

There is, though, provision for the person who contributed and was then overtaken. Someone who has resided and contributed lawfully across the better part of a decade, and is stopped short of settlement by an evidenced injury or illness that disables them within the last two years of that record, is carried through to settlement rather than failed for the shortfall: they met the test of contribution, and the framework does not punish them for misfortune that struck after they had shown it. The provision turns on evidence rather than assertion, and is drawn narrowly — for those who contributed and were overtaken, not a general route around the requirement.

None of this touches the citizen. A British citizen who cannot contribute — disabled, or fallen ill, or born unable — is a member already, supported fully and without any test, exactly as the welfare reforms set out: membership, once held, is never contingent on continued capacity, and the contribution principle is the gate into the contract, not a condition of remaining within it. It is separate again from protection, which is owed whether or not a person could ever contribute: the safety, the floor, and the freedom from return to harm set out in the asylum architecture are honoured for everyone who qualifies, regardless of ability, because protection answers a different question from membership. The framework keeps the two in separate hands so that neither corrupts the other — protection humanitarian and unconditional, membership earned.

Asylum Policy Consolidation

If legal migration is the question of whom Britain chooses to admit, asylum is the question of who arrives uninvited. It is the most contested part of the framework, and it is set out as an operative process rather than an argument: defined statuses, defined triggers, defined consequences. It rests on one premise — that control of its own border is the first thing a state owes itself, that an island is well placed to exercise it, and that Britain cannot rely on Europe, least of all after Brexit, to exercise it on Britain's behalf. Within that premise the architecture is built on a credible and demonstrated deterrent.

The Core Distinction: Protection and Settlement

Two principles govern. First, citizenship is bestowed by the polity on those it accepts; it is not claimed by persistence, and the legitimate routes to membership are those the polity has consented to. Second, cooperation with France, the EU, and other safe-third countries is welcome where available but is not structural — the system works on what Britain does, not on what others agree to.

Protection and settlement are separate obligations. Protection — that no one is returned to persecution or left in danger — Britain owes and discharges in full. Settlement in mainland Britain is a distinct thing, and is not owed to a person for having reached British soil outside the law. The European Convention and the Refugee Convention govern whether a person must be protected from return to harm; they do not govern the country in which that protection is discharged. The framework meets the first obligation in full and declines the second. Protection, always; mainland settlement, only by the consented route.

The Lawful Route

Standing provision. The lawful route is fully resourced and is the precondition for everything harder that follows.

- Protection may be sought from outside the United Kingdom — at a UK-operated processing centre in France where cooperation allows, and at British missions and designated centres elsewhere — with fast-track examination at lawful points of entry as the standing fallback that needs no partner's consent.
- Claims are assessed under British legal standards, with representation, interpretation, and independent appeal, and decided in weeks rather than years.
- A successful claimant travels to Britain lawfully, with full refugee status and the ordinary path to citizenship.

Other consented routes run alongside: the standard immigration routes, marriage on existing terms, service through Cura Custodum-qualifying roles, and a one-time amnesty at implementation for the long-resident undocumented. The lawful route offers what the irregular route no longer can: a path to mainland settlement.

The Closure of the Irregular Route

The rule. From the date a government acting on this framework announces the policy — not the date it commences — a person entering outside the lawful route acquires no path to mainland settlement: no accumulation of time, no subsequent marriage or employment, no future amnesty, no general humanitarian discretion. Protection is still assessed and, where required, granted; it is discharged without mainland settlement. The closure is absolute because only an absolute closure deters.

Effective date. The closure binds from announcement, not commencement. A policy of this scale is legislated and built over a period of public knowledge, and dating it to announcement removes any incentive to cross before the door shuts: arriving earlier secures nothing arriving later would not. What the smuggling networks can sell is foreclosed before the machinery is even complete.

Family-life claims. Individuated Article 8 claims are weighed case by case, as the law requires — a judicially policed exception held at the margin, never permitted to become the route. Named in *The Legal Ground* below.

On arrival. A person arriving outside the lawful route after announcement receives what the law requires:

- Individual assessment of any protection claim, under British legal standards, with representation, interpretation, and independent appeal.
- Where protection is required it is granted; the person is not returned to Article 3 harm. Where it is not, the claim is refused.
- Pending determination, transfer, or departure, detention in domestic secure facilities under UK law — HM Inspectorate of Prisons, Independent Monitoring Boards, coronial jurisdiction, parliamentary oversight, full legal access, Article 3 conditions.

Detention limits. Twelve months in the first instance; judicial review of any extension; eighteen months absolute maximum, after which the person is released. Indefinite detention is both wrong and unlawful. The detention estate is expanded to make this real.

Endpoint. The endpoint is departure, not limbo. In order of application:

1. **Return** to a safe country of origin, under the UK–France agreement and its successors or comparable arrangements.
2. **Transfer** to a genuinely safe third country where return is not possible.
3. **Territorial settlement** on Saint Helena for the residual who can be neither returned, transferred, nor accepted by any third country — the discharge that depends on no one, set out below.

Cooperation handles the bulk most cheaply and most humanely, and Britain should treat it as a first-order aim of border and foreign policy. The final endpoint requires no other state's consent.

The Territorial Settlement: Saint Helena

Trigger. A person whose claim is resolved but who can be neither returned nor transferred nor accepted by any third country, and who would otherwise face indefinite domestic limbo, is resettled on Saint Helena. This is the steady-state discharge of the residual; the closure and the domestic process operate from commencement regardless of whether the island is ready, because the deterrent is the bar itself, not the island.

What it is. Genuine settlement, not detention: permanent residence, housing, healthcare, education, lawful work, property, civil courts, and local democratic participation. A resident is free to leave for any country that will receive them, and Britain facilitates that departure. What is withheld is only mainland Britain.

No subordinate class. Residents and their descendants hold equal civic and political rights; the bar is on the arrival, not the bloodline. A child born on the island to settled parents takes what British nationality law has given every child so born since 2002 — citizenship of the territory and, with it, British citizenship at birth. The framework states this rather than legislating around it: a hereditary exception written against children for the manner of their parents' arrival would create the very subordinate class the settlement forswears.

Why the island. Saint Helena is one of the last substantial pieces of sovereign British ground on which something new can be built, and after a century of neglect Britain has begun to build it: an air link in 2017, a subsea fibre cable landed in 2021, and the island's first commercial port, fully operational since 2025. Its value is of two kinds. The first needs people and capital, which the settlement supplies: satellite ground stations serving the new low-orbit constellations and the West African littoral, a cable node, and the expansion of the wharf. The second needs only remoteness and a small, quiet population, and is therefore worth having whether anyone is resettled or none: radio astronomy, for which a comparable South Atlantic island measures among the quietest sites on earth, subject to survey; and the geophysical and atmospheric monitoring of an under-instrumented ocean. The resettlement triggers and funds the activation; it is not the island's hidden purpose, and the island's worth does not stand or fall on how many are settled.

The Saints. The island is not empty ground to be filled, and its people are not a means to a mainland end. They are a small British community long under-served, and the settlement is offered to them first as the renewal of their own island — investment, work, infrastructure, and a future for a shrinking population — before it is anything to do with the residual it also houses. Their consent is sought and their interests are protected by covenant, not treated as a formality to be managed:

- Growth proceeds in partnership with the elected territorial government, by stages, each beginning only once housing, water, power, services, and employment have been shown to keep pace and environmental limits are respected.
- The covenant's core terms — the protection of land, the standard of services, and the principle that development serves everyone on the island — are entrenched in the territory's constitutional order, beyond the reach of any ordinary majority,

settler or Saint, and beyond the reach of the government in London that makes them.

- The local franchise is earned by years of residence, as in democracies everywhere: a qualification met person by person, the ordinary slope of arrival into membership.

Britain holds the sovereign decision and bears its weight honestly: the choice to develop the island is Westminster's, but it is exercised through a covenant that binds Britain as firmly as it binds the island, and that no future government may quietly unpick. Beyond a single generation the question answers itself — the children of settlers and Saints are born on the same island, into the same citizenship, schooled in the same rooms, and the two populations are merged by the surer instrument of growing up together.

Cost. A commitment without a price is a wish. The only modern comparator, Australia's offshore detention at roughly a billion Australian dollars a year for one to two thousand people, is named to be distinguished: closed detention buys its cost through security and the deliberate absence of an economy. A civic settlement carries different arithmetic, because residents work and the development rides on the South Atlantic investment in Section XIII. Planning provision, at the conservative end: capital of approximately £3–6 billion across the build-out, net running costs of approximately £0.5–1.5 billion annually in the early years, declining as the settlement economy takes weight. These are framework assumptions pending survey. If the closure works the residual is small and the total modest; if arrivals run higher the total rises while the per-head cost falls.

The Legal Ground

Proportionality. The distinction will be tested on proportionality, and is built to hold there. A person reaching Britain outside the law has, in the ordinary case, passed through safe countries with functioning asylum systems and bypassed an accessible lawful UK route. The framework presumes no bad faith; it holds only that where a safe and accessible lawful route existed and was bypassed, the route of entry may bear on the settlement that follows, while the protection is untouched. Because the policy runs prospectively from a public announcement, a person arriving afterwards is taken to have known the consequence and chosen it. Foreseeability, the lawful alternative, and the continued availability of protection are what make a different settlement outcome proportionate.

Article 31. The framework does not stake itself on any single reading of the Refugee Convention's Article 31. Whether a court reads "coming directly" narrowly or broadly, the framework operates either way, because it regulates the geography of settlement rather than access to protection: claims are processed, protection is granted where required, the obligation is discharged.

The ECHR. All of this sits within the European Convention, which forms part of the United Kingdom's constitutional settlement and which the framework does not propose to leave — not least because the Good Friday Agreement is built on the Convention's incorporation,

and to unpick the one is to reopen the other. The fuller position is in Section XIV; here the Convention is simply the legal order within which the work is done.

Secure core, contested edges. The elements are not equally secure in law, and the difference is named. The closure of mainland settlement is the robust core: whom the polity admits to membership is for the polity to decide, and non-refoulement governs where a person may be sent, not whether they are made a citizen. The contested elements turn on facts a court will examine:

- that a third country is genuinely safe before anyone is sent there — the lesson of the Rwanda judgment;
- that territorial resettlement is in substance a life and not a confinement;
- that individual claims of family life are weighed case by case rather than refused by rule.

The framework expects to hold the core and to be tested at the edges, and is built so that an edge may be lost as an exception without the core falling with it.

Communication, Removal, and the Hard Edges

Communication. The communication of the outcome is itself an instrument. The decisive moment in irregular migration is the expectation formed before departure, carried through smuggling and diaspora networks more effectively than through any official channel. The framework funds a deliberate effort to carry the true outcome — that the irregular route leads to protection but never to mainland Britain — into the countries, languages, and channels that reach people before they pay for passage. The message is lawful because it is accurate.

Failed claims. A person found not to need protection is ordinarily removed. Where removal is not presently possible, the same logic governs as for the protected residual: non-removability is not a route to mainland settlement, and territorial resettlement, not domestic limbo, is where the obligation rests pending return or voluntary departure. A failed claim cannot convert into settlement through the mere difficulty of enforcing it.

The lines not crossed. These measures are hard, and they arise from reconciling two duties too often presented as exclusive: to protect those in genuine need, and to maintain control of the border. Neither is abandoned. But the limits are absolute: protection is never withheld, no person is returned to danger, destitution is never engineered, and detention is never indefinite. What is withheld is mainland settlement, and only from those who declined the lawful route by which it could have been obtained. On a problem this hard no answer satisfies everyone; there is only a choice of which costs to bear, made in the open.

Pension and Capital Architecture: Legislative Foundations

Britain is sitting on approximately £3 trillion of pension capital that mostly does not work for the country. UK pension funds allocate only 2–3% of assets to UK productive infrastructure,

against far higher allocations in peer pension systems. The state pension is pay-as-you-go and modest by international standards. Auto-enrolment minimum contributions are 8% total against Australia's 12% and Dutch levels of 20–30%. The private pension industry is fragmented across thousands of small schemes too small to invest efficiently at infrastructure scale. The combined result is a country whose retirement architecture is inadequate, whose domestic capital is poorly deployed, and whose infrastructure financing depends disproportionately on international institutional investor appetite that Britain cannot guarantee.

This is potentially existential across the demographic horizon. Pension architecture reform is among the most consequential things the framework can do. The first parliament builds the legislative foundations; implementation belongs to subsequent parliaments.

The first parliament passes legislation establishing six reinforcing mechanisms; their implementation and operational scaling belong to the second parliament and beyond, set out in Sections VIII and IX.

National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) expansion legislation. NEST, the state-established default auto-enrolment provider, is given statutory authority to develop into a sophisticated institutional investor on the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) model. The legislative framework establishes operational independence within the wider public institutional architecture, governance structures appropriate to long-horizon investment, and the mandate to build investment capability across decades. Direct fiscal cost is modest; the build follows in subsequent parliaments.

National Wealth Fund (NWF) expansion legislation. The existing institution is scaled meaningfully through primary legislation establishing the fund as Britain's sovereign wealth institution on Norwegian and Singaporean precedent. Initial endowment of approximately £10–15 billion is seeded through the blended capital programme set out in Section XI — the borrowing and recurring-allocation legs, not the levy's cash floor, which Section VII's allocation already exhausts — with the fund built thereafter through retained returns, recurring capital allocation, and where appropriate capital borrowing within fiscal rules — the route by which the comparable sovereign funds actually began — compounding across decades. The fund invests in UK productive infrastructure (providing the domestic capital that reduces the framework's exposure to international institutional investor risk), in strategic equity holdings, and in global assets diversifying the underlying risk. Operational governance is independent within statutory remit; political direction is limited to mandate-setting, not investment decision-making.

The fund is given a public face as well as a public purpose. Alongside its institutional capital, a holding is opened to citizens directly — a small, secure stake in the national fund, bought and held through the same verified means by which a citizen already deals with the state, on the premium-bond principle of wide ownership in modest amounts. The capital it raises is additional to the endowment and draws on none of the levy; the fund's governance is

untouched, mandate-set and independent as before, the citizen an owner of the whole rather than a director of any part. The purpose is twofold, and both halves serve the framework. It draws domestic savings into domestic productive investment, the patient home capital the renewal needs and would otherwise seek abroad. And it does for the citizen what the channelling relief does for the investor (Section XII): it makes the holder of a stake an owner of the renewal, and an owner argues for the thing they own. A fund a few thousand hold is a line in a budget; a fund millions hold is a settlement a later government unpicks at its cost.

Pension fund consolidation legislation. Legislation for the consolidation of the UK's fragmented pension scheme architecture passes in the first parliament, with implementation across subsequent parliaments. The objective is consolidation into a smaller number of large funds capable of investing at infrastructure scale, on the Australian super-fund model. Existing accumulated assets remain with beneficiaries; the administrative architecture moves to operational scale. Fiduciary protections are strengthened rather than weakened.

Auto-enrolment contribution increase legislation. Mandatory contribution minimums rise progressively from 8% to 12% across approximately a decade on the Australian phasing model. The increase is split between employer and employee contributions such that the take-home pay impact is gradual and manageable. Legislation passes in the first parliament with implementation beginning in the second and completing across the third. The effect is greater retirement security and a larger pool of capital available for productive investment.

Domestic infrastructure allocation framework. Legislation establishes the framework for encouraging UK pension and insurance allocation to UK productive infrastructure, and where appropriate for requiring it. The mechanism that works is making UK infrastructure investments good enough to attract pension money on their merits, supported by state guarantees and risk-sharing arrangements; crude mandates that breach fiduciary duty are rejected. Further reform of the Solvency UK regime unlocks insurance capital for UK infrastructure consistent with prudential safety. The framework allows but does not require an allocation floor — typically 10–15% of assets to UK productive investment — implemented through tax incentives in the first instance, with mandatory mechanisms kept as contingency if voluntary frameworks underperform.

State pension reform legislation. The triple lock is reformed to a double lock (earnings or inflation, whichever is higher) once foundational state capacity rebuilding is delivering. The triple lock has compounded faster than either underlying metric and is fiscally unsustainable at scale. The fixed pension age is replaced with a flexible claiming window. A national reference age continues to rise, linked to healthy life expectancy rather than crude life expectancy, so that it does not ratchet upwards on the strength of wealthy longevity while poorer citizens die before they collect. But the citizen, not the state, chooses when within the window to begin — earlier at an actuarially adjusted rate, later at an enhanced one, on

the Swedish and Norwegian model, so that the choice is free and the lifetime cost is neutral. The flexibility answers the differential the uniform age ignored: healthy life runs a decade shorter in parts of the North than the wealthiest South, and under a fixed age the longest pensions flowed to those who needed them least; under a chosen one, the worker whose body is spent at sixty-three may go at sixty-three. And because a flat actuarial reduction would press hardest on exactly those forced to claim earliest, years of arduous occupational work earn credits that soften it, on the continental precedent — the early pension follows the scaffolding, not the postcode. The regional instrument is declined: an entitlement varied by address invites gaming at every boundary and punishes regions for recovering their health. The gap itself is attacked as what it is — a health and economic failure — through the renewal programme, rather than compensated as if it were permanent. Legislation passes in the first parliament with phased implementation across subsequent parliaments to manage political and operational transition.

The first-parliament legislative work is the foundation. The results compound across decades. Pension architecture reform is the work of a generation; what the first parliament commits to is putting the foundations in place that enable the generational work to begin.

Fiscal cost in the first parliament is modest: legislative architecture costs little; the National Wealth Fund initial endowment of £10–15 billion is seeded through the blended capital programme (Section XI); operational costs of the expanded NEST and the regulatory architecture for consolidation and infrastructure allocation add approximately £100–200 million annually. The real fiscal commitments arrive in the second and third parliaments as implementation scales.

AI Governance: Legislative Foundations

Of all the policy questions before the country, artificial intelligence is among the most consequential for the coming generation. Britain hosts frontier AI capability of the first rank, treated here as both a strategic asset and a responsibility of state. The first parliament lays the legislative foundations of British AI governance; the work of implementation runs across the parliaments that follow.

The UK AI Security Institute — established as the AI Safety Institute and since renamed — is given statutory authority. The existing body is placed on a primary legislative footing with real powers:

- The mandatory disclosure of capability evaluations for frontier models above defined compute and capability thresholds
- The authority to require safety modifications before the deployment of models meeting defined risk criteria
- Statutory access to model internals for the purposes of evaluation
- The power to set evaluation standards that any frontier laboratory operating in or from the United Kingdom must meet

These powers are written for the most mobile capital on earth, and the behavioural response is priced rather than ignored. A frontier laboratory's assets are weights, people, and compute contracts; powers that bind what operates in or from Britain can be answered by ceasing to operate from Britain, and the European experience since the AI Act — staged releases, models withheld, codes of practice declined — shows the response is real, not theoretical. The architecture therefore prices it the way the tax architecture prices capital flight. The thresholds are graduated, binding in proportion to capability rather than mere presence. Compliance is built to be portable: the evaluation standards are developed for interoperability with the American and European regimes, so that a laboratory meeting the British standard has discharged most of what the others ask, and meeting it once is an asset carried everywhere rather than a tariff paid at one border. And the constraint is real: the binding limit of British AI governance is what other jurisdictions do not require, which is why the international coordination this section commits to is load-bearing rather than decorative. The aim is a regime leading laboratories comply with once and carry with them — regulatory craftsmanship, which this framework claims as Britain's advantage, applied first to its own design.

Britain's comparative advantage in this domain lies in that craftsmanship rather than in home-team laboratory development, and the framework puts it to use. The Institute is built to be of the first rank — staffed through the international recruitment pathway with senior AI safety researchers from the leading laboratories and the academic institutions in the field, under the Cura Custodum-equivalent guaranteed citizenship pathway for those completing multi-year contracts.

Algorithmic decision-making within government is brought under proper governance. The remit of GAIA extends to the deployment of AI in public administration. The principle is simple: AI assists the civil servant; it does not replace the human accountability owed to citizens for decisions affecting their lives. Algorithmic decision-making in welfare, immigration, criminal justice, and the other domains in which the state acts upon individual rights requires human accountability in the loop, transparency in operation, the right of appeal against automated decisions, and audit of deployed systems for accuracy, bias, and effect. The state may use AI; the state remains answerable for what AI produces in its name.

Labour market disruption is recognised as a structural risk. AI may compress labour markets across the horizon in ways no policy now in place can handle, and the framework says so openly. The Universal Credit reforms and the institutional development of sectoral bargaining, both set out in Section VIII, are made to bear this weight, strengthened so as to handle scenarios in which displacement runs ahead of re-employment. The framework does not accept the convention by which AI's effects on labour are deferred as a problem for someone else, at some later time.

Universal Basic Income (UBI) is kept as a contingency response, should AI displacement exceed what the welfare and labour market architecture can absorb. The framework does

not commit to UBI as default policy, but to an architecture capable of deploying it should circumstances require it, with the design work for a British UBI carried forward in parallel to the wider welfare reform so that the instrument exists when it is needed.

AI capability is held as strategic infrastructure. British comparative advantage in AI research is sustained through R&D investment, through an immigration policy that brings senior researchers in (the Cura Custodum guaranteed citizenship pathway extends to senior AI safety and capability researchers), and through the wider industrial strategy. AI capability is held with the seriousness given to nuclear energy and defence: long-horizon investment, sustained commitment across parliaments, integration with the wider strategic architecture of the country.

International coordination is pursued in earnest. The framework engages with the implementation of the EU AI Act, with the regulatory architecture emerging in the United States, and with the wider international AI governance order through the AI Safety Summit institutions, the Council of Europe AI Convention, and bilateral cooperation with allies. British AI governance is built to be interoperable with peer democratic governance, not divergent from it.

Fiscal cost in the first parliament: the AI Security Institute at full statutory scale runs approximately £300–500 million a year at maturity, with build cost across the first parliament. It is funded through the recurring revenue envelope as foundational regulatory capacity, not as discretionary spending.

Constitutional Convention Convened

A Citizens' Constitutional Convention is convened in the first parliament: a body of citizens, selected to reflect the country and resourced to deliberate properly, charged with examining the questions a renewal of the constitution must confront — the electoral system, the form of the second chamber, the relationship between the nations of the Union, and the case for a written constitution and a civic oath. The Convention deliberates and recommends; it does not legislate, and it does not bind. Parliament remains sovereign and enacts what follows from its work, and changes of constitutional magnitude are put to the people by referendum. What the framework commits to is not obedience to an unelected body but good faith in the process: to convene the Convention, to bring its recommendations before Parliament and the country rather than quietly shelving the inconvenient ones, and to abide by what Parliament and the people then decide, including outcomes some who began this movement might personally oppose.

The Convention's relationship to this framework is bounded in advance, because a thirty-year programme cannot leave its own machinery as an open question. The Convention is deliberative and its recommendations advisory: they proceed to enactment only through Parliament, and where they touch the fundamentals — the electoral system, the structure of the Union — through referendum. Should the polity choose to change the machine itself,

the framework continues on whichever machine the polity chooses: the tier structure is an ordering of capacity, revenue, and delivery, and it does not depend on any particular electoral system to run. What the Convention may not do is suspend the work while the constitutional question is argued; the two proceed in parallel, and the renewal of the state does not wait on the renewal of its rulebook.

A provisional note: the framework does not propose to reopen the monarchy, which it takes as broadly settled, reformed only where necessary. The Union is a different matter — the working lean is towards maintaining it, but it sits within the Convention's remit and deserves careful analysis rather than reflex commitment.

The Convention's work takes most of the first parliament; its recommendations and any necessary referendum proceed in the second.

One implication must be faced squarely: the Convention's remit includes the electoral system, and the polity may choose to change how it is governed. The framework does not rest on any one party holding power across its horizon; it is built to be modular for precisely that reason, so that what is rebuilt endures under whoever inherits it. The framework accepts this without hedging. It forces nothing on the British people; it offers a path and accepts the polity's verdict on the democratic process itself, including a verdict that complicates its own delivery. It can accept this because the foundational rebuild does not belong to one movement or one party. State capacity that works, a productive economy, defence that deters, institutions that deliver, and the one-time revenue already raised and spent in building them: none of this is a larger slice of the pie handed to one side. They are a larger pie, and a better one, for whoever governs next, of any complexion. A constitutional verdict changes who governs and how the gains are shared; it does not change whether the rebuilt capacity endures, because what has been built cannot be un-built and serves every successor that inherits it. The contestable part is only the recurring social programme of the later tiers, and its revisability by a future government is the polity's right, not a defect. How a distant future government behaves beyond this programme's horizon is outside the document's scope, and the framework does not pretend to bind a future it cannot see.

The framework seeks no entrenchment against a future Parliament, which nothing can provide. Its only protection is the political cost of dismantling a working national capability for partisan advantage: a government that does so must answer for the choice in the open. That cost is real, and for a rebuild that serves whoever governs next, it is protection enough.

The First Parliament's Fiscal Position

The cumulative additional spending at the end of the first parliament reaches roughly £22–33 billion annually at the end-of-parliament run rate — a figure summed from its components in the ledger rather than asserted — and it is a run rate by design: spending in the early years, before the new revenue lands, runs far below the end state, with the Cura baseline and the defence trajectory building towards their full rates as collection capability

delivers, and no recurring commitment financed by borrowing while it waits. The figure sits well within the tax envelope as the tax architecture reforms generate the revenue side of the contract. This modest figure reflects the deferral of the personal allowance increase to the second parliament; with that £20–30 billion foregone-revenue commitment excluded, the first parliament's recurring position stays deliberately tight. The periodic progressive wealth tax provides the additional capital investment funding for renewal-scale priorities that recurring revenue cannot cover.

The first parliament's recurring spending is deliberately restrained, and the restraint follows from the Capacity Parliament discipline: the heavy spending commitments sit in the second and third parliaments, conditional on the first parliament's foundational work succeeding.

The restraint has a visible side. Three of the first parliament's commitments are delivered within the term itself, and all are funded from the floor rather than the forecast: they do not wait on the productivity recovery. The route around the asylum system closes from the date of announcement, and the control this restores is immediate. The Cura Custodum baseline reaches those in uniform and the clinical workforce of the health service across the parliament, as recognition owed rather than relief promised. And the replacement of council tax by the land value tax redistributes the burden of local taxation by arithmetic rather than by grant: council tax takes a far higher effective rate from a modest terrace in the North than from a high-value home in the South East, and its replacement cuts bills across most of the post-industrial regions within the first parliament — a change a household feels when it lands, not a statistic it is asked to believe. The timing is stated: the bills change when the valuation is done, late in the parliament, not at its start, because a national land valuation is real work that Britain has deferred since 1991 and this framework declines to pretend otherwise. None of the three is the transformation the later parliaments carry. All are the part of the work a citizen can see, and weigh, within a single term.

Limits of the First Parliament

What the first parliament does not deliver is named openly. Universal childcare to full coverage. NHS reform's operational improvements. Universal Credit comprehensive reform. The personal allowance increase. Drug policy reform. The larger defence increases up the trajectory beyond the first parliament's opening level. The major industrial strategy investments. The broad Cura Custodum extension beyond military and NHS clinical scope. Sectoral bargaining beyond initial legislative framework and social care pilot. The housing programme reaching scale.

These commitments are made, but to subsequent parliaments.

VIII. The Roof: The Second Parliament

The second parliament begins the policy reform that the first parliament's institutional rebuilding makes possible. The commitments are Tier 2 and the early-deliverable elements of Tier 3, conditional on the first parliament's Tier 1 work having succeeded.

NHS Baseline Reform

The NHS is a civilisational achievement, and as currently administered it is failing its users. The country has been offered a false binary for forty years — worship versus privatisation. Neither captures what is required. Healthcare free at the point of use remains the principle. The institution that delivers on that principle must be reformed by those who believe in it, before it is destroyed by those who do not.

The reform programme sits within Tier 2 in the second parliament, with Tier 3 extensions phased across the third parliament.

Ending permanent reorganisation. The NHS has been reorganised by ministers approximately every five years since the early 1980s. Each reorganisation costs years of operational productivity. The NHS architecture is settled and left alone for at least a decade. The political discipline to leave well alone is itself a reform, and one that previous governments of both parties have demonstrably lacked.

The Frontline Advisory Council. A standing NHS Frontline Advisory Council with statutory authority to be consulted on operational and policy reforms. Membership drawn from currently practising clinical staff across specialties, regions, and roles. Members continue clinical practice while serving, ensuring perspective stays grounded in actual patient care. Reports to Parliament, not the Department of Health and Social Care. Annual cost approximately £30–50 million.

Workforce stabilisation. Pay restoration to address the real-terms decline of NHS pay over the last fifteen years. Cura Custodum framework applied to NHS clinical staff. Large-scale expansion of UK domestic training capacity across all clinical professions — medical school places increased by 40–60% over a decade, with full doubling set as a longer-horizon aspiration because faculty, clinical placement capacity, and postgraduate training places do not exist for it within a decade; nursing, allied health professional, and paramedic training similarly expanded. Annual fiscal commitment approximately £4–6 billion across the training pipeline at full implementation.

Priority operational improvements. GP capacity expansion through retention work plus multidisciplinary team expansion. Diagnostic capacity expansion addressing Britain's position as having the lowest MRI and CT scanners per capita among advanced economies. Mental health parity actually delivered, with the specific commitment that children's mental health waiting times are reduced to clinically appropriate timescales within two parliaments.

Hospital flow and discharge integration. Annual additional cost approximately £7–10 billion at full implementation across these operational priorities.

Dentistry. The collapse of NHS dentistry has a clear proximate cause: the 2006 contract, which pays for units of dental activity (UDA) rather than outcomes, underpays complex work, and — because dentists are independent contractors free to take private patients — drives an exodus the moment NHS work stops covering its cost. The reform is to replace that model with one that pays the real cost of care and rewards prevention and access over throughput. The framework will not pretend the contract is the whole problem. Three things must hold with it: the new payment is set against the actual cost of delivering NHS care, a figure no government has yet established and without which any contract reproduces the old failure at a new rate; the NHS offer is made positively attractive rather than merely less punishing, set out in the Dental Settlement below, since in a mixed market the private alternative always absorbs the supply the NHS cannot hold; and the honest position, long avoided — on present capacity, universal NHS dentistry is not restored within a single parliament, so access is rebuilt in priority order, children and urgent and high-need care first, with the ring-fenced budget spent in full rather than handed back unspent as it has lately been. The longer answer is prevention: the water fluoridation and supervised-brushing measures in the Prevention Settlement are dental policy as much as public health, and they bend the demand a treatment-only system would chase forever. The incremental contract changes already enacted — urgent-care quotas, complex-care pathways, and wider use of therapists and nurses — sit in the baseline; what the framework commits to is the fundamental replacement they stop short of.

Capital and estate. Large capital investment programme: approximately £15–20 billion over a decade for hospital rebuilding and major refurbishment, plus £5 billion for mental health facility renewal, funded through the wealth tax allocation in the early years and capital borrowing against productive returns thereafter, consistent with the capital-funding framework in Section XI.

The fiscal commitment. NHS baseline reform additional recurring cost approximately £12–15 billion annually at full implementation in the second parliament, with the package reaching £18–22 billion by the end of the third parliament as workforce expansion compounds. The conditional architecture in Section XI holds this commitment visible and accountable.

The Dental Settlement

Dentistry is restored through a reciprocal settlement in which the state grants generously and the dentist serves, each half of it real. The contract reform makes NHS work viable; viable is not the same as chosen. What holds a dentist in the NHS, where a private chair in the same street pays more, is not a rate but a settlement — a reason to commit that survives contact with the numbers. The problem is the one every skilled profession the state cannot conscript presents — how to win the professional and then keep her — and the

framework answers it here as it does for teaching: with a reciprocal bargain rather than a bidding war it would lose.

Recruitment is won at the point of choosing, and won as a gift rather than a debt. The cost of qualifying — the training of a dentist, or the conversion step a returning or overseas-trained clinician actually needs — is funded for those who commit to NHS service, and weighted towards the places that have least. But the gift is earned across service rather than handed over at the gate: it accrues year by year as the dentist does NHS work, and a clinician who leaves early keeps only what was earned, with nothing clawed back and no one left in a hole. There is no lump to seize and walk away with. Three filters keep the offer sound, as they do its counterpart in teaching: the skill it demands, which cannot be faked; the funding paced to service, which leaves the grab-and-go nothing to grab; and the work itself, which the uncommitted do not sustain.

But recruitment fills the chair only once; what empties it is the work. Dentists leave the NHS for the reason teachers leave the classroom — not pay alone, but a working life that does not pay its way and grinds without relief. So the state's half is not the gift but the job, and the reciprocity is exact: if the dentist owes service, the state owes work worth committing to. That means NHS care paid at its genuine cost rather than at a loss; the administrative churn of the old contract lifted; and, where supply is shortest, an NHS payment raised above cost to make the underserved place worth choosing — the targeted top-up doing the work a blanket subsidy cannot. It is the conditions, not the cheque alone, that do the keeping.

The settlement is plain about its limits, and turns the chief one into a design. It does not pretend to hold every dentist in the NHS, and does not try: in the wealthiest catchments a private chair will always outbid any reasonable NHS offer, and the framework declines to bankrupt itself resisting that. Nor should it want to. The affluent area is precisely where NHS dental need is lowest, so a drift to private there frees capacity rather than losing it — the market serving those who can serve themselves, and the NHS budget concentrating where the need actually is. The measure of the settlement is therefore not universal retention, which is neither achievable nor desirable, but NHS dental capacity held where need is greatest: the same priority order — children, urgent care, the high-need and the underserved place — by which the whole dental reform is built. Its cost sits within the dentistry commitment already carried in the NHS baseline; what it buys is the difference between a contract that no longer loses money and a profession that actually stays.

The Prevention Settlement

Every NHS settlement before this one has treated demand as weather: something to be funded, never something to be bent. The framework declines the habit, because the arithmetic now compels it twice over. Healthy life runs roughly a decade shorter in the poorest parts of Britain than in the richest, and the flexible pension window is indexed to exactly that measure — which makes prevention, for the first time, not a health policy with

fiscal benefits but a central part of the pension arithmetic itself. A country that does not bend the curve of avoidable illness pays for the failure three times: in the NHS that treats it, in the workforce that leaves early because of it, and in a pension architecture that counts it. Prevention is also the policy domain most cruelly mismatched to electoral time — its costs land in this parliament and its benefits in the fourth — which is precisely why a thirty-year framework is its natural vehicle, and why every five-year government before this one planted so little of it.

The liberty question comes first, because this is the ground where policy is routinely caricatured into nannying. The citizen's freedom is the point, not the obstacle — and the present food and drink environment is not a neutral landscape in which free choices are made but a commercial engineering project optimised, with great skill and budget, towards the outcomes Britain now treats in hospital. The framework does not lecture the citizen; it fixes the environment. The instrument set follows the evidence of what has actually worked. Reformulation is the quiet giant: the soft drinks levy removed roughly a third of the sugar from the category without banning a single product or costing the consumer a choice, and the same architecture extends across processed food — voluntary targets first, statutory levies on published dates where voluntary fails, the conditional grant applied to industry. The generational tobacco endgame already in statute is enforced rather than relitigated, because smoking remains the success that proves the method. Alcohol pricing follows the Scottish evidence on minimum unit pricing, aimed where the deaths are. Advertising of the engineered diet to children ends, on the same principle by which the framework protects children from every other commercial capture of their attention. Water fluoridation is expanded where the local evidence supports it, the cheapest and most equitable dental intervention there is and the one that reaches the children least likely ever to see a dentist; and supervised toothbrushing is established in early-years settings in the areas of highest need.

The active half of the settlement is built rather than urged. The planning reform and the new towns consent walkable, cycleable places as the default, because the cheapest exercise programme in history is a street a person can cross; the school day carries the Life Skills curriculum's food and cooking competence; and the Children's Settlement's outdoor entitlement is, among everything else it is, the largest physical-activity programme Britain will have run. The new pharmacology is treated as a tool, not a verdict: the weight-loss drugs work, their price does not yet, and the NHS deploys them as a conditional grant — rollout widening as price falls and long-term evidence accrues — while the framework declines the fantasy that a molecule repeals the need to fix the food environment that fills the queue.

The settlement's accounting: the levies are revenue-positive, the planning and curriculum instruments are regulation and redirection, the drugs line is carried within the NHS settlement, and the public-health grant to local government — quietly cut by more than a quarter in real terms over a decade — is restored as part of the council repair, since the

services it buys are the cheap upstream of everything expensive. The benefits are claimed at their true tempo: little inside one parliament, compounding across four, measured in the only currency that ultimately matters here — the closing of the decade-wide gap in healthy life that this framework's own pension promise now depends upon. Fitness of the nation was a founding purpose of this project, and the settlement gives it what founding purposes require: instruments, dates, and a ledger row.

Universal Childcare

The single highest-return social investment available to the modern state. Workforce participation rises markedly, particularly for women. Child outcomes improve, particularly for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. A meaningful fraction of the cost — around a third to a half — is recovered through increased tax revenue and reduced welfare dependency over time.

Universal childcare from approximately age one is rolled out across the second parliament, with full coverage achieved by the end. Annual cost rises to around £15 billion gross, £8–10 billion net at full coverage.

The binding constraint is people, not money. Full coverage requires in the order of a hundred thousand additional qualified early-years staff, in a sector that has been shrinking, and no funding line conjures them. The rollout therefore begins with the pipeline rather than the promise: early-years educator routes through the further education (FE) expansion, pay and conditions set through the early-years sectoral agreement arriving in the same parliament, and coverage certified region by region as staffing — not merely funding — is in place. If the pipeline underdelivers, coverage extends into a third parliament under the named contingency; what the programme will not do is dilute ratios or qualification standards to hit a date.

Universal Credit Reform

The reform begins from a principle the present system has lost: that the purpose of welfare is participation, not the minimising of a cheque. The system is judged here by how many people it brings into contribution and a stake in the common life, not by how little it pays out. That reframing matters because the public picture is distorted. The work-capable claimant who could work and will not looms far larger in the public mind than in the figures: fraud runs at a small fraction of the bill, and the great bulk of welfare spending goes not to the idle but to pensioners, the disabled, carers, and people already in work whose low wages are topped up. The real growth is in sickness, above all mental ill-health, not in indolence. A framework that prizes rigour over grievance aims its welfare policy at that true picture rather than at the vivid exception.

Two principles follow. The first is that worklessness is treated as a harm to be remedied, including a harm to the person: idleness and exclusion corrode, and a citizen left with no

role and no stake is someone the polity has failed, not merely a cost it carries. The second is that the gate for health-related support is functional capacity, not the severity of a diagnosis. The question is not how grave a condition sounds but whether, with reasonable treatment and adjustment, a person can work; and the default for treatable, work-compatible conditions is support into work, because that serves the person as much as the public finances. Genuine incapacity is carried without grudge, which is what makes the expectation of everyone else fair rather than punitive.

The immediate changes are concrete. They are felt in the first months, not deferred:

- First payment within days rather than weeks.
- A gentler taper, so that work always pays.
- Adequate levels, benchmarked against a genuine measure of minimum living cost.
- Sanctions used rarely, and only for clear non-compliance.

Disability assessment, where the current system inflicts the most harm, is redesigned with genuine clinical input. The practice of contracting assessments to private firms with perverse targets is ended. The medical evidence of claimants' own doctors is treated as presumptive, not secondary. Appeals architectures are restructured so that getting initial decisions wrong carries institutional consequences.

Targeted adjustments for categories of acute harm. Three are made where the harm is sharpest:

- A children's element uplift, addressing child poverty rates that have risen sharply since 2010.
- Housing element reform, aligning Local Housing Allowance with actual rents in genuinely high-cost areas.
- Disability premium restoration for severe disability categories.

Second-parliament additional cost approximately £3–5 billion. Full adequacy benchmarking to minimum income standard is a Tier 4 commitment maturing across the third and fourth parliaments as the programme produces the productive capacity that funds welfare adequacy.

The further horizon. Beyond what this framework commits to fund, the logic points towards a further destination, named here as a direction rather than a promise. If worklessness is a harm and participation the aim, the end of the road is a standing offer the market cannot always make: paid, useful civic work for any capable citizen the labour market has not placed, the state acting as employer of last resort, so that no one able to contribute is left with nothing to do. It is the most demanding form of the principle and the most expensive, and it is neither costed into the programme nor promised. The framework points to it as the shape of a finished settlement, to be built only if the programme exceeds expectation and the fiscal capacity is there.

Personal Allowance Increase

The personal allowance is raised from £12,570 to approximately £16,000–18,000, sequenced into the second parliament once recurring revenue from the first-parliament tax architecture is arriving and the fiscal headroom is established. Foregone income tax revenue approximately £20–30 billion annually.

This is meaningful relief for lower earners and the principal mechanism by which the tax architecture produces net progressive distributional effect on the lower income distribution. The first parliament's tax architecture raises revenue from wealth, property, and higher incomes; the personal allowance increase in the second parliament returns a defined share of that revenue to working people at lower incomes. The sequencing is fiscal discipline, not distributional retreat.

Drug Policy Reform

Full regulated legalisation of cannabis on the Canadian model. Licensed producers and retailers, quality controls, age restrictions, advertising restrictions, taxation generating approximately £1–2 billion annually.

Portuguese-style decriminalisation of personal use for other controlled substances, treating use as a public health matter rather than a criminal one. Users are referred to health services, not courts. Law enforcement focus shifts to organised supply.

State-controlled medical supply of harder drugs begins on the Swiss model — supervised provision for dependent users, at the full scale of demonstrated need rather than the token scale Britain has piloted before. The objective beyond it is unapologetic: the illegal market for hard drugs dies only when its consumer base leaves it, and the framework intends that death. But the path there is gated, not presumed. Eligibility expands in defined stages, each conditional on the evidence of the last — illicit market share falling, deaths from unknown purity falling towards zero, acquisitive crime falling, initiation not rising — assessed publicly on the same discipline that governs every staged commitment in this framework. Britain follows what Switzerland has proven and leads where the evidence licenses the next step, in that order.

A specialist statutory review panel is established to examine sentences currently being served for drug offences. Automatic release or resentencing applies where conduct would not be criminal or would be less seriously penalised under the reformed regime. Historic convictions are expunged where the underlying conduct is no longer criminal.

The benefit is operational, not purely revenue: approximately ten to fifteen per cent of current police time is freed up, prison capacity is reclaimed, criminal justice load reduces sharply. The savings cascade across the system.

Defence: The Path Up the Spending Trajectory

Defence spending rises on the trajectory towards 3.5% of GDP on core spending, measured on the agreed NATO definition and set on the alliance timeline, with the path beyond the first parliament's opening level conditioned on procurement reform demonstrably working. The level reached is set against strategic conditions through annual defence reviews, with the wider resilience and security spending counted towards the total as set out in Section XIII.

Continued integrated digital warfare capability development. Cura Custodum military implementation reaches full scale. Intelligence community expansion continues. Sovereign space capability development begins in earnest. Reservist system rebuilding continues towards the doubled trained reserve of approximately 80,000 across all services.

Annual additional cost above the first parliament's 2.5% commitment approximately £15–20 billion, depending on level within range and GDP at the time. The conditionality binds: if procurement reform fails to release projected waste, the further defence increases are constrained accordingly.

Nuclear deterrent continues with Dreadnought programme completion. The strategic deterrent is grim necessity rather than choice. In a world where the American security guarantee is no longer reliable, an independent British nuclear capability is the ultimate backstop against coercion. Continuous-at-sea deterrence is maintained.

The nuclear power programme described in Section IX begins capital deployment, with state capital commitment scaling to approximately £8–12 billion annually at peak across capital and operations, alongside the large private capital component through the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model.

Planning Reform

The political fight is formidable but the legislation can be done in a single parliament. The first parliament prepared the ground — the national land valuation the LVT requires is the survey work planning reform inherits; the second parliament delivers the reform.

Discretionary case-by-case permission is replaced with rules-based zoning for most development, modelled on Japanese and continental European systems. Meaningful democratic input occurs at the zone-setting stage, with minimal case-by-case discretion thereafter.

The Green Belt is reformed, not abolished. The 1950s-era blanket designation gives way to a designation system based on actual ecological and amenity value. Low-value Green Belt within reasonable distance of transport infrastructure is released for housing. High-value landscapes are protected properly under ecological designations.

The Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects regime is strengthened with real teeth. Strategic projects — energy, rail, water, industrial sites — are decided at national level on national criteria.

Permission, though, is only half of what a strategic project needs; the other half is a connection to the grid, and here Britain's true bottleneck lies. A factory or a data centre may hold its consent and still wait years in a queue to draw power, projects that are ready stranded behind projects that are merely speculative, the line ordered by the date of application rather than the readiness to build. The framework ends that. Connection for projects of strategic national scale is prioritised and accelerated, the queue reordered so that the ready connect first, and the grid reinforcement the energy programme builds is planned against where demand will actually fall rather than where it happens to have queued. The power the nuclear-and-renewables build produces is of little use to an industry it cannot reach.

And for the largest arrivals the framework offers a single front door. A strategic inward investment of defined scale is met not by a sequence of separate permissions — planning, connection, environmental, and the rest — pursued through separate bodies on separate clocks, but by one accelerated and coordinated consent, the planning analogue of the binding tax certainty offered elsewhere. The firm bringing significant capital is told, quickly and bindingly, what it may build and when it may draw power, rather than left to discover both across years of fragmented process. This is the deployment promise without which the rest of the invitation is only words.

Direct fiscal cost is modest; the indirect cost is borne by homeowners whose property appreciation slows.

Housing Programme

The housing programme begins at scale in the second parliament, building on the planning reform and the capital programme. Public, private, cooperative, and self-build construction in the places people want to live.

Right to Buy is repealed for new social housing tenancies; existing tenants who have already exercised the right retain their ownership. The remaining social housing stock is preserved as social housing rather than continuing to deplete.

Renter rights reform on the European peer model:

- Indefinite tenancies as default, not the current assured shorthold structure.
- Landlord termination only on defined grounds.
- The German Mietspiegel model of rent regulation in high-demand areas.
- Proper deposit protection.
- Building quality enforcement.

- Tenant advocacy properly resourced.

New towns programme connected to industrial strategy, with public ownership of underlying land at agricultural rather than development value, infrastructure built alongside housing rather than retrofitted later. Capital allocation approximately £4–8 billion across the decade through the blended capital programme.

Existing stock quality programme: energy efficiency retrofit at scale, damp and mould enforcement strengthened, building safety post-Grenfell completion. Annual fiscal commitment approximately £3–5 billion for grant programmes.

The housing programme reaches the pace required only by the end of the second parliament. The first parliament's planning reform is the precondition; the second parliament's sustained investment delivers the scale. Generational results follow across the third and fourth parliaments.

Civic Identity Card

The card has two functions. The first is to make the citizen's dealings with the state simpler and faster — one verified means of proving who they are, in place of the dozen separate accounts and posted letters that burden ordinary life. The second is to make remaining in the country unlawfully impractical: at each gate where entitlement matters — work, rent, banking, benefits, publicly funded care — the card answers whether the person before it is entitled to what they seek. The state need never find the undocumented person. It has only to close the doors through which an unlawful life is lived, until resolving status or leaving is the course that remains. The same gate that spares the citizen an afternoon of paperwork makes the shadow economy unliveable.

What the card amounts to is a verifier of entitlement at defined points. A person does not carry it to be demanded in the street; there is no routine requirement to produce it, and possessing it enrols no one in anything. It answers a specific question at a specific threshold and is otherwise silent. It distinguishes citizen from non-citizen, and lawful from unlawful presence, at the points where that distinction carries consequences. The breadth is owned: the card is the civic spine and gates the major economic and civic transactions of a life. Its safety lies in what the architecture forbids — set out below — and in the rule that no new gate may be added except by a fresh Act.

Cost and timing. The card is launched in the second parliament after first-parliament HMRC and digital government capacity rebuilding has produced the foundation. Front-loaded capital cost over the parliament of perhaps £3–5 billion. Operational costs from completion are modest at perhaps £200–500 million annually.

Where it is required. The card is required at major economic and civic chokepoints: employment, banking, tax, benefits, healthcare administration. It is not made a new condition of voting: the franchise is governed by electoral law, which already sets its own

identification requirements, and this card adds no further gate — voting remains the constitutional act of the citizen on the polity, not an act gated by this administrative apparatus. There is no routine street-level production requirement.

How it is constrained. The safeguards are stringent. The permitted uses of the card are specified in primary legislation, and no use may be added except by a fresh Act, debated and passed in its own right. No statute can stop a future Parliament from widening those uses — none can bind its successor — but this one forces any widening into the open, as a named decision that cannot be made by regulation, guidance, or administrative drift. Function creep, where it has happened elsewhere, has happened quietly; here it can happen only loudly. Data architecture is federated rather than centralised — the single credential GAIA's common spine provides proves who a citizen is, while the records it unlocks remain held apart, department by department, so that one identity never becomes one database. The citizen has a right to see who has accessed their identity and when. The civic identity system is kept separate from any online identity infrastructure.

What it returns to the citizen. The card is designed to repay the citizen more than it asks. A document that only ever checks up on people will be resented and evaded; one that removes friction from ordinary life will be used. So the same identity verified at the economic chokepoints also unlocks a single, secure means of dealing with the state: one verified sign-on for tax, benefits, health administration, pensions, and licensing, in place of a dozen separate accounts and posted verification letters; instant proof of the right to work and the right to rent, replacing the paper ordeal that currently burdens every job and tenancy; a change of address told once and propagated across services rather than re-entered at each; and age verification that confirms a threshold without disclosing the identity behind it. For the unbanked, who are disproportionately the poorest, a free and official verified identity removes the first barrier to a bank account. The principle is single: the card must take less from the citizen's time than it returns.

Protecting the young without building a surveillance state. The state has resolved, rightly, to keep the youngest children off social media and to curb the features that do them the most harm. The protective instinct is sound: these products are engineered for compulsion, and the algorithmic churn of outrage and comparison falls on a developing mind as something closer to an assault than a pastime. But the manner of protection matters as much as the fact of it. An age limit enforced by requiring every adult to prove they are not a child is, by a short step, a requirement that every adult identify themselves to use the public square — a children's safeguard quietly become a universal identity register. That is precisely the road this framework refuses. The card's age check answers the only question that needs answering — is this person over the threshold — and answers it without disclosing who they are, to the platform or to the state. The harm to be regulated is the design: the compulsion architecture and the targeting of the young, which the state may govern as it governs any product built to injure its user, the same way it regulates the

engineering of a slot machine or the additives in food. What is said by adults in the course of lawful speech is no part of it, and is left where a free country leaves it.

The fraud it closes. The card also closes a category of fraud that administrative effort alone never reaches. The frauds that turn on identity — simultaneous claims under different names, claims by people who have left the country, claims tied to identities that do not exist — collapse when entitlement is bound to a single verified person. It makes a rule the country already has self-executing: that there is no recourse to public funds before settled status, established at the point of claim rather than discovered long after it. This is a contribution to welfare integrity on the axis of identity, and only that axis. The card does not police income; under-declared earnings are matched through existing real-time tax data, not through the card. And it is emphatically not a fraud-scoring instrument: it does not link a citizen's records across government to generate suspicion, score behaviour, or flag individuals for investigation. That precise design, cross-departmental data linkage producing risk reports on individuals, has been struck down in European courts as a violation of private life and has driven governments from office where it was deployed. The card verifies that a person is real, present, and entitled. It does not watch what they do.

The entitlements it also delivers. The same machinery, turned the other way, serves an obligation the polity holds as firmly as it pursues fraud, though the arithmetic here runs against the Treasury rather than for it. A large sum in benefits and reliefs goes unclaimed each year, lost not to any choice of the state but to the maze of separate applications and to simple unawareness that an entitlement exists. The common spine reaches the near-free half of this directly (Section IV): the joined identity that closes fraud also closes official error and underpayment — money the state already means to pay and pays wrongly — and strips administrative cost from both sides of the counter. That correction is kept here without reservation, because it funds nothing new and merely pays correctly what is already owed. The far larger half is another matter. Unclaimed entitlement is a liability the polity owes and does not currently fund; to deliver it in full would convert a phantom underspend into real recurring expenditure of many billions, building neither capacity nor revenue and so earning no place in the early tiers. It belongs with the aspirational horizon, alongside the Universal Credit adequacy commitment it completes (Section X): the spine builds the means by which a citizen reaches what they are owed, and the deliberate raising of take-up waits, as the fullest social ambitions wait, on the programme working and the fiscal performance permitting. What the framework will not do is bank the public's ignorance of its own entitlements and call it prudence.

Independent oversight. Those safeguards are extended by an institution and a principle. The institution is an independent statutory body with full audit access to the system, charged with guarding the citizen against both the agency that operates the card and the government of the day. The principle is transparency of the system set against the absence of standing access to the person: the rules the card runs by, the data it may link, and the queries it permits are public and independently audited, while no committee or official

holds browsing access to individual records. The citizen's existing right to see who has accessed their identity is what makes the watching mutual — the watchers are watched, and watched by the person whose data it is. Three roles are kept apart: the agency that operates the card, the independent body that oversees it, and the Royal Institute, whose part is confined to setting the standards the system must meet and never reaches the data within it. The body that writes the rules, the body that runs the system, and the body that guards the citizen against both are not the same body.

Two hard exclusions. Two uses are excluded by design, and named here so the exclusion is a commitment rather than an omission. The card carries no record of civic participation — not a person's engagement with Cura Custodum, not any measure of contribution — because a card that scored civic worth would be a social credit system under another name, and would exclude first those least able to take part. And the card holds no location capability. A document that could find its holder could track its holder, and the infrastructure for the one is the infrastructure for the other; a citizen's safety, where it is at stake, is a matter for devices they choose to carry, not for the identity every citizen must hold. The card facilitates and it does not monitor: it can enrol a person in Cura Custodum and confirm what they have earned through it, but it does not keep the score.

Sectoral Bargaining: Initial Implementation

The legal framework for sectoral bargaining is established. Social care brought into the new arrangements first, where the public sector is the major funder and the leverage is greatest. Parts of construction follow as institutional capacity permits.

Sectoral bargaining at scale is a decadal project. Germany's Tarifverträge system evolved over a century with strong institutional foundations on both union and employer sides; the Nordic systems took fifty to eighty years to reach their current form. British trade union density is around 22%; British employer associations operate as lobbying organisations, not institutional bargaining counterparts. The institutional capacity required for full sectoral bargaining does not currently exist on either side.

One precondition is named at the outset because the Nordic and German comparators all rest on it and Britain lacks it: employer association density. Collective agreements need organised employers as much as organised workers, and British employers' organisations cover a fraction of what their Swedish or German counterparts do. The framework's position is that this precondition may not be buildable in British industrial culture at the comparators' scale, and the programme does not pretend otherwise. The mechanism therefore carries its own fallback, stated in advance: where employer organisation fails to reach the density that voluntary sectoral agreement requires, the sector proceeds instead through statutory minimum standards councils — tripartite bodies setting enforceable sector floors on pay, conditions, and training, on the model of the wages councils Britain itself operated for most of a century. That is a lesser instrument than true sectoral

bargaining, and no pretence is made otherwise; but it delivers the floor-setting function without waiting on an institutional culture that may never arrive, and it leaves the door open for sectors that organise to graduate to the full architecture.

The second parliament begins the institutional development. Universal coverage is not achievable within the twenty-year horizon. By the end of the period, sectoral bargaining covers perhaps 30–40% of the workforce — a marked transformation from the current near-zero coverage, but not the universal default.

The conditionality is asymmetric: the institutional position offered through sectoral bargaining is gated by union contribution to workforce development including the British Standard Apprenticeship framework, training delivery, member protection, and contribution to the wider social partnership. Unions that perform benefit from significant expansion; unions not performing don't lose what they currently have.

Water Infrastructure

The privatised water company model has produced documented failure on infrastructure investment, environmental performance, and consumer outcomes. Combined sewer overflows have reached levels that breach environmental obligations and produce severe public health consequences. Investment in supply infrastructure has lagged demand growth and climate-driven pressure on water availability. Dividend extraction has continued during periods of environmental non-compliance. The regulatory architecture has proved inadequate to the structural problem. The framework treats this as a critical infrastructure question requiring a structural response.

The second parliament conducts a water sector review with binding consequences. The review examines four options without pre-commitment:

- Full renationalisation of the sector, or of the worst-performing operators.
- Conversion to public-benefit ownership structures — mutual or trust models, on the Welsh Water precedent.
- Greatly strengthened regulatory architecture under continued private ownership, with much harder constraints.
- Combinations of these approaches across different regional operators.

The criteria for the review are published in advance. Environmental performance against proper standards. Infrastructure investment against documented need. Consumer outcomes against value-for-money benchmarks. Long-horizon resilience against climate-driven demand and supply pressure. The review produces binding recommendations, not advisory output.

Whatever ownership outcome the review produces, the investment programme is committed. Combined sewer overflow remediation across the sector requires approximately £60–80 billion across the horizon to bring infrastructure to compliant standards. Drought

resilience and supply security in chronically stressed regions (East Anglia, parts of the South East) require considerable additional capital. The investment is funded through a combination of consumer bills (with explicit progressive structure protecting lower-income households from the full pass-through cost), wealth tax allocation for the most acute infrastructure needs, and private capital under reformed regulatory architecture that aligns returns with environmental performance, not dividend extraction.

The regulatory architecture is reformed regardless of ownership outcome. The economic regulator — Ofwat or the integrated successor now planned — is given enforcement powers including heavy fines for environmental non-compliance, the power to require dividend suspension during periods of non-compliance, and the authority to require infrastructure investment plans that meet documented need. Environmental performance is integrated rather than treated as separate from economic regulation. Consumer interest is properly represented through institutional architecture with standing, not nominal consultation.

The framework rejects the pattern by which water sector failure has been treated as occasional scandal rather than as structural problem. Water infrastructure is critical infrastructure; its failure has consequences for public health, environmental integrity, and economic activity that compound across decades. The investment is large; the alternative is larger still.

Annual fiscal cost across the water sector reform programme: the consumer bill component varies by ownership outcome; the wealth tax allocation contribution approximately £8–12 billion across the horizon for the most acute infrastructure needs; the regulatory reform operational cost modest (approximately £100–200 million annually for expanded regulatory capacity).

The outcome the programme exists for is stated so that it cannot be negotiated away: the use of Britain's rivers and seas as a dumping ground ends. The distinction the framework draws is the one the engineering draws. Some discharge is infrastructure deficit — the Victorian combined sewers that, in storm, can either overflow to the river or back up into homes — and that deficit is built out within the committed programme: storage, separation where it pays, sustainable drainage in every development the planning reform consents, and the wetlands and restored floodplain the three-zone vision supplies, which treat water more cheaply than concrete and are paid for partly as the habitat they also are. Complete separation of every Victorian sewer would cost several hundred billion and the framework does not pretend to it. What it commits to, with dates and a published ratchet, is this: dry-weather discharge ends immediately, because a spill without rain has no engineering excuse and is treated as the offence it is; the waters where the harm concentrates — bathing waters, shellfish waters, the rivers of highest ecological standing — are cleansed first, on named dates; and the national spill volume declines on a published curve that live monitoring makes impossible to fudge. The sea is in this sentence deliberately. The coast this framework asks the country to return to cannot be its outfall; the shellfish waters it

cleans are the export waters the fisheries settlement reopened; and the agricultural share of river pollution is met by the catchment payments in The Land and the Sea, because a river does not care which industry poisoned it.

And where the dumping was a choice, someone answers for it personally. Where discharge occurs with treatment or storage capacity standing available, where plants are run below their permitted capacity to save money, or where monitoring is falsified — and the sector's record contains all three — the response is not a fine absorbed as a cost of business but personal criminal liability for the directors who made the choice, disqualification from office, and clawback of the remuneration the choice protected. The conditional grant runs here in its sternest form: a licence to operate a monopoly on something no one can live without is the deepest grant the state makes, and its conditions are now real. Where a company cannot meet them and fails, the special administration regime restructures it with the losses falling on equity and junior debt, never on bills or the Exchequer. The framework does not rescue balance sheets that were hollowed on purpose.

Pension and Capital Architecture: Implementation Begins

The second parliament begins implementation of the pension and capital architecture reform whose legislative foundations were established in the first parliament.

The National Wealth Fund accumulates. The initial endowment from the blended capital programme is supplemented by ongoing capital allocation from recurring revenue, retained returns from initial investments, and strategic equity holdings as the institution's investment capability develops. Assets at end of second parliament approximately £70–105 billion against the eventual Norwegian-equivalent scale that takes decades to reach.

NEST expansion operationalises. Senior investment management capability is recruited in scale through the international recruitment pathway, with Canadian CPPIB and Australian super fund veterans as priority targets. NEST's asset base grows through continued auto-enrolment contributions and the contribution increase phasing, alongside operational sophistication that enables higher-return investment strategies. The institution's capacity for sophisticated investment in UK productive infrastructure begins delivering.

Pension fund consolidation operationalises. Implementation of the legislative framework reduces the number of UK pension schemes markedly through structured consolidation, addressing the fragmentation that has limited domestic investment capacity. The transition is managed carefully to protect existing beneficiaries; the operational scale of the consolidated industry rises.

Auto-enrolment contribution increase phasing begins. Minimum contributions begin rising from 8% towards 12% across the phasing period, on the Australian model. The take-home pay effect is gradual; the additional capital flowing into pension architecture compounds across the longer period.

Infrastructure allocation framework operationalises. Tax incentives activate for UK pension and insurance investment in UK productive infrastructure. The Solvency UK reform unlocks insurance capital. UK pension funds' allocation to UK productive infrastructure begins rising from the current 2–3% towards the 10–15% range targeted across the longer horizon. The effect begins arriving: domestic capital available for the framework's infrastructure programme, reducing exposure to international institutional investor risk.

State pension reform implementation proceeds. The triple lock transition to the double lock is implemented carefully, with clear communication that the underlying state pension protection remains real and that the reform addresses fiscal sustainability rather than reducing entitlement adequacy.

Second-parliament additional cost approximately £2–4 billion annually beyond first-parliament baseline, comprising operational costs of expanded NEST, regulatory infrastructure for consolidation, and the tax incentive cost for infrastructure allocation. The capital effects — National Wealth Fund accumulation, infrastructure allocation flow — are not fiscal costs but redirections of existing capital and the capital programme already committed.

Criminal Justice that Both Punishes and Rebuilds

The current British justice system fails on every measure its defenders claim matter — charge rates for serious offences including rape have collapsed, court backlogs reach into the tens of thousands of cases and victims wait years for trial, prisons are at effective capacity with governments periodically forced into emergency early-release programmes, more than a third of those released from prison reoffend within a year, rising to nearly sixty per cent for those serving short sentences under twelve months. This is a system in multiple crisis.

Rehabilitation is the proper purpose of imprisonment for first offences and lesser crimes, supported by sustained investment in probation, prison education, and reintegration. Productive work in prison — skills-building, real economic output, earnings directed in part to victim reparation — is standard, not the Victorian cruelty of hard labour, which was abolished in 1948 because it did not work.

For the most heinous crimes — multiple murder, child murder, serial sexual offences — the existing whole-life tariff regime is expanded, retaining the narrow compassionate-release mechanism that keeps the regime lawful under Strasbourg jurisprudence. Life means life: release is the rare and exceptional mercy, never the expectation. This meets the legitimate demand that the worst offenders face proportionate consequences.

Capital punishment is rejected on two grounds. Empirical: every functioning justice system produces wrongful convictions, and Britain's own record — Stefan Kiszko, the Birmingham Six, Timothy Evans, Andrew Malkinson, and hundreds of others — demonstrates that the

cases where certainty is greatest are the cases where error has been most catastrophic. No evidentiary standard eliminates wrongful conviction, because the sources of wrongful conviction affect the quality of evidence itself. The only way to prevent wrongful execution is not to execute. Civic-republican: a state should not hold powers it does not need, particularly irrevocable ones. Whole-life tariffs achieve everything capital punishment achieves without the irreversibility. Granting the state the power to kill its citizens outlives the government that built it.

System capacity is rebuilt as a precondition of any philosophical position. Court backlogs cleared. Charge rates for serious crimes raised sharply. Probation properly resourced. Prison population managed without early-release crises. Justice delayed by three years is justice denied.

Crime, Public Order, and the Institutional Response

The criminal justice section above addresses how the system functions; this commitment addresses what the system responds to. The two are related but distinct, and both need attention in their own right.

The Picture and the Crisis

The picture is mixed and the mixing matters. Total recorded crime has fallen since the 1990s peak by most measures. But the picture varies widely by category. Violent crime is rising. Sexual offences are at record levels — partly through increased reporting, partly through genuine increase, both consequential. Knife crime has risen steeply. Fraud has grown enormously and is now the largest single category by volume, with the institutional response far short of the scale. Cybercrime barely existed three decades ago and is now considerable and largely undetected. The crime picture is not a single trend but several, requiring policy responses calibrated to each.

The institutional response is in crisis. Police numbers were cut deeply after 2010, partially restored, but the workforce is younger and less experienced than at any point in recent decades. Charge rates for serious offences have collapsed — fewer than three per cent of recorded rape offences result in a charge — and this is institutional failure rather than evidential reality. Fraud reporting through Action Fraud produces investigation in a tiny minority of cases. Serious organised crime far exceeds enforcement capacity. The state's response to crime as actually experienced by British citizens has hollowed.

Several existing commitments largely address parts of this picture, and the crime commitment builds on them rather than duplicating their work. Drug policy reform with cannabis legalisation and rationalisation reduces police workload markedly — perhaps ten to fifteen per cent of current police time is freed up. Cura Custodum addresses the recruitment and retention crisis across the police workforce alongside other frontline services. Legal system reform improves the procedural environment within which prosecutions proceed. GAIA modernises case processing and digital evidence handling.

Asylum policy consolidation reduces specific demand drivers at the borders. The wider economic and social commitments reduce some of the conditions that produce particular kinds of crime over time.

What the crime commitment specifically adds is the direct response to crime itself, beyond what these other commitments deliver.

Core Capacity Commitments

Police capacity and equipment. Police numbers sustained at appropriate levels for the demand placed on the workforce, with workforce stabilisation through Cura Custodum addressing the retention crisis that has hollowed experienced capacity. The current pattern of inexperienced workforce facing heavy demand is reversed through proper retention support and the wider Cura Custodum benefits package described in Section VI.

Bodycams as standard issue across all forces. The evidence base is strong — bodycams produce documented benefits including accountability for both officers and complainants, evidential value in prosecution, reductions in use-of-force incidents, and reductions in complaints. Most British forces have rolled them out partially; comprehensive standard issue is straightforward policy. Tasers as standard issue with proper training and accountability frameworks. The alternative in many situations is firearms or physical confrontation, both with worse outcomes for officers and citizens. Capital cost approximately two to four hundred million pounds with modest ongoing costs.

Specialist training and units where evidence supports. Domestic abuse, child protection, sexual violence, serious organised crime, cybercrime, fraud — these all require specialist capability, not generalist response: dedicated units, proper investigative training, and caseloads that allow cases to be worked rather than merely logged. The commitment is to build that capacity consistently across forces, rather than leaving it to the accident of local priority.

Sexual Violence and the Rape Charge Collapse

The proportion of recorded rape offences resulting in a charge has collapsed from around eight per cent in the mid-2010s to fewer than three per cent currently. This is institutional failure rather than reflection of the underlying offences. The structural causes are well-documented — Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) resource constraints producing more cautious charging decisions, evidential complexity around digital evidence, court delays meaning complainants withdraw before trial after waiting years, evidential standards being applied in ways that produce high victim attrition.

The response draws on evidence from jurisdictions that have made progress on sexual violence prosecution outcomes. New Zealand's specialist sexual violence courts have produced higher charge and conviction rates. Iceland has invested in specialist investigative training and dedicated sexual violence units. Some Scandinavian countries operate consent-based legal frameworks that have changed evidential standards in productive ways.

Specialist support services for complainants throughout the legal process have demonstrated benefits across multiple jurisdictions.

The commitments include:

- Specialist police investigation units with proper training and resources, available consistently across the country rather than concentrated in some forces.
- Dedicated CPS sexual violence prosecutors with appropriate caseload limits to allow proper case preparation.
- Specialist court tracks with appropriate timetabling priority, drawing on the New Zealand specialist court model.
- Reform of disclosure rules around complainant digital evidence, where the current pattern of complainants surrendering their entire phone history is a documented major attrition driver.
- Proper independent advocacy throughout the process for complainants.
- Specialist judicial training.
- Public information campaigns about consent law that target the actual cultural patterns producing offence rather than generic awareness messaging.

The fiscal commitment is moderate compared to the benefit — approximately two to five hundred million pounds annually — funded through the recurring tax envelope as part of criminal justice investment. The rape charge collapse cannot be reversed in a single parliament. Sustained institutional reform across police, CPS, courts, and support services produces results over years rather than months. The commitment is to deliver the institutional reform with the discipline that produces results, rather than the rhetorical commitment that has characterised previous responses.

Fraud: The National Fraud Agency

Fraud is the largest single crime category by volume, perhaps forty per cent of all reported crime, and the institutional response falls far short of the scale. Action Fraud has been documented as essentially non-functional, with the vast majority of reports producing no investigation. Police forces typically deprioritise fraud because it is cross-jurisdictional and resource-intensive. The National Economic Crime Centre exists but is small relative to the scale.

The institutional response is the National Fraud Agency, established in the first parliament as set out in Section VII. Its consolidation of the fragmented current effort — Action Fraud, NECC, regional police fraud units, the relevant Financial Conduct Authority enforcement, and HMRC's fraud response — into a single body with statutory authority, and its funding model of general revenue scaled to the problem rather than to its own seizures, are set out there and not repeated here. What this commitment carries is the Agency's operational maturation across the second parliament, as unified investigation, prosecution, and asset recovery capability reaches the scale the crime category warrants.

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 already establishes the legal framework for asset recovery. What is missing is the dedicated institutional capacity to apply it consistently and at scale to fraud, and the Agency's establishment fills that gap. Funded to the scale fraud's position as Britain's largest crime category by volume warrants, and measured on the fraud it clears and the deterrence it builds rather than the sums it brings in, it becomes an enforcement capacity proportionate to the problem for the first time.

Cybercrime

Cybercrime against UK citizens, businesses, and infrastructure is considerable and growing. The current institutional response is fragmented across National Crime Agency (NCA), GCHQ's NCSC, regional police cyber units, and various sector-specific bodies. The policy commitment is to an integrated response combining the defensive infrastructure that GAIA and wider cyber capability provide (cross-referenced to defence section) with prosecution capacity for cybercrime against British citizens and businesses. The National Fraud Agency takes responsibility for fraud-related cybercrime; the cybercrime response sits with NCA in coordination with NCSC.

The challenge is jurisdictional. Most cybercrime against British citizens originates abroad, often from jurisdictions where prosecution cooperation is limited. The response is therefore partly preventive (better defensive infrastructure, citizen education, platform accountability) and partly enforcement against criminals operating within reach. International cooperation through Five Eyes and partnerships is part of the response, recognising the limits of unilateral British action against international cybercrime.

Serious Organised Crime

The current institutional response is fragmented across NCA, regional crime units, Border Force, intelligence agencies for some functions. The scale of organised crime affecting British citizens — drug trafficking, modern slavery, county lines distribution, financial crime through London-based structures — far exceeds current enforcement capacity. The commitment is to the NCA properly resourced and consolidated, with statutory authority appropriate to its responsibilities, integrated with intelligence community capabilities (cross-referenced to defence section).

Financial crime through London-based structures requires particular attention. The City's role in international money laundering is well-documented and heavily under-enforced. The combination of beneficial ownership transparency reforms, dedicated financial crime enforcement capacity within the Agency structures, and proper resourcing of financial regulators produces the institutional response the scale requires. This is uncomfortable territory because some of the activity benefits the British financial sector economically, but the country cannot accept being a global laundering centre regardless of revenue implications.

Rehabilitation for Non-Violent and First Offences

The evidence on outcomes is clear — reoffending rates are lower for community sentences than short prison sentences for comparable offences. Norway's rehabilitation-focused approach produces dramatically better outcomes than Britain's punitive default. The fiscal benefit is large; community sentences cost a fraction of prison sentences. The prison capacity benefit is significant. This is supported on principled grounds — citizens whose offences are non-violent or first-time can frequently be rehabilitated to productive citizenship, and the polity benefits from this outcome more than from incarceration that produces hardened offenders.

The commitment is to community sentence capacity at appropriate scale, properly resourced probation services (cross-referenced to workforce stabilisation), and the rehabilitation infrastructure that makes community sentences genuinely rehabilitative rather than nominally so. Drug treatment, mental health support, addiction services, vocational training, accommodation support — these are what produce the outcomes the framework commits to. The current pattern where community sentences exist nominally but lack the supporting infrastructure to be effective is reversed through proper investment.

Violent and serious offences continue to receive prison sentences appropriate to their gravity. The rehabilitation focus applies to the cases where evidence supports it, not as universal substitute for punishment. Serious violent offending requires incapacitation alongside whatever rehabilitation is possible.

Crime Prevention and Social Policy

Crime responds to social conditions, and the programme here reduces demand drivers over time. Economic stabilisation through industrial strategy addresses deprivation correlates. Universal Credit reform reduces survival-driven crime. Education and childcare investment reduces developmental contributors to offending pathways. Mental health investment addresses the untreated illness that contributes to violent offending. Drug policy reform reduces the offending that currently fills the criminal justice system. Immigration consolidation addresses specific border-related drivers.

These are reductions in crime demand over time, not substitutes for real enforcement against actual crime. Effective governance does both — addressing the conditions that produce crime alongside enforcing the law against the crime that occurs. The current British political pattern of treating these as alternatives (the right preferring enforcement, the left preferring social investment) misframes the question.

Costs and Timescales

The crime commitment is Tier 2 in the prioritisation hierarchy set out in Section IV — critical capacity that prevents acute failure, distinct from foundational infrastructure or revenue generation. The fiscal commitment at full implementation is approximately two to four billion pounds annually in additional spending, comprising police capacity stabilisation through Cura Custodum, sexual violence response, baseline National Fraud Agency

operations before recovery funding builds, cybercrime response, organised crime response, and rehabilitation infrastructure.

The results are visible across different timescales. Bodycam and taser deployment, immediate. Specialist unit establishment, parliament-scale. Sexual violence prosecution outcomes recovering, multi-parliament. Fraud Agency reaching effective scale, parliament-scale to two parliaments. Organised crime response improvements, sustained over years. Crime-rate reductions from social policy, generational. The commitment is to the work across all these timescales rather than promising rapid transformation.

The principle is that public order and effective response to crime are foundational state functions that the polity must deliver, and that delivering them requires institutional discipline rather than rhetorical commitment.

Sex, Gender, and the Protection of Single-Sex Provision

This is the topic British politics has been least capable of discussing honestly, and a position worth stating has to be able to hold competing commitments in view without flinching.

Adult trans people are full citizens. They are protected from discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodation. They are addressed by their chosen names and pronouns in ordinary civic life. The state does not police ordinary civility. This is the baseline of dignity every citizen is owed.

No medical interventions for gender transition are available for under-18s. No puberty blockers. No cross-sex hormones. No surgical procedures. Whether routine or research-pathway. Full provision is made for psychological support, mental health care, family therapy, and holistic clinical assessment. At 18, adult pathways become available through informed consent. This goes further than the Cass Review in one respect, and says so directly: Cass counselled extreme caution and left a research pathway open, and this framework closes it. The position matches the approach of several Nordic countries, and is grounded in the principle that the state should be especially cautious about irreversible interventions on citizens who cannot yet fully consent.

The Gender Recognition Certificate process is retained with medical evidence and lived-experiencerequirements, and may be tightened further. Self-declaration is rejected. Legal sex recognition is kept meaningful precisely by being evidence-gated.

Single-sex spaces are organised on the basis of biological sex where proportionate to a legitimate aim — women's refuges, prisons, competitive women's sport, intimate care settings — consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in For Women Scotland v The Scottish Ministers (2025). Legal sex recognition does not grant automatic access to single-sex spaces; those spaces are governed separately by reference to biological sex where appropriate. The rights, safety, and provisions secured by women over decades are not negotiable against competing dignity claims where genuine conflict exists.

Positions apply symmetrically to trans men and trans women. Civic republicanism permits no asymmetric application of principle.

This position will satisfy neither activist camp. That is probably a signal it is roughly where the reasonable middle sits. It is stated outright because a programme that cannot state its positions on contested questions does not deserve readers.

The Free Press and the Informational Commons

A self-governing polity requires a shared informational commons. Britain is in the process of losing its one, and the loss is a civic harm in its own right.

The press is among the most important institutions a free society possesses. Its role as the primary informer of citizens and as a check on power is fundamental, and the framework defends without qualification the right to report, investigate, and criticise. A free press must be free to take positions the powerful dislike, including positions the government of the day dislikes. That freedom is not reduced, nerfed, or made conditional here, and it is not the subject of reform. The press should report freely, and the framework wants it stronger in that role, not weaker.

The state must not be made the judge of what is true. Truth matters to a self-governing society, and the sensationalism and falsehood of parts of the press have done real damage; both are affirmed here without hesitation. But the remedy cannot be a public authority empowered to rule on accuracy, because the press that prints the falsehood is the same press that holds power to account, and a state that can discipline a newspaper for being wrong can discipline it for being inconvenient. The distinction between the two collapses in the cases that matter most — where fact and framing are contested, and where the powerful would most value an arbiter to appoint. That arbitration is not the state's to hold. It is because the press must be free to be wrong that it can be trusted to be a check at all.

The BBC is preserved as a civic institution, with its Charter and funding protected more robustly against political leverage. The licence fee is reformed into a progressive household levy collected alongside the land value tax that replaces council tax, with lower bands paying proportionally less and low-income households exempt. Sport, documentaries, Radio 3 and Radio 4, the World Service, and regional output are treated as civic assets worth sustaining at the scale they have historically reached.

The news operation is required to reform culturally — clearer editorial principles about evidence-led reporting rather than false-balance centrism, better handling of the distinction between fact, analysis, and opinion. Middle management bloat and top-end pay are addressed. The Local Democracy Reporter scheme is expanded markedly, with additional public subsidy for local journalism on the Scandinavian and French models through institutions at arm's length from government.

The improvement worth seeking comes from two directions, and neither is the state ruling on content. The first is structural. Ownership and funding are made transparent, so a reader knows whose interest a title serves; concentration of ownership is limited, and foreign control of the country's primary means of informing itself is restricted, on the principle that it should be owned neither from outside the polity nor by too few hands within it. Robust and truly independent self-regulation is encouraged and rewarded, not imposed. Writers and publishers are protected against the strategic lawsuits by which wealth silences scrutiny it cannot answer. Where reporting crosses into genuine wrong — defamation, contempt, the reckless ruin of a private reputation — the remedy lies where it already does, in the courts and the existing law, decided case by case by a judge rather than wholesale by a regulator. The state may shape the structure a free press works within; it may not touch what the press says.

The Second Parliament's Fiscal Position

The cumulative additional spending in the second parliament reaches roughly £68–98 billion annually above current baselines if everything proceeds — summed from its components in the ledger, including the settlements set out above — but not all of it is committed against the central case. The committed core — NHS baseline reform, Cura Custodum scaling, defence increases, planning and housing — is sized to fit within the lower central revenue case; the personal allowance increase (£20–30 billion, deferred from the first parliament) and the Tier 3 extensions are staged on top of it as revenue arrives, not assumed. Drug policy revenue of £1–2 billion and the operational savings from reduced criminal justice load offset part of the cost. Tier 3 and Tier 4 commitments remain conditional on continued delivery of the foundational programme within budget and on revenue arriving towards the upper end of the range. The fiscal arithmetic is tight against the lower central, and tighter still at the floor; the architecture handles this through sequencing of Tier 3 extensions and, where necessary, staging of the personal allowance increase, not deficit financing, with the practical implication examined in Section XI.

IX. The Fabric: The Third Parliament

The third parliament continues and extends the work, with transformation visible across more domains as the institutions built in the first parliament reach maturity and the operational reforms of the second parliament compound. The fourth parliament and beyond complete the policy reform programme and reach towards the aspirational horizon set out in the next section; the institutions built here are designed to outlast their authors.

Industrial Strategy at Scale

Industrial strategy investments scale up sharply. The Catapult Network expansion towards Fraunhofer levels reaches £3–4 billion annually. Public R&D restored and extended. Sectoral commitments to chosen industries committed for the long horizon. Total industrial strategy investment reaches around £12 billion annually.

The mechanism is tiered. Research-and-procurement is the workhorse — heavy public investment in the research base and in government procurement preference for strategic sectors, on the aerospace model that has sustained Rolls-Royce and similar companies. Patient state equity through a properly insulated National Wealth Fund style institution, modelled on Singapore's Temasek or Germany's KfW, for cases requiring longer time horizons than private capital sustains. Direct state ownership reserved for narrow sovereignty cases only.

Backing an industry is only half of ownership, and the easier half. Britain's failure has rarely been invention; it has been retention — the habit of building world-beaters and parting with them at the very moment they turn strategic. The processor architecture beneath the world's devices, designed in Cambridge and sold abroad; the foremost artificial-intelligence laboratory of its day, founded in London and bought by an American giant; a long line of university spin-outs carried off for want of patient domestic capital and the will to hold them. A nation of inventors that lets others become the owners takes the wages of discovery and forgoes the wealth of it. BRAID is therefore an ownership strategy as much as an investment one, and its instruments are built to keep what the country starts, not merely to start it.

Three things keep ownership at home. The first is patient capital at domestic scale — the very purpose of the pension consolidation and the National Wealth Fund, for a country sitting on trillions in pension savings barely turned towards its own growth companies has, once that capital is gathered and aimed, the means to let a champion scale in Britain rather than sell itself abroad to grow. The second is the state as anchoring customer, the procurement preference already described, which hands a young company a market while it finds its feet. The third is retention as deliberate policy rather than afterthought: the National Security and Investment Act and golden-share instruments used with intent, so that a strategic company cannot be quietly carried off the moment it begins to matter — the Arm lever set out in the technology section being one instance of a standing rule.

And the strategy fishes where the British advantage lies. The Arm model — capital-light, built on intellectual property and standards rather than on the capital-heavy manufacturing where the deepest pockets win — is the one to repeat, and the waters are the emerging chokepoints a strong research base can own early: the assurance of advanced systems, photonics and compound semiconductors, quantum, advanced materials. The limits hold here as everywhere. A champion cannot be willed into being to a timetable; luck, timing, and the arrival of a new platform are real and uncommandable. Patient capital is necessary but does not suffice, for talent retained and an exit culture changed matter as much as money. And most firms never become the one that sets the standard, which is why this is a portfolio held with patience, not a promise staked on any single bet. What changes is not that Britain will choose winners, but that when it grows one, it will be equipped, at last, to keep it.

The instinct to keep cannot rest on a minister's eye for which company matters, for that is how the wrong ones are rescued and the right ones sold. It rests instead on a test, declared in advance and applied without favour. Where an enterprise holds a position the world cannot easily find elsewhere — a singular command of a market, a piece of critical national infrastructure, a chokepoint others must pass through, or the credible prospect of becoming one — its passage into foreign ownership is no ordinary commercial matter to be waved through, but a strategic act to be weighed, conditioned, and where the national interest demands it, refused. What governs the decision is the character of the asset, not the identity of the buyer or the temper of the day; and it is the standing rule of which the Arm lever, set out in the technology section, is the leading instance rather than the exception.

The test described is broader than the law that now exists, and deliberately so. The National Security and Investment Act screens an acquisition for one thing — a threat to national security — and a strategic industrial asset can be carried off without ever posing one: the company whose loss is a matter of economic sovereignty rather than of secrets passes cleanly through a gate built only to catch the spy. The framework widens the screen accordingly, from a security test to a strategic-industrial one, with the standing power to call in the sale of a chokepoint asset, to condition it, and where the national interest requires it, to refuse — the golden share and the blocking power held as instruments of course rather than emergency improvisations. The case that proves the need was lost in plain sight. Newport Wafer Fab, the largest British maker of the very compound semiconductors this strategy means to back, was sold in 2021 to a Chinese-owned manufacturer while the government of the day declined to intervene; only afterwards, and only on security grounds, was a partial divestment forced, the plant passing in the end to an American buyer. A screen that fires a year late, on the narrower question, and hands the asset from one foreign owner to another is barely a screen at all. The widened test exists so that the next such sale is weighed before it closes, not unwound once it has.

And because the gate is narrow by design, it is no general fetter upon enterprise. The firm that builds in Britain, the investor who takes a stake and in time sells it, the company that

restructures its ordinary holdings — none of these is touched by the test, which closes on the few assets that meet it and not the many that do not. Capital that comes to build here keeps its freedom to leave; what it may not do is carry off, unweighed, the handful of things on which the country's strategic position rests. The distinction matters as much for what it permits as for what it forbids: a country that wishes to attract the builder cannot afford a rule that frightens him, and this one is written so that only the strategic sale of the strategic asset ever meets it.

A prohibition is only half a policy, and the lesser half. The screen forbids the strategic sale; it does nothing about the commoner way a country loses its companies, which is not by sale at all but by attrition. The British firm that invents and prototypes well reaches the point where it must raise the large sums that turn a promising company into a big one — the growth rounds of tens and hundreds of millions — and finds them scarce at home and plentiful abroad. It takes the foreign money because the foreign money is there; and the money brings with it a foreign board, a foreign listing, and in time a foreign domicile, until the company that began in Bristol or Cambridge is American in all but sentiment. No one sold it. It was outgrown at home. This is the missing middle of British enterprise — the country starts companies and seeds them, then loses them at the very moment they would have become large — and no screen reaches it, for nothing is being carried off against the national interest; the company is simply going where it can grow.

The remedy is to make home the place it can grow. The patient capital the framework has already gathered — the National Wealth Fund, the consolidated pension savings — is turned to this directly: equipped not merely to take minority stakes but to lead and cornerstone the large growth rounds themselves, in the strategic sectors the retention test defines, so that the company raising its decisive round raises it in London rather than being drawn to California to do so. This is a sharper thing than providing capital and hoping; it is the state anchoring a growth round as it anchors a market through procurement, and it is bounded deliberately to the sectors that matter rather than offered as a general subsidy to every firm seeking its next cheque. No new institution is raised to do it: the instruments are the fund and the pension capital the framework has already built. The aim is narrow and exact — that no British company of strategic worth is ever again driven abroad for want of a domestic cheque of the right size.

Capital is not always the binding constraint. For the company that makes a physical thing, the wall is more often the absence of anywhere to make it at scale. A firm with a working prototype in compound semiconductors or photonics — the niches named above as Britain's to own — needs pilot lines and mid-volume manufacturing it can reach without building a plant of its own, and where that capacity is missing at home it follows the foundries abroad. So the pathway provides it: shared pilot-line and mid-volume foundry access for the chosen niches, anchored where the cluster already sits, in South Wales above all, within the existing industrial and Catapult remit rather than a new body. This is emphatically not the leading-edge logic fabrication the framework declined and declines

again — a compound-semiconductor or photonics line is a matter of millions to low billions, not the tens of billions a cutting-edge logic fab consumes, and it is precisely the scale at which a medium power can compete. And here the argument the screen makes and the argument the pathway makes are revealed as one. Newport was this capacity: the country's largest compound-semiconductor plant was the very scale-up manufacturing this pathway means to provide, already built and already working, and it was let go. To keep the scale-up capacity a country already holds is cheaper and surer than to raise it again from nothing — which is why the screen that guards such an asset and the pathway that builds more of it are not two policies but one.

For the company that grows abroad in spite of all this — and some will, for the reasons already named — the public that helped build it keeps a claim on what it built. The support the pathway extends is structured as convertible patient capital: it behaves as patient debt for as long as the company's strategic core stays and builds in Britain, repaid on ordinary terms; and it converts to a minority equity stake at the single trigger of a foreign sale or the relocation of that core abroad, settled in the transaction like any other holding on the company's books. The instrument asks nothing the market finds strange — the convertible is the venture investor's commonest tool, not an alien imposition — and it needs no pursuit of a company across borders to collect, because the public's stake is a registered claim on the equity that any buyer must clear to complete the purchase, not a debt to be chased once the company has gone. It scales with the success it shares in: a modest sale returns the public a modest sum, and the rare enormous one returns a real share of the fortune that public capital and public custom helped create, rather than the bare return of the money first put in. And it is by design a claim on the proceeds and not a hand on the controls — a minority economic interest, never a blocking stake — because the framework has already reasoned that a retained veto makes a company less investable and likelier to be sold, the opposite of the intention. Revenue follows the value home; control does not chase the company abroad. Beside it stands the one true chokehold the framework keeps — the jurisdictional lock on genuine chokepoint intellectual property, the Arm instrument set out in the technology section — reserved for the rare asset the world cannot route around, which remains governed from Britain whoever comes to own the company that holds it.

What is kept must be worth keeping, and here the framework chooses its ground deliberately. Britain will not win the manufacture of the world by volume or by price, which are settled by a scale and a cheapness it neither holds nor should covet. It can win, as once it did, on quality — on the made thing whose precision, endurance, and provenance command a premium the commodity never will. The instrument of such a reputation is a mark that means something, and here the history instructs. Britain devised the country-of-origin mark in the nineteenth century to shame inferior imports, then watched its rivals turn "made in Germany" and "Swiss made" into watchwords of excellence while its own distinction dimmed. The mark the country carries now is voluntary and self-declared, and so promises little. Given statutory force — a real threshold of British value, certified to a British

Standard pitched above the international floor and independently tested, as the Kitemark has long tested, then defended against imitation — it becomes once more what those others made of it: a promise a buyer will pay to trust. Above that baseline, a premium hallmark for the highest tier, as the Geneva Seal stands above "Swiss made", is where the older and prouder claim is actually won. It is the assurance argument of the technology section in another dress: a Britain trusted to certify quality, as it is trusted to evaluate intelligence.

Beneath the mark and the firms it honours lies the capital without which neither stands: the engineer and the scientist. Every industry in which Britain might lead — the engine, the instrument, the reactor, the chip — is at root an engineering and scientific one, and so the deepest instrument of the whole strategy is not a fund or a statute but a classroom. A country cannot make world-class things without world-class makers, and it does not find them ready-made; it grows them or it goes without. The framework's wager is to grow them — to build an education that produces engineers and scientists of the first rank, and in the numbers the ambition requires. That means mathematics and the sciences taught with depth and seriousness from the early years; a technical and applied path set genuinely level with the academic, its apprenticeships and institutions carrying real standing rather than the air of a consolation; and a university research base, addressed elsewhere in this section, kept strong enough to hold its finest minds at the frontier instead of ceding them abroad. This talent is the sovereign capability prior to all the others: a nation that produces it in abundance can build whatever this list requires, and one that does not will hold none of it for long.

Industrial strategy is geographically explicit. Manufacturing capacity in the post-industrial heartlands of the North and Midlands. Marine economy and offshore-wind manufacturing along the coasts. Defence manufacturing sustained in regions that have historically hosted it. Life sciences and advanced engineering distributed across regional research strengths.

This is now possible because the first parliament's procurement reforms and state capacity rebuilding mean the spending produces results rather than waste. The same investment in the first parliament would have produced the very failure this programme exists to interrupt.

Artificial Intelligence and Technological Sovereignty

Artificial intelligence may be the most transformative technology humanity has produced. It is not one industry's tool but a general capability that reshapes every field it touches — the work of government, the conduct of war, the ordinary business of a citizen's day — and Britain controls none of it. The capable systems on which the state, the economy, and the individual increasingly rely are built and run under foreign jurisdiction. As those systems and their successors become ubiquitous, woven through public administration and commerce and the texture of daily life, the dependency compounds: the more a country runs on a

capability, the more the granting of it, and the withholding of it, becomes a lever in the hand that holds it. A foreign power able to disable the tools a country depends upon wields a leverage over it that no ally should possess and no adversary should be handed. This is the lesson the framework draws about defence, drawn again here, and it will only sharpen as the technology spreads. A capability another state can switch off is not a capability a country holds; it is a permission it is granted, and permissions are revoked.

There are only two answers to a foreign switch, and the framework states them because the comfortable middle options are not answers at all. Britain must either own a capability sufficient to its needs, or make itself so indispensable to the structure that holds the capability that no one dares throw the switch. A negotiated guarantee, the goodwill of allies, custom spread across several foreign suppliers — each lowers the chance the switch is thrown, and none removes the switch from a foreign hand. They are mitigations, worth having as mitigations, but a framework that called them sovereignty would be deceiving the country it serves. Own it, or be indispensable to it; all else is the management of a dependency, not the ending of one.

Owning it does not mean willing a frontier laboratory into being to rival the American and Chinese giants. Training at the frontier is among the most capital- and compute-intensive undertakings on earth, the preserve of a few firms spending tens of billions on hardware alone; a mid-sized economy that set out to match them line for line would spend enormously and arrive late. The objective is not a British flag on a frontier model. It is that the critical functions of the state and economy continue when access to any single foreign system is withdrawn — a far cheaper and more answerable thing, built in layers, most of them within reach:

- **Sovereign compute.** Domestic data-centre capacity and secured access to advanced semiconductors, so that the physical substrate of intelligence is not itself a foreign dependency.
- **A guaranteed open-weight fallback.** A standing requirement, mandated across government by GAIA, that critical public services can run on openly available models held on British infrastructure, so that no service can be disabled by a vendor's withdrawal or a foreign order.
- **Diversification as a rule.** No critical system dependent on a single provider in a single jurisdiction.
- **Retention of what has been paid for.** Strategic holding of the model weights the state has funded or come to depend upon, so that capability already acquired cannot be recalled.

Held together, these are a capability deliberately a step behind the frontier and fully the country's own: not the most powerful intelligence in the world, but one no foreign hand can switch off.

The second answer is to hold something the capability cannot be built or run without — a chokepoint of the kind the Netherlands holds in lithography and Taiwan in fabrication,

where the holder is too important to cut off because the world cannot proceed without it. Britain holds one such asset in this field, and its story is the whole argument in miniature. The instruction-set architecture designed by Arm in Cambridge sits beneath very nearly every smartphone on earth and a fast-growing share of the silicon on which artificial intelligence runs — a genuine chokepoint of precisely this kind, one of the rare British things the modern world cannot easily build without. And Britain let it go. Some nine-tenths of Arm is owned today by a Japanese investment group, its shares listed in New York rather than London, its direction drawn ever deeper into a foreign constellation of chip and AI interests. It was sold in 2016 and floated abroad in 2023 — no foreign power seized it; it was let go, as British champions have repeatedly been let go, at the moment they became strategic. This is the retention failing the framework names as industrial strategy elsewhere: a state quick to celebrate what its inventors create and slow to think the ownership of it any of its business. The framework holds that it is its business. Britain hosts the chokepoint. It did not keep the holding of it.

What can be done is bounded, and should be done to its bound. Buying back control is beyond reach: the company is worth more than the whole of the sovereign wealth fund this framework builds, and no fund responsibly run sinks itself into a single holding. The instrument that remains is jurisdiction rather than ownership. Arm is incorporated under English law and headquartered on British soil, and the National Security and Investment Act, used with deliberation, can bind its most strategic licensing and any change in its control to British consent, whoever holds the equity. And where shares come onto the market — which the present owner's wider commitments make a live prospect — their acquisition should be treated as a national priority rather than an ordinary investment, for a strategic stake in this one asset is worth more to the country than its financial return alone would justify. The hold so gained is leverage, not possession; it is contestable, as open architectures rise to challenge Arm's; and it is named as that, and no more.

There is a softer indispensability Britain already holds, and should deepen. In the evaluation and assurance of advanced systems — the testing of models before they are deployed, the standards by which their safety is judged — Britain leads, and coordinates the network through which other nations' institutes do the same. To be the referee the laboratories submit to and the world's institutes organise around is real influence and real industry, and it keeps Britain in the room where the rules are written. But it must be seen for what it is. Evaluation is influence, not control; the finest evaluator in the world is still cut off when its access is withdrawn. Assurance leadership buys a better seat and a stronger hand in any guarantee. It is not, by itself, a lock.

Britain holds neither a sufficient owned capability today nor a chokepoint it commands, and a framework that pretended otherwise would fail its own test. But the gate it set itself permits no rest in mitigation. For a technology this consequential, a permanent management of dependence is not a destination but a deferral, and the framework owes the country a destination. That destination has two parts: one reachable, the other a reach.

The reachable part is sufficiency made sovereign: the resilience layer above, built out until the critical functions of the state and economy can run, when any single foreign system is withdrawn, on compute and models the country holds — a capability a deliberate step behind the frontier and wholly its own, and within the first parliament's means. The reach is a share of the frontier itself — to own part of a frontier-capable system and be impossible to remove from it — and the framework names it for what it is: the harder gate, a genuine long-shot, pursued where a route opens and never leaned upon as though it were secured.

The reason it is a long-shot is structural, and it disciplines the whole approach. Frontier training is no longer a contest of laboratories but of capital-and-compute platforms: a single top training run costs hundreds of millions, the compute to sustain a cadence runs into tens of billions, and the firms that manage it are backed by trillion-dollar cloud platforms that fund the spend and recoup it as compute revenue. The United States sustains several such efforts because it has several such platforms; Europe struggles to sustain even one, because it has none, and the continental champions that try are driven to debt or, under-capitalised, bought up and carried abroad. Britain cannot out-spend that structure, and a plan that depended on its doing so would be no plan. So the frontier stake, if it is ever taken, is taken opportunistically and by whatever route is live — a share in a European effort should one prove both able and willing to be shared, a domestic venture seeded through the sovereign-investment machinery, a consortium where Britain's weight earns a place — and it is pinned to no single company or country, because no single bet of that kind is safe to lean upon. What Britain brings to any such table is real: patient capital from the National Wealth Fund and the consolidated pensions, at a scale far below the headline valuations, because the cost of building frontier capability is a fraction of what such firms come in time to be worth; jurisdiction over Arm, the one chip-design chokepoint a frontier compute effort cannot easily build without; and the assurance lead, the trusted evaluation no rival holds. A country that brings capital, a chokepoint, and the referee's chair is no guest at that table wherever it forms — but it goes as a builder only if the table forms, and the framework does not stake the country's sovereignty on its forming.

The American relationship is kept through all of this, as a bridge of access while sufficiency is built and for the breadth its laboratories still lead — but kept as a bridge, never as the ground to build upon, for the same reason the framework will not rest British defence upon the American guarantee. The discipline the gate demands is owed at the end as at the start: a frontier stake, by whatever route, would buy a capability equal to the country's needs and beyond any single hand's power to switch off; it would not buy the most powerful intelligence in the world, and should not pretend to. Should the frontier stake never be taken, what remains is not failure but the floor built regardless: the sufficient-to-needs sovereignty that keeps the critical functions running when the switch is thrown. Only if both the frontier and that floor were lost would managed dependence remain, named as the worst case and not the plan.

The sequencing keeps the framework's discipline. The resilience layer — open-weight fallback, diversification, retained weights, and the first sovereign compute — is first-parliament work, cheap against its value, largely a matter of procurement rule and modest capital, and governed by GAIA. The jurisdictional lock on Arm is statutory and available now; its reclamation waits upon the market. A share of the frontier is the long horizon, pursued opportunistically as routes open, and the patient capital that would fund it is the same machinery — the National Wealth Fund, the consolidated pension capital — by which the framework means to stop the country selling its strategic assets at the moment they begin to matter. For sovereignty in artificial intelligence is not a separate ambition bolted to the industrial strategy; it is the sharpest instance of it. The nation that designed the architecture beneath the world's computing and let the ownership go is the same nation now renting its intelligence from abroad, and the remedy is a single remedy: to become, at last, a country that keeps what it builds. What this framework will not do is rebuild the state upon a tool it does not control, and call the dependency strength.

The British Medical Institute

Britain's advantage in health science is real but scattered — the data in one set of hands, the genomic cohorts in another, the discovery laboratories in a third, the clinical service in a fourth, and the value leaking abroad for want of anyone whose business it is to hold them together. The British Medical Institute is that body: the standing hub of the medical and life-sciences spine, charged with making the nation's structural advantage in health actually pay, and keeping it British. Like the Royal Institute of Statecraft, it is chartered under the Crown, in the lineage of the Royal Society and the medical Royal Colleges — the permanent institutions of British science that stand above the election cycle — and for the same reason: the work is generational, and the body that does it must outlast the governments that fund it.

The Medical Institute performs four functions, each separate and reinforcing.

First, it is the steward of the nation's health data as sovereign capital. It holds the licensing framework under which the linked national record is worked — licensed, never sold; ownership retained; the return flowing back to the public that is the data's source — and it is the single point of accountability for how that asset is put to work, so that the country has one answer, not a dozen, to the question of who governs its most valuable holding.

Second, it is the guarantor of the oversight and transparency that keep public trust. It maintains the auditable consent lineage by which no dataset is repurposed beyond what people agreed to; it publishes, in plain language, every use to which the data is put; and it submits to independent oversight with the power to halt. The lesson of the national prediction model paused over precisely this failure is written into its design: the engineering is never the part that gives way, the consent is, and an asset worked without the public's

understanding freezes the moment that understanding is breached. Trust is the one input that cannot be manufactured, and the Medical Institute exists in part to keep it.

Third, it is the coordinator of the medical-AI and genomics programme. It connects what is now fragmented — the population cohorts, the genomic libraries, the secure data environments, the prediction models, the discovery laboratories — and translates their output into care through the NHS, which is at once the data's source, the model's validator, and the patient's route to the result. That single system holding all three roles is an advantage no rival possesses, and the Medical Institute is what turns it from a latent fact into a working pipeline.

Fourth, it is the anchor of retention. Britain has invented more of this science than it has kept: the structure-prediction breakthrough and the discovery engine built upon it are British in origin and foreign in ownership. The Medical Institute is the body whose business it is to break that pattern — co-investing alongside the national funds to keep the next discovery company British as it scales, and standing as the bridge between the laboratory and the health service that is its first and most demanding customer.

What must happen sooner rather than later is not the Medical Institute but the work it will one day house. The advantage in health data is real but time-limited — other nations are building their own population cohorts, and a lead measured in years is not a lead held forever — so the development itself, the building of models on the linked national record within secure environments, begins in the near term, on the compute the country already holds and under the data regime as it is stood up, rather than waiting on the full establishment of the body that will govern it. The Medical Institute matures on the horizon the foundational institutions occupy, founded early and grown across parliaments as the Royal Institute is; its physical flagship — the integrated clinical-research-training campus on the Singapore model — is the generational capital culmination. The sequence is deliberate: the work starts now because the window is open now, the governing hub forms around it, and the campus crowns it as revenue allows.

The Medical Institute does not duplicate what the framework builds elsewhere; it interfaces with it. It takes the standards for evaluating advanced systems from the AI Security Institute, not from itself; it draws its clinical workforce through the Cura Custodum settlement; and it keeps the separation of roles the framework holds throughout — the body that works the data, the body that oversees it, and the body that guards the citizen against both are not the same body — so that the steward of the asset is never also its sole judge.

The Life Sciences Settlement

Life sciences is one of the few fields in which Britain is a frontier power rather than a follower — the discovery science, the research concentration that runs from Oxford through Cambridge to London, the company-building. And it is one more place where the national failing is not invention but retention: Britain discovered the monoclonal antibody in

Cambridge and let others manufacture and bank it, the pattern the framework names already in semiconductors and in artificial intelligence. The settlement treats the sector as the strategic asset it is, and turns on it the same discipline applied elsewhere — keep what is invented here, and build the means to make it here.

The relationship between the state and the industry has lately swung between two failures, each the mirror of the other. Pressed to control the medicines bill, the single buyer has at times clawed back so much that companies cut their investment and looked abroad; pressed then to keep them, it has conceded higher prices it cannot easily afford, and conceded them to outside pressure rather than on its own terms. Neither pole holds. The squeeze loses the industry; the surrender loses the discipline. The settlement is built to escape the choice, and the escape runs through the one asset the see-saw overlooks.

That asset is the health service itself. The National Health Service is not only a cost to be managed; for the discovery of medicines it is the most valuable instrument the country possesses — a single system holding the records of a whole population across their lives, the genomic record built alongside them, and a platform on which a trial can run at a scale and speed no fragmented system can match. This is precisely what the making of modern medicine most needs, and almost no other nation can offer it whole. The settlement's first move is to stop treating the health service as a budget to be defended and to begin treating it as the strategic asset it is — the thing the industry must come to Britain to reach. A country that is merely cheap is replaceable; a country that holds what the industry cannot get elsewhere is not. The framework named this logic in the technology section — own a capability or be indispensable to it — and here Britain is dealt the stronger hand.

The framework's argument on technological sovereignty drew a hard line: at the frontier of general artificial intelligence Britain cannot lead, because that contest is bound by capital and compute it does not command. There is one field where the binding constraint runs the other way, and Britain holds the scarce thing rather than lacking it. Biomedical artificial intelligence is bound not by compute but by data — by the depth, the breadth, and the lifetime continuity of the records on which models of human health are trained — and here the National Health Service gives Britain a holding wealth cannot quickly buy and no rival of comparable openness possesses: a single-payer, whole-population, cradle-to-grave record, increasingly linked to genomic sequence, assembled across decades. A country can purchase more processors; it cannot purchase a population's lifetime of health, consented and curated. This is the sharp edge the framework's sovereignty doctrine looks for — a place where Britain leads not by outspending the world but by holding what the world cannot assemble.

The instinct of the state has been to treat this holding as treasure: to guard it, to lock it down, to reckon its value only in the harm a breach would do. The instinct gets the matter backwards. A hoarded record is not a safe one — a static vault is still a target — so the guarding posture pays the full cost of the risk and realises none of the asset, which is the

worst trade on offer. And the asset is unlike treasure in the one respect that counts: it is not spent by use. Worked through secure environments the data never leaves, licensed rather than sold, it can be put to work and kept at the same time — earning its return while remaining wholly in the nation's hands, and growing richer through linkage and use while a guarded copy only ages as others build their own. The discipline that makes this safe is the governance around the work, which is the Medical Institute's charge; the principle beneath it is the one that governs the framework's whole approach to what the nation owns. An asset worked under sovereign control is wealth. An asset merely guarded is a liability waiting to be stolen.

That this is not theory, Britain has already shown. A model trained on the de-identified records of some fifty-seven million people — the first generative model of an entire nation's health ever built — demonstrated at a stroke the advantage, the uniqueness, and the viability of the holding: a world-first that only a single-payer system could produce, trained on compute the country already had, because the work is data-bound and modest in its processing. The holding is real and the lead is Britain's to take. What governs whether it is taken well is not the engineering, which is within reach, but the consent and the trust on which all of it rests — which is the settlement that follows.

The asset cannot be used by stealth, and the attempt to do so has failed before: public trust in the use of health data was squandered once by programmes done to people rather than with them, and it will not survive a second such attempt. So the asset is put to the public as a choice, made in the open. The nation may use its health data — anonymised, governed, and never sold — to drive a better bargain from the industry, in lower prices, earlier access, and investment made here rather than abroad; or it may decline, and accept that medicines will cost more for the refusal. The choice is the country's to make in daylight, and the framework states which way it would lean, while defending without qualification the right of any person to stand outside it.

Two conditions make the bargain safe enough to strike. The first is retention: access is licensed and never sold, granted on terms that keep the value and the control in Britain, and closed absolutely to the uses the public rightly fears — never to insurers, never to immigration enforcement, never passed into a foreign jurisdiction beyond the reach of British law. The data is held on the principle that governs every strategic asset in this framework: its use may be sold, its ownership never. The second is that no individual is made to pay for the collective choice. Opting out costs a person nothing in care or treatment — the only thing withheld is their weight in the national bargain, never their place in the queue — and consent is a dial rather than a switch, tiered by purpose and changeable at any time. This protects those with the most reason to stand apart, the survivor and the holder of a stigmatised diagnosis, and it protects the asset itself: an opt-out driven by fear does not merely shrink the data, it skews it, and a skewed record is a degraded one. Trust grows the asset; pressure shrinks it. The bargain is built to be earned, not extracted.

And because the data is the public's, so is the return on it. The value the asset earns — the cheaper medicines, the retained industry, the stake the state takes in the companies it helps to build — returns to the public that owns it, on the same principle as the citizen stake in the National Wealth Fund. This is not the state asking a favour of the citizen; it is the citizen's own asset, worked on the citizen's behalf, paying a dividend the citizen shares. The reframing is the substance of it: not extraction, but ownership.

The price of medicines is then settled on value rather than volume, and here Britain leads rather than imports. The instrument already exists and was invented here: the subscription under which the health service pays a fixed sum for access to a medicine by its assessed worth, not the number of doses dispensed. Built first for antibiotics, it does three things at once that the framework wants done together — it gives the company the predictable, de-risked revenue it values above a high headline price; it gives the health service certainty over its bill; and, because the payment does not rise with the volume sold, it removes the incentive to oversell that disfigures other systems. Where it fits — the medicines that must be used sparingly, the diseases a country would treat to eliminate — it is extended; where it does not, value- and outcome-based pricing carry the same principle, the state paying in proportion to the good a medicine actually does. This is the reply to the prescription culture the framework will not import: payment for health delivered, not for pills moved.

Against that culture the wider protection is largely a matter of keeping what Britain has and others lack. The advertising of prescription medicines to the public, permitted in few wealthy nations, stays forbidden. The body that judges a medicine's value stays independent, its judgement defended against the pressure, domestic or external, to loosen it. The prescriber's independence from the manufacturer's inducement is protected and tightened. And the discipline the framework already applies to the new pharmacology — the weight-loss drugs admitted as a conditional grant, widening only as price falls and the long evidence accrues — is the template for every wave that follows: the molecule is a tool, never a verdict, and never a substitute for repairing the conditions that fill the queue. The aim is to grow the industry that discovers and makes medicines, and to fence the machinery that only sells them.

What is discovered and priced here should, so far as it sensibly can be, be made here — and the framework is deliberate about where that line falls, because making everything at home is a slogan that wastes capital, and conceding that Britain cannot compete is a defeat that misreads the economics. There are three kinds of medicine and three answers. The high-volume commodities, the basic generics and the bulk active ingredients, are left to the global producers who make them at a scale and cost Britain cannot and need not match; there is no sense in making aspirin expensively. But the modern medicines — the sterile injectables, the biologics and biosimilars, the vaccines, the cell-and-gene therapies — are made in highly automated plants where the cost is capital and process control rather than cheap labour, and the old wage advantage of the low-cost producer largely falls away; on these Britain can compete, and for its own market it can come out ahead once the true cost

of the import is counted — the freight, the failure and recall risk, the currency exposure, and above all the shortage premium the health service already pays, sharply, each time a distant plant fails. And the novel, protected medicines the discovery base produces are kept and scaled here on the retention argument alone, the same that governs the chip and the model. So the rule is not timid: what cannot sensibly be made here is bought abroad, and everything else — including the domestic option that costs a little more — is made at home, for the premium is small and the security large, and a pound spent here returns through wage and tax as a pound sent abroad does not. Resilience is the reason; the money staying in Britain is what makes the reason cheap to act on.

The National Wealth Fund co-invests in the companies the science produces, so that the state is investor as well as customer and the public captures the upside its health service helped create; and the retention test applies to the laboratory as to the factory, so that a discovery of strategic worth is kept and built in Britain rather than invented here and banked abroad, as too much of it has been.

The settlement also makes a demand the framework is already building to meet. A manufacturing base in biologics, sterile production, vaccines, and cell-and-gene therapy needs a workforce Britain barely holds at scale — bioprocess engineers, manufacturing scientists, the quality and regulatory specialists, the skilled technicians of advanced biomanufacturing — and the data-and-trials platform needs another, in data science, bioinformatics, and clinical research. These are named as a designated strand within the regional skills academies and technical institutes the framework already founds, rather than as an academy of their own: the same machinery, pointed at a sector that now has a concrete and strategic need of it. The catch is that this strand draws on the same scarce pool of specialist instructors the teaching settlement is already working to widen — the bioprocess engineer who might teach is wanted as badly in the plant — so it is an addition to the supply problem as much as a use of the supply, and the framework counts it as both.

The settlement is clear about what it cannot abolish. The tension between a cheap medicines bill and an attractive market is real and permanent: press the price down and investment leaves, let it rise and the bill grows. The settlement does not claim to repeal that tension but to shift it — to win value through the asset, the trials, and the pricing of worth, so that Britain can afford to be fairer on price while holding discipline on cost. It makes at home all it sensibly can and buys abroad only what it cannot sensibly make, and it does not pretend the domestic premium is nothing where it falls. And it rests, in the end, on a public bargain that must be kept honestly to hold — the data governed as promised, the dividend real, the retention enforced — because the asset is trust, and trust is the one input that cannot be manufactured.

The Creative Industries Settlement

Among the things Britain sells to the world, few travel further than its culture — the film and the television, the music, the games, the writing and design and performance that this document has until now named in passing and left undeveloped. It is one of the country's genuine strengths, and one more place where the pattern holds that the framework names elsewhere: the work is made here and the ownership drifts abroad, the catalogue sold to a foreign fund, the studio bought, the rights banked overseas. But the figure that captures the sector — the billions of export, the share of the economy — hides the thing this settlement is built around. Behind it stands a workforce, and that workforce is, for the most part, precarious, freelance, and poorly paid; and it now faces a machine trained on its own work. The settlement begins with the people, not the product.

The creative worker is rarely an employee, moving from project to project without the safety net the rest of the economy assumes, on an income the glamour of the work disguises as comfortable when it is usually thin. The framework cannot turn a project-based craft into a salaried profession, and should not try; the freedom is part of the draw. But it can put a floor beneath it — extending the contributory and welfare architecture built elsewhere to reach the self-employed creator, so that the insecurity of the work does not tip into destitution between the jobs.

And then there is the machine. Generative systems are trained on the accumulated work of human creators — the writing, the images, the voices, the music — and the question of the age is whether that work may be taken without consent or payment to build the thing that then competes with its makers. The framework answers as it answers everywhere a strategic asset is at stake: the use of a creator's work may be licensed, never expropriated. Training by default, in which the creator must hunt down every model and beg to be left out, is refused; consent and payment come first. In its place the framework builds the market the refusal requires — a licensing mechanism, collective where the individual creator is too small to bargain alone, through which a model may train on British creative work on terms that pay the people who made it.

Two supports make the principle enforceable. The first is transparency: a model sold into the British market must disclose what it was trained on, and the duty attaches to the market and not the training ground, so that a system cannot launder its origins by learning abroad and selling here. The second is a protection the new technology makes necessary — over the creator's own voice, face, and performance, against the synthetic replica that clones them without leave. A performer's likeness and a singer's voice are theirs, and the framework gives them an enforceable right to say so, against the deepfake and the imitation passed off as the real thing.

None of this is a war on the technology, and it does not fight the framework's own ambition in artificial intelligence; rightly seen, the two are allies. A model built on licensed British work is built on clean ground — trusted, lawful, and free of the litigation that trails the take-everything approach — and a lawful corpus is an advantage to British intelligence, not a tax

upon it. The proportion settles the rest: the creative industries are many times the size of the AI sector they are asked to feed, and a country does not strip a proven strength to subsidise a hopeful one. The framework wants both, and means to have both, by making the one pay the other rather than plunder it.

Where the state already does well, it keeps doing it and stops meddling. The tax credits for screen and for games are among the most successful industrial measures of the era — they built the production boom and the studios that house it — and they are held steady under the same stability the framework gives the rest of the tax code, and extended where they reach. The single condition the framework adds is that the support reach the worker and not only the producer: a credit that fills a studio's order book should help underwrite the skilled and decently paid workforce inside the studio, and not merely the balance sheet above it.

The framework owes the sector an admission about its own bias. This document leans hard upon the sciences and the engineer, for good reason; but a country that prized those alone would hollow out the very strength this settlement defends. Creative skill is a strategic input, not a soft alternative to a hard subject, and it is treated as one — its training valued alongside the technical, its pipeline from school through the grassroots rooms into the industry kept open, the talent it produces counted among the capabilities the nation means to keep. The arts are not the relief from the hard work; for this country they are part of it.

The retention instinct applies here too, and admits its weaker grip. A song, a format, a catalogue is mobile in a way a chip foundry is not, and the framework cannot fence the export of culture as it fences the sale of a strategic plant. What it can do is make Britain the place where the creator would choose to stay and to own — through the tax, the skills, the licensing market, and the floor beneath the worker — so that the ownership has reason to remain even where it cannot be compelled to.

The settlement knows the limits of its reach. It cannot abolish the insecurity of a project-based life, only soften its sharpest edge. The licensing market it depends upon is hard to build and harder still to make pay the smallest creator fairly, and the global drift towards permissive copyright means some training will happen beyond Britain's reach whatever it legislates — the market-access duty narrows that gap without closing it. And it keeps a clean line between this, the industrial and human case for the people who make culture, and the separate question of what the state should fund for culture's own sake, which the framework's civic offer answers elsewhere. What this settlement refuses is the future in which the country lets the machine harvest its creators, the venues close, and the workforce drift away — and then wonders where its culture went.

The Space Settlement

Space is critical national infrastructure that most people never see. The signals that fix position, guide navigation, and — least visibly and most importantly — distribute precise

time, together the discipline known as position, navigation, and timing, underpin the grid, the payments system, the telephone and data networks, and the armed forces alike. In this field Britain is a credible medium-sized power rather than a giant, strong where the framework expects it to be strong: in the data and the applications, the analysis of what satellites see, the awareness of what moves in orbit, and — newly, after half a century — in sovereign launch. The settlement treats space as it treats the other strategic capabilities: it commits a modest, justifiable floor now, built from what the country already holds, and sequences the larger ambition behind the success of the wider programme. It does not pretend Britain can be a space power, and it does not need to.

The sharpest vulnerability is also the least understood. The timing signal on which the grid, the banks, and the networks silently depend is broadcast by a foreign military system, and its loss would not chiefly be a matter of lost direction — a lorry taking a wrong turn — but of critical systems across the country losing the shared clock they keep in step by. It is a single point of failure sitting beneath several vital systems at once, owned by another state, and the threat to it has stopped being hypothetical: the jamming and spoofing of these signals have risen sharply, the techniques are cheap, and they are spreading. The framework therefore places the resilience of timing where it places energy security and defence — among the foundational functions of the state, committed and funded early rather than left conditional — because a country whose grid and payments can be halted by the corruption of a borrowed signal has not yet secured the conditions of its own functioning.

The remedy does not require a sovereign constellation, which Britain is not going to build and does not need. The timing layer can be made resilient on the ground and cheaply: a terrestrial network broadcasting precise time as a public utility, and a standing requirement that the receivers in critical national infrastructure draw on more than one source and resist deception, so that when the signal from orbit is jammed or corrupted the country degrades gracefully rather than failing — the backup holds the clocks, the vital systems keep running. The aim is resilience, not independence: not that Britain ceases to rely on the foreign signal, but that the loss of it becomes survivable rather than catastrophic. This is the floor, and it is cheap against the harm it prevents.

The ground beneath the capability, Britain already owns. The satellites of others are tracked, commanded, and corrected from a handful of sites around the world, and a striking number of them sit on British territory — Ascension Island in the mid-Atlantic foremost among them, a working ground station with sixty years of spaceflight heritage and a location no medium power could buy if it lacked it. The temptation is to call this leverage over the systems it hosts; the framework does not, because it would not survive scrutiny. To host a node of another state's system is not to hold power over it — the system is built to tolerate the loss of any one site, and the function can be moved. What the territories give Britain is something quieter and real: a globe-spanning geometry of sovereign ground sites, the very spread that a resilient timing system, satellite tracking, and awareness of what moves in orbit all require, and which almost no comparable nation possesses. The asset lowers the

cost and raises the feasibility of Britain's own future capability; it is not a chokehold on anyone else's. And it is shrinking by inattention — the Chagos settlement returns Diego Garcia, one of those rare sites, to another flag with only a leased base retained — which is the argument for holding and equipping what remains while it is unambiguously Britain's, rather than discovering its worth once more of it is gone.

Two further pieces of the floor cost little now and would cost a fortune to recover. Sovereign launch, arriving at last on British soil after fifty years, is kept alive on stable and minimal support rather than built into a grand programme — the firms ask for continuity, not largesse, and feast-or-famine funding is precisely how a hard-won capability is lost cheaply and rebuilt expensively. And the downstream strength where Britain genuinely leads — the data, the analytics, the services built upon what satellites observe — is underwritten by the state as an anchor customer for British-sourced space data and orbital awareness: demand the state has in any case, directed deliberately homeward, so the industry scales on custom rather than subsidy.

The wider effort is European, not solitary. Britain remains a member of the European Space Agency (ESA), which is no organ of the Union and outlasted the departure from it, and that membership is the multiplier — the route by which a medium power reaches a scale it could never reach alone. Sovereign capability is layered upon that collaboration, not raised as a lonely rival to it, the same logic the framework brings to artificial intelligence. The cautionary tale is recent and its lesson plain: the rescue, a few years ago, of a British satellite venture taken on for sovereign communications and navigation ended with the strategic stake diluted into a foreign-led company — capability invested in and then let go, the pattern this document names across every sector it touches. So the retention test applies to space as to the chip and the laboratory, and two option-preserving moves are made now while they remain nearly free: the screening that guards against a second such loss, and the early reservation of the spectrum and orbital slots that are claimed in order and gone once taken, so that a future Britain wishing to act is not first made to buy back the room in which to do so.

The settlement separates what is committed from what is conditional. The floor — the resilience of timing, the ground network held and equipped, sovereign launch kept alive, the options reserved — is committed and funded early, because it is cheap, foundational, and in the case of timing cannot wait on anything else. The larger ambition — a fuller sovereign capability, an expanded launch industry, investment at scale — is sequenced behind the success of the wider programme, taken up if and as the revenue the renewal generates arrives, and not before. This is the framework's discipline applied to its smallest strategic fish in its largest pond: spend little now to keep the costly thing possible later, lock in what is irreplaceable, and let the ambition scale with the means.

The limits are stated. Britain cannot match the United States or China in space and the settlement does not pretend it can; this is niche leadership — the data layer, the resilience

of timing, the awareness of the orbital environment, the sovereign launch of modest payloads — multiplied through Europe, not a space power raised from a standing start. The ground network is a saving on a future bill, not a hold over a present system. Ascension is a ground station and not a spaceport, and would make a poor one. And the timing programme buys graceful degradation, not the end of dependence. What the floor secures is not greatness in space, but the refusal of an avoidable vulnerability — and the option, held cheaply open, of more, should the country one day be able to afford it.

Nuclear Power as a Strategic Pillar

Britain made a grave mistake over the past forty years. The country that built the world's first commercial nuclear power station at Calder Hall in 1956, that operated a fleet of advanced gas-cooled reactors no other country mastered, that built the submarine reactor capability that anchors the deterrent, allowed its civilian nuclear capacity to age out without replacement programmed. The political class treated nuclear as a problem to be deferred rather than a strategic asset to be sustained. By the end of the decade the existing fleet will have shrunk to a single operating station. The country's electricity is increasingly weather-dependent at exactly the moment industrial revival, electrification, data centre growth, and the climate transition all require abundant reliable low-carbon power.

This is reversed. Nuclear power becomes a strategic pillar of British electricity over the next quarter-century, alongside the expanded offshore wind and storage capability the country must build. The target is approximately 20–25 GW of new nuclear capacity operational by 2050, with a further wave under construction at that point. Combined with major offshore wind expansion to approximately 80–100 GW by 2050 and the storage and grid integration infrastructure that makes a low-carbon grid work, this produces a British electricity system that is reliable, largely decarbonised, and capable of supporting the industrial and compute-intensive activity the country requires. Nuclear's share of generation depends on demand outcomes and renewables co-development, sitting in the range of approximately 25–40% by 2050, with the share growing through the second half of the century as further build comes online.

The Targets

This is unusually important and worth sustaining the discipline. Hinkley Point C took seventeen years from approval to projected commissioning, for 3.2 GW. France's nuclear build between 1974 and 1990 — the gold-standard reference case for state-led rapid nuclear deployment — produced approximately 50 GW under conditions of strong state direction, standardised design, and political consensus that no Western democracy has replicated since. Britain in 2026, even with real reform, will not match France in 1980. To deliver 20–25 GW of new capacity by 2050 requires commissioning roughly 1 GW annually starting in the early 2030s and sustaining that rate for two decades. That is achievable. Targets far above this are not, on any realistic reading of British construction, regulatory,

and supply chain capacity. The country has had quite enough of programmes whose headline targets were credible only in their PowerPoint.

The figures above are the planning case. A pessimistic case — 15–18 GW of new capacity by 2050, perhaps 30% of generation share — remains transformational compared with the current trajectory, which delivers a single operating station and increasing import dependence. The programme is committed to even in its pessimistic case; the planning case is what disciplined sequencing aims for; the upper case is recovered only if the early years go better than precedent suggests.

The Strategic Case

The argument for large-scale nuclear is not climate alone, though climate makes it urgent. A modern economy requires reliable abundant electricity. Weather-dependent generation cannot deliver this without storage overbuild on a scale neither technically nor economically realistic. Gas peaking plants are incompatible with credible climate commitments. A country dependent on imported energy or intermittent supply has surrendered economic sovereignty in ways British politics has refused to face. Nuclear is the only proven technology that delivers low-carbon electricity at the scale, reliability, and density Britain requires alongside renewables. The countries that have decarbonised their grids successfully — France, Sweden, Switzerland — did so largely through nuclear in combination with renewables. The framing is nuclear and renewables as complementary pillars, not one as primary against the other.

The mix at 2050 is approximately one-quarter to two-fifths nuclear, one-third to one-half renewables (offshore and onshore wind, solar), with storage and dispatchable capacity (hydrogen turbines, biomass with carbon capture where feasible, limited gas peaking as residual) and interconnector imports balancing the rest. The country's large offshore wind capability — the largest in Europe — is preserved and continues to expand at the pace supply chain and grid integration permit. Offshore wind expansion to the levels required is itself constrained — the UK currently has approximately 15 GW operational; government targets of 50 GW by 2030 were revised down because supply chain, planning, and grid connection constraints proved harder than expected. The 80–100 GW figure for 2050 is itself ambitious and requires sustained investment and institutional development across two decades.

Energy security is a public good that markets price imperfectly because the costs of failure fall on the polity, not individual consumers. State direction of the underlying infrastructure is justified accordingly — public oversight in regulated markets that allow private capital while preserving public-interest direction, providing reliable energy security and skilled employment in regions that need it.

Safety as the Foundational Principle

Nothing in this commitment is more important than this. Britain has one of the strongest civilian nuclear safety records in the world, built over seven decades through the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the National Nuclear Laboratory, and the regulated discipline of the nuclear industry itself. That record is preserved and strengthened, not compromised for delivery speed.

The Office for Nuclear Regulation is expanded sharply — staffing approximately doubled across the next parliament, salaries lifted to retain technical expertise, statutory independence reinforced. The principle is that the regulator approves what is genuinely safe and rejects what is not, regardless of political timetables. Construction proceeds at the pace safety permits, not at the pace political ambition would prefer. Where this means slower delivery, slower delivery is what the framework accepts. The country that cuts safety corners on nuclear loses the public consent the entire programme depends on.

The technologies chosen are proven. The first wave of new build is the Sizewell-C-class pressurised water reactor (the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) design, drawn from the pressurised-water lineage France has operated for decades and now running in Finland, China, and at Flamanville) and the Rolls-Royce 470 MW small modular reactor (SMR), designed in Britain, derived from submarine reactor heritage, with design certification well advanced through the ONR's Generic Design Assessment. More speculative technologies — Generation IV designs, thorium reactors, advanced modular reactors using novel coolants — are pursued through dedicated R&D and demonstrator programmes but are not committed to as deployment technologies until proven elsewhere. The principle is that Britain leads on what it knows works and follows on what others prove.

Decommissioning and waste management are treated as integral to the programme, not externalised. The cost of disposal is built into electricity pricing rather than left for future generations to discover. The Geological Disposal Facility programme proceeds with proper community consent, recognising that Britain has considerable nuclear waste already requiring permanent disposal regardless of new build decisions, and that responsibility for managing that waste is unavoidable.

The Build Programme

The shape of the programme over the next quarter-century is as follows.

The first parliament completes Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C, the two large reactors already under construction, ensuring delivery to budget and schedule that the country can rely on. Both are essential to demonstrating that British nuclear delivery has been restored and that the programme is credible. Final commissioning across the early-to-mid 2030s adds approximately 6.4 GW of capacity.

A second large reactor pair is committed in the first parliament, sited following engineering and regulatory assessment rather than political announcement. North Wales and the Suffolk-Essex coast region remain the leading candidates. These projects begin construction

in the first parliament and complete in the second-to-third parliament, providing a further 6.4 GW of capacity by approximately the late 2030s to early 2040s.

A third large reactor wave is committed in the second parliament for delivery across the 2040s, sited across the North West corridor and the Severn-Trent region. This wave provides a further 4–6 GW by approximately 2050, with continuation into the late 2050s for completion of the fleet.

The Rolls-Royce SMR programme proceeds in parallel, with first units operational in the early 2030s and manufacturing capacity scaling to produce two to four SMRs annually by the late 2030s. SMRs serve regional grid needs, replace retiring gas plants, and support energy-intensive industrial users. The programme aims for 6–10 GW of SMR capacity by 2050, distributed across sites where large-reactor placement is unsuitable.

The manufacturing centre for Rolls-Royce SMRs is committed to a specific region — most plausibly Tees Valley or the Sheffield-Rotherham corridor where the relevant heavy engineering capacity exists or can be rebuilt. This is one of the major regional industrial commitments described elsewhere; nuclear manufacturing becomes a multi-decade industrial anchor for a region that has waited too long for skilled work.

Regional Industrial Commitments

This is the part of the commitment that connects nuclear directly to the regional renewal programme. Specific regions become specific nuclear hubs with multi-decade industrial commitments behind them.

The North West nuclear corridor — Cumbria, Lancashire, parts of Cheshire — becomes the densest concentration of nuclear capability in Europe, building on the existing Sellafield, Heysham, and supply chain base. Sellafield remains the centre of decommissioning and waste management capability. Moorside hosts new large reactor build. Heysham continues operation and possibly hosts replacement. The nuclear engineering, operations, and supply chain workforce expands to perhaps 35–50,000 across the region, with associated multiplier effects.

North Wales, particularly Anglesey, becomes the Welsh nuclear hub. Wylfa hosts the next major large reactor build, subject to the extensive local consent-building work the political situation requires. Trawsfynydd, where the original Magnox station has been decommissioned, hosts SMR siting. The Welsh nuclear workforce becomes a significant component of the region's economy, with Welsh-language nuclear engineering training as part of the Cura Custodum educational pathway.

Tees Valley becomes a nuclear manufacturing hub. The Rolls-Royce SMR factory establishes 1,500–2,500 long-term high-skilled manufacturing jobs, with supply chain expansion across the region. Hartlepool's nuclear heritage continues through possible reactor replacement.

The Suffolk-Essex coast hosts Sizewell C and Bradwell — large reactor capacity supporting eastern grid demand and the data centre industrial base.

Somerset continues its nuclear role through Hinkley Point C operation and possible expansion.

These regions host nuclear industrial leadership for the next sixty to one hundred years — skilled employment, technical training pipelines, supply chain capacity, and the local prosperity that comes from anchor industries.

The Workforce through Cura Custodum

Nuclear engineering, reactor operations, radiation protection, and the nuclear specialisms are exactly the strategic workforce categories the Cura Custodum framework was designed to support. The skills bottleneck is the single greatest constraint on faster delivery. The nuclear engineering workforce is aging and the training pipeline is inadequate to even the build programme described above. The Cura Custodum nuclear pathway and university programme expansion address this but take a decade to mature. The first parliament focuses heavily on workforce development; the build programme's pace in the second and third parliaments depends on the workforce being available. This sequencing is built into the programme rather than ignored.

Nuclear engineering apprenticeships at scale, with the Cura Custodum benefits package. University programme expansion in nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, and reactor design at Imperial, Manchester, Cambridge, Birmingham, Bristol, and the Welsh universities serving the North Wales hub. Cross-fertilisation with the defence nuclear programme — the Rolls-Royce submarine reactor capability and the civilian SMR programme draw on the same fundamental engineering. Personnel rotation between Astute-class and Dreadnought submarine work, civilian SMR development, and nuclear operations becomes a deliberate feature of workforce planning.

Fusion: The Long-Horizon Commitment

Civitas Britannica commits to fusion power as a national objective in earnest, not merely as research that might eventually pay off. Britain has world-class fusion capability at Culham, where the Joint European Torus operated for forty years and where the STEP programme — Spherical Tokamak for Energy Production — aims to deliver prototype fusion power generation by approximately 2040.

STEP is committed as a national priority. Funding scales up steeply — from current levels to approximately £2–3 billion annually across the next decade and beyond. The principle is that Britain commits to fusion delivery rather than treating it as research that may or may not succeed. If the engineering proves more difficult than current projections suggest, the commitment continues; if the technology requires a generation rather than a decade to commercialise, the commitment continues. This is the kind of long-horizon civilisational investment the framework here supports.

The strategic logic is straightforward. If fusion works at commercial scale within Britain's lifetime, it becomes the dominant energy technology of the late 21st century. Britain has the scientific capability to be among the countries that commercialises it first. The fusion commitment is held precisely because the fission programme above is bounded in ambition — fission delivers what can reliably be delivered now; fusion holds open the transformative option.

The fusion commitment connects to the nuclear programme rather than competing with it. The fission build programme provides the workforce, supply chain, and regulatory expertise that fusion will eventually require. STEP is sited at West Burton in Nottinghamshire — confirmed in 2022 — providing a Midlands anchor for the fusion programme alongside the Cumbrian and Welsh fission hubs.

Storage, Grid Integration, and Renewables

The nuclear programme is one pillar; the renewables and grid programme is the other. Offshore wind expansion proceeds to approximately 80–100 GW operational by 2050, with the supply chain, port infrastructure, and grid connection capacity built progressively across the period. Floating offshore wind capability is developed for the deeper waters around Scotland and the Celtic Sea. The British offshore wind manufacturing base is rebuilt as part of the industrial strategy — the country exports offshore wind technology and components rather than importing them, as has been the pattern in recent years.

Storage capacity is built at the scale a largely decarbonised grid requires — pumped hydro where geography permits, grid-scale battery deployment, longer-duration storage technologies as they mature. Grid integration infrastructure — interconnectors, demand-side management capability, transmission upgrades — is treated as foundational, not supplementary. The capital programme for grid modernisation, storage capacity, interconnectors, and demand-side management infrastructure runs to approximately £60–90 billion across the decade, funded through combination of public capital allocation, regulated returns frameworks attracting private capital, and the fiscal architecture.

The point is that nuclear, renewables, and grid integration are co-developed rather than one being primary against the others. The country requires all three working together; investment in one without the others produces a partial solution that does not deliver the reliable, deeply decarbonised system the ambitions require.

International Partnerships

British nuclear capability is sovereign but not isolationist. Substantive partnerships with France through EDF (already deeply engaged at Hinkley and Sizewell) continue and deepen. Cooperation with the United States on SMR development, regulatory frameworks, and strategic supply chains is expanded. South Korean engagement on Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)'s APR-1400 reactor capability is explored as a complement to the EPR

programme. Civil nuclear cooperation with Japan rebuilds the relationship that historically supported British nuclear development.

The principle is that Britain operates a sovereign nuclear capability — design authority, regulatory authority, fuel cycle capability, decommissioning capability — within a network of broad international partnerships. This is consistent with the international posture: credible medium-power capability, partnered closely with allies, not dependent on any single supplier.

Funding and the Fiscal Picture

The capital cost of the nuclear programme is large. Approximately £450–600 billion across the next quarter-century in current pounds at central planning case, with optimistic floor £350 billion and pessimistic ceiling £700 billion. The wide range reflects that British nuclear construction has a track record of overrun, that the assumption of learning-curve cost reductions from Hinkley to Sizewell to subsequent units depends on EDF actually delivering effects the French EPR programme has not consistently shown, and that the country starts from a workforce and supply chain position weaker than the comparable French programme in the 1970s.

This is not affordable as conventional public spending. It also does not need to be. The funding model combines:

- State capital commitment of approximately £30–50 billion across the first parliament, establishing the programme and proving capability.
- £8–12 billion annually thereafter for two decades, drawing on the wealth tax capital pool, ongoing capital allocation, and borrowing within fiscal rules against the productive returns.
- Significant private capital through the Regulated Asset Base model that Sizewell C pioneered, attracted by the long-duration inflation-linked returns that pension funds and institutional investors actively want.

Under the central case, private capital provides approximately 65–75% of total programme financing. The state's role is providing the framework, absorbing the construction-period risks markets cannot price, and ensuring delivery discipline.

Annual state fiscal commitment peaks at approximately £12–16 billion at peak deployment across capital and operations, declining as the build programme completes and operational revenue becomes self-sustaining. The fusion R&D commitment of £2–3 billion annually is additional and continues regardless of the fission programme schedule.

The Regulated Asset Base model assumption is the critical element of the funding architecture, and its principal risk. If institutional investor appetite for UK infrastructure declines — whether through sovereign credit considerations, political risk perception, or alternative returns becoming more attractive — the state has to absorb more of the financing. The conditional architecture handles this: if private capital share falls below

approximately 60% of programme financing, either the state absorbs more with corresponding pressure on the recurring envelope and Tier 3 commitments, or the build programme slows. That risk is real, and it sits on the books, not in a footnote.

The risk has a specific feedback loop, at the point where the funding architecture and the tax architecture interact. The cumulative tax package set out in Section XI — the wealth tax, National Insurance uncapping, capital gains and inheritance reform — is itself capable of affecting sovereign credit standing and institutional appetite for UK assets if markets read it as hostile to capital. Were that to occur, the Regulated Asset Base model would become harder to deliver precisely when the recurring fiscal position was most stretched, the two pressures compounding rather than arriving separately. The framework does not dismiss this. Two things hold against it. First, the channelling relief set out in Section XII works directly in the opposite direction: by giving long-duration UK infrastructure a privileged tax position, it manufactures domestic institutional appetite for exactly the assets the Regulated Asset Base model depends upon, partially offsetting any decline in general investor sentiment. The relief and the nuclear funding model are designed to reinforce one another. Second, the September 2022 episode demonstrated that the binding market judgement is on fiscal credibility and coherence, not on the level of taxation as such; a tax architecture that is high but coherent, costed, and paired with productive investment is read differently from one that is incoherent or unfunded. The framework treats fiscal coherence, not fiscal modesty, as the protection against this feedback loop.

This is among the largest fiscal commitments here. It sits within the recurring envelope and the wealth tax capital allocation, but it requires sustained political commitment across multiple parliaments without flinching when individual project costs rise or schedules slip. The country has watched too many large infrastructure projects collapse under political short-termism. Nuclear cannot be allowed to repeat the pattern. The discipline mechanisms described in the conditional architecture apply — sequencing, contingency reserves, rigorous gate reviews — but the underlying commitment is firm.

The alternative is also expensive. The renewables-plus-storage path Britain has been on requires comparable capital scale, with greater technological risk, greater dependence on weather-dependent generation, and lower energy security. Nuclear is not cheaper than the alternative; nuclear and renewables together are differently expensive than either alone, with far better strategic outcomes than either alone.

The Industrial Transformation

Abundant reliable low-carbon electricity is the foundational input for the industries that will define the coming decades. Even at the substantial-share level described here, Britain becomes one of the few countries in Europe that can offer reliable low-carbon power at industrial scale, with the firm capacity nuclear provides anchoring the variable renewables output.

Energy-intensive manufacturing — steel through electric arc furnaces, green ammonia, electrochemistry-based industrial processes, advanced materials — becomes viable to rebuild in Britain rather than continuing to offshore. Green hydrogen production at industrial scale becomes economic where the underlying power costs are competitive. Battery manufacturing at scale becomes feasible on power-cost fundamentals.

Compute-intensive industries follow the same logic. A modern AI training cluster consumes 100–300 megawatts continuously; data centre demand globally is projected to triple by 2035. Britain with significant nuclear capacity and expanded renewables becomes a competitive location for hyperscale data centres and the frontier-technology compute base, supporting the technology strategy set out earlier in this section. The qualifier is that competing on pure power cost with countries like the US, or with regions like the Nordics that have hydro at scale, remains demanding. The British proposition is a combination of reliable power, regulatory quality, alliance positioning, and proximity to European markets — not power cost alone.

Advanced manufacturing requiring reliable continuous power becomes economically viable in regions where reliable power exists at competitive cost. The nuclear hub regions named above are not just nuclear regions; they are the foundations of the industrial reordering that nuclear-substantial power makes possible.

Acknowledged Difficulties

Three real difficulties deserve naming directly.

The political commitment must be sustained across multiple parliaments without flinching. Nuclear projects span decades; political short-termism has been the principal cause of British nuclear underperformance for forty years. The commitment to long-horizon governance and the discipline mechanisms in the conditional architecture address this, but the specific risk that future governments may abandon the programme remains real. Public consent earned through honest argument is the principal safeguard.

Public opposition at specific sites will be intense. Some communities will object to new build regardless of national strategic importance. The principle is that strategic siting decisions cannot be vetoed by single-community opposition where the engineering, safety, and grid integration cases are strong, but generous community benefit packages and real engagement reduce the legitimate ground for opposition. The Welsh sites are particularly sensitive given existing political resistance; the commitment to North Wales as a nuclear hub is firm but requires considerable local consent-building work.

The skills bottleneck constrains the timetable directly. The domestic answer runs on two tracks alongside the welcomed skilled migration set out in the migration architecture: the first parliament focuses largely on workforce development through the regional skills academies and technical institutes established in Tier 1, and the build programme's pace in subsequent parliaments depends on that workforce becoming available. The pessimistic

case reflects what happens if workforce development underperforms; the planning case assumes it broadly succeeds; the upper case requires it to far exceed expectations. The framework commits to the planning case and accepts the pessimistic case if delivery is harder than projected, rather than pretending the upper case is the central estimate.

The country that built the world's first commercial nuclear power station, that operates a sovereign deterrent, that has the scientific and engineering capability to commercialise fusion, chooses to use its capability rather than allow it to atrophy. The state directs strategic infrastructure in the public interest while welcoming private capital on regulated terms. Regions with industrial heritage host industrial commitments worthy of their inheritance. The country becomes energy-secure, climate-credible, industrially capable, and scientifically ambitious — through the substantial-share reality that British capability can deliver, alongside the renewables and grid investment that complement it.

Within the prioritisation hierarchy, nuclear power sits in Tier 2 (foundational state functions). Energy security is comparable to defence in its strategic significance. The fusion commitment sits in Tier 3 (substantial reform delivering high value), reflecting that fusion is uncertain in timing while being potentially transformative.

This is the strategic foundation. The renewables and grid investment described above is its essential complement. Everything else in British energy and industrial policy follows from the combined capability.

Education Reform

Education reform proceeds in the main in the third parliament, the institutional architecture having been built by the Capacity Parliament's foundational work. One element, though, is deliberately brought forward, because it is the longest of all to bear fruit: the curriculum, and within it the priority given to mathematics, science, and engineering. A gap in national expertise is a gap in the nation's education arriving a generation late, and the child taught poorly at twelve cannot be conjured into an engineer at twenty. So the direction is set in the second parliament rather than waiting for the third, and the teacher supply that governs its pace — the recruitment and training of mathematics and science teachers, which binds everything downstream — is begun as early as the first parliament's capacity work allows.

The priority is a continuous spine of quantitative and scientific learning running the length of a schooling, not a specialism chosen late by a few. Mathematics and the sciences are taught with depth from the primary years, where the foundation is either laid or lost for good; design, engineering, and computing are treated as real subjects and not as the margins of the timetable; and the early spotting of aptitude becomes a duty of the system rather than the luck of a particular school. Above all, the spine does not break at sixteen. Britain's long peculiarity — that a young person may abandon mathematics at sixteen, and most do — is ended: a core of mathematics and quantitative reasoning is carried to eighteen by every post-sixteen route, the technical no less than the academic, because no country has ever

produced scientists and engineers in number from a population half of which stopped counting at sixteen.

From sixteen the routes are three, and the framework names them, so that a young person and their family can see the whole map and not a fragment of it. The first is academic: the established subjects to eighteen and a degree in engineering or science at a university now funded to teach those costly courses at their true cost. The second is the degree apprenticeship, the framework's preferred road into the profession — the young person employed by a real firm, drawing a wage, carried to a full degree and chartered standing without debt, the places made real by the contract conditions the British Standard Apprenticeship framework lays on those who take the state's custom. The third is technical: a rigorous applied qualification at one of the technical institutes the framework expands, joined to genuine placement in industry, and — the point the system must make true rather than merely assert — a road that runs onwards into the degree apprenticeship and to chartership beyond, not a siding from which there is no way back. Beneath all three lies one principle, parity made structural and not merely proclaimed: the technical path is properly resourced, its demand guaranteed by procurement, and its ladder connected upwards, so that the choice made at sixteen is a choice of route and never a choice of ceiling.

The Teaching Settlement

Teaching has been allowed to lose its standing, and the framework restores it for the same reason it restores the standing of the other critical callings: the work is foundational, and a country that lets it decay pays for the neglect everywhere else. Few functions are more consequential. The Royal Institute draws on the minds the schools have formed; the engineers and scientists this programme depends upon are taught before they are recruited; the capable citizen is an educated one first. Teaching is therefore treated not as one public-service pressure among many but as critical work whose dignity is to be restored — and restored on the framework's own logic, a reciprocal settlement in which the state grants generously and the teacher serves, each half of it real. It is the same instrument the framework uses to hold dentists in the NHS against the pull of private practice; the two settlements rhyme because the problem does.

Recruitment in the subjects the country is shortest of — mathematics, the sciences, computing, where the salaries of industry pull hardest — is won at the point of choosing. To the able student weighing the classroom against a job that pays far more at once, the state offers the route in as a gift rather than a debt: the cost of qualifying, the tuition and maintenance for the degree and training that lead into shortage-subject teaching, is funded, so that the young person who would otherwise be deterred by the price of entry is not. For the career-changer who already holds the degree — the engineer of thirty who turns to teaching — the gift is scoped to the training step she actually needs, her first skill being the asset she brings.

The gift is earned across service rather than handed over at the gate, and this is what guards it without a single string. It is not the clearing of whatever debt a person happens to carry, which would be arbitrary and would draw those who came for the money and not the work; it is the cost of the qualification, made good as the teacher teaches. There is no lump to seize and walk away with: serve, and the funding accrues year by year; leave early, and only what was earned is kept, with nothing recovered and no one left in a hole. Three filters keep it sound, none of them a financial trap — the skill it demands, which the unqualified cannot fake; the payment paced to service, which leaves the grab-and-go nothing to grab; and the work itself, which the uncommitted do not survive. The offer is generous and hard to qualify for at once, which is a wholly different thing from free money for the asking.

But recruitment fills the room only once; what empties it is the job. The evidence is unforgiving, and the framework states it: teachers leave overwhelmingly not for want of pay but for want of a bearable working life — crushing workload, an accountability that hunts rather than helps, the slow erosion of professional trust. A settlement that wins the teacher in and then breaks her on those is no settlement but a turnstile. So the state's half of the bargain is not the gift but the job, and the reciprocity is exact: if the teacher owes service, the state owes work worth committing to. That half is load-bearing, and it is built, not asserted.

The inspectorate is reformed in three named ways, because reforming Ofsted is otherwise an applause line. The single high-stakes grade that reduces a whole school to one word, and wires that word to consequences severe enough to end careers, is ended: a school is described across the several dimensions on which it is rarely uniformly strong or weak, and the judgement is severed from the punitive cascade, so that inspection informs rather than executes. The inspector arriving to catch a teacher out against a checklist gives way to expert peer review — serving practitioners, credible to the inspected, whose account reads as professional counsel and not a verdict. And the school found wanting is routed to help, with capacity and expertise enough to improve, intervention restored to the genuine last resort it was meant to be rather than the standing threat it became. Beside the inspectorate, the workload itself is cut: the data-collection and marking treadmill that inspection culture generates is lifted, so that a teacher's hours are spent teaching rather than evidencing that she taught.

The countervail is stated in the same breath, for a reform written only for the comfort of teachers becomes a shield against scrutiny at the children's expense. Inspection exists in part to catch the school failing its pupils, and that scrutiny does not soften — only its weaponisation against the professional does. The line is between high stakes for improvement and high stakes for punishment, not between scrutiny and none: a school genuinely letting its children down is still met, unflinchingly, with the help and where necessary the intervention those children are owed. The parent loses the blunt simplicity of a single grade — a real cost, named as one — and gains a truer picture in its place. And none of it is a stroke of the pen: the corps of credible reviewers must be found and given time,

and the support a struggling school is promised must be funded and staffed, or the punishment is merely removed and nothing set where it stood. This is the hard and costed half of the settlement, and the half on which the whole instrument stands or falls, for it is the conditions and not the cheque that do the keeping.

The settlement is plain about its limits. It does not abolish the gap between a teacher's pay and industry's, which no country has; it makes the classroom competitive enough at entry and bearable enough across a career that the comparison is no longer one-sided, and it accepts that the state will sometimes fund a teacher who serves a few years and leaves — three years of a good mathematician before a class being worth the having, and the price of an offer the talented will actually accept. What the framework will not do is the thing each predecessor did: win the teacher with a bursary and lose her to the job, and call the revolving door a workforce.

An Education Frontline Advisory Council is established on the NHS model.

The Life Skills programme rolled out nationally, providing the practical life skills British schools have stopped reliably delivering: home economics, first aid, swimming, financial literacy, basic civic knowledge. The programme cooperates with existing voluntary youth organisations where they wish to take part, drawing on what they already do rather than duplicating or displacing it. Its instructors are drawn largely from the retired and semi-retired, and from the Cura Custodum population, as described in Section VI.

Higher education funding restoration begins, with tuition fees reduced towards approximately £4,000 annually and corresponding restoration of taxpayer funding as fiscal performance permits, and with the Cura Custodum priority pathways adding full grant funding for students entering programmes that lead directly to qualifying service. Restoration to full scope — comprehensive maintenance support across the student population — remains the Tier 4 commitment set out in Section X.

Special educational needs reform: assessment capacity rebuilt, specialist provision expanded, mainstream school support strengthened. Approximately £2–3 billion annually at full implementation.

The British Standard Apprenticeship framework operationalised: independently administered accreditation with broad industry, education, and union representation, statutory authority over quality standards, real market differentiation through government contract requirements, regulated industry requirements, public funding pipelines, and Cura Custodum priority pathway recognition.

Total recurring additional spending at full implementation approximately £15–22 billion annually. Capital programme over the decade approximately £18–22 billion for school and FE estate renewal, funded through the wealth tax allocation in the early years and capital borrowing against productive returns thereafter, consistent with the capital-funding framework in Section XI.

The Universities Settlement

The universities are in a quiet solvency crisis, and the framework addresses it as a system rather than waiting for the first failure to force improvisation. The domestic fee, frozen for most of a decade, has been eroded by inflation to the point where teaching a British student is a loss-making activity cross-subsidised by international fees — which makes the sector's finances a hostage of visa policy, and makes every migration adjustment a university funding decision nobody names as one. Research is funded below its full cost, with the gap met from the same vanishing surplus. Several institutions sit near insolvency with no orderly regime for failure. This is managed decline by accident, and the framework prefers its decisions made on purpose.

Teaching is funded at its full cost through a rebalanced mix: the fee indexed now, and reduced towards the £4,000 level as the wider education settlement matures, with a restored teaching grant weighted towards strategic and high-cost subjects, so that the price of a degree stops being set by the politics of the moment and the cost of a laboratory stops being met by an overseas student's rent. Maintenance grants return for students from the poorest households, because participation, not the fee headline, is where access is actually decided.

A statutory student-protection and resolution regime is created before it is needed, and it runs the conditional grant in its inverse direction: institutional autonomy is preserved in full while finances are sound, with graduated intervention as solvency indicators deteriorate and an orderly transfer mechanism that protects students and staff when an institution cannot continue. The regime exists so that the first failure is administered, not improvised.

Research moves towards full economic cost on the strategic priorities the industrial strategy names, through the funding architecture and Catapult expansion already committed. Differentiation is treated as realism rather than hierarchy: not every institution should chase research rankings, and the teaching-first university is honoured as such, in parity of esteem with the technical and apprenticeship routes this framework has already rebuilt. International students remain a national strength, recruited with integrity and counted fairly within the migration architecture rather than blamed for it.

The settlement adds approximately £2–4 billion annually at maturity — the teaching grant and maintenance restoration — phased in the third parliament behind the fiscal gates, with indexation and the resolution regime costing little and legislated early. The ledger carries the rows.

Cura Custodum Extension

Cura Custodum extends from the first-parliament baseline (military and NHS clinical) to other emergency services across the second and third parliaments as the institutional architecture matures. Police, fire, prisons, Border Force, ambulance services receive

provisions matched to high-risk operational service, sustained trauma exposure support, and the specific career architecture each profession requires.

Full implementation cost reaches the £18–23 billion annual range described in Section VI, with the partial offset from reduced turnover, recruitment churn, and agency staffing reducing net fiscal pressure.

Regional Renewal

Regional renewal commitments deepen across the third parliament. Distributed anchor institutions, regional banking architecture, devolution to a smaller number of meaningful English regional bodies on something closer to the German Länder model. The grant follows the conditional pattern set in Section III: each regional body starts with more than the present mayoral settlement offers and gains further fiscal and policy weight as it demonstrates delivery and clean audit — powers earned forward rather than rationed from the centre, with the same published conditions for every region so that devolution never becomes favouritism. The mechanisms work because the first parliament built the institutional capacity to run them.

Local government is repaired with the same sequence as the state itself: capacity, then money, then freedom. Why councils fail is no mystery. A decade of central grant cuts collided with demand-led statutory duties — adult care, children's services, special educational needs (SEN), temporary accommodation — that now consume the budgets and have eaten every discretionary service a resident can see; council tax is regressive, frozen on 1991 valuations, and capped, so revenue could never follow need; some councils, told to be entrepreneurial, gambled on commercial property and lost; and the local audit system collapsed into a backlog of unsigned accounts, so failure went unwatched until it arrived. Three repairs cost almost nothing and start early: audit is rebuilt first, because power cannot be devolved to bodies nobody audits; funding moves to consolidated multi-year settlements, replacing the begging-bowl of competitive grant pots and their bidding circus, on the same bankability principle this framework applies to farm payments; and the land value tax gives councils the base Section VII sets out — locally collected, nationally equalised, growing with the place. Beyond the floor, freedom is earned on the conditional-grant pattern, and the measure that gates it is chosen because it is hard to cheat: the verdict of residents themselves, through independent, nationally run satisfaction surveys, compared between statistically similar councils and sized fairly to each, alongside the hard service outcomes that satisfaction alone might flatter. And the duties that broke the system are not left on local books pretending to be local problems: the care settlement in this section carries the largest of them nationally, and every pound it lifts is a pound returned to the services residents can actually see.

Annual cost approximately £3–5 billion above what was committed in industrial strategy. Capital allocation from the wealth tax pool funds the regional infrastructure investments.

Not every region returns to its previous size. The deindustrialisation of the 1980s removed economic activity that does not return on demand. What can be committed to is making the post-industrial regions liveable for the citizens who remain there — with public services, transport, cultural infrastructure, and economic opportunity that justify civic life rather than counsel departure — and providing sound economic models that build on what is locally sustainable rather than promising restoration of what is gone.

The Cultural and Civic Offer

A country worth living in has cultural depth as well as institutional capacity. The programme commits to sustained support for the cultural infrastructure that has been declining alongside the civic economy.

Festivals are cultural infrastructure worth preserving. Glastonbury alone contributes approximately £100 million annually to the local and regional economy; the UK festival sector contributes approximately £2 billion annually and supports around 85,000 jobs. The sector currently struggles for structural reasons — insurance costs, venue and licensing costs, post-Brexit touring complications, restrictive local authority licensing in some areas. The programme commits to extending Arts Council remit to include festival sector support, developing insurance pooling mechanisms through state facilitation, and reforming local authority licensing frameworks to balance legitimate community concerns with recognition of the sector's value.

Music venues are similarly civic infrastructure. The closure of small and mid-size venues across British cities has been a structural problem for fifteen years. The agent-of-change principle is properly enforced through the planning reforms — developers building near existing venues bear the cost of soundproofing rather than the venue facing complaints from new residents. This is essentially cost-free to the state and protects the sector directly.

There is a kind of national vitality that never shows in the productivity figures and is badly missed when it goes, and Britain has been losing it: the late-night city, the club and the dancefloor, the grassroots music room, the festival field — the places a country goes to let its hair down. This framework asks a great deal of its citizens, in duty and in seriousness; it owes them, in return, somewhere to be unserious. A thriving nightlife is not a frivolity to be tolerated but part of what makes a place worth living in, and Britain's has thinned alarmingly — more than half of grassroots music venues now turn no profit at all, scores close each year, and the touring circuit has contracted so far that whole towns no longer see a professional act from one year to the next. The talent pipeline the whole industry rests upon is being starved at its root, and the framework treats this as the real loss it is.

The grassroots venue and the small club are given relief from the business rates that fall on them out of all proportion to what they earn — a tax levied before a venue has made a penny of profit, and a named cause of the closures of recent years. They keep the protection of the agent-of-change principle set out in the planning reforms, so that the

newcomer who builds beside a venue bears the cost of the noise rather than the venue that stood there first. The live industry is asked to water its own roots, through a modest levy on the tickets of the largest arena and stadium shows returned to keep the small rooms open — made binding if the industry's own voluntary effort will not, for no grassroots stage means no future headliner. Licensing, turned in too many places against the night-time economy by default, is reset to treat a well-run nightlife as something to enable rather than suppress. And the festival, already named here as infrastructure worth keeping, is backed to grow rather than merely survive, the support and the insurance pooling extended with the ambition of more festivals in more places — so that the field in summer and the back room on a wet Tuesday are kept alike as the country's common ground.

Touring artist mobility is part of the reciprocity Britain seeks from European partners. Post-Brexit visa and equipment complications for touring musicians, technical crew, and equipment have damaged Britain's standing as a venue for international acts and have damaged British artists' ability to tour internationally. The European framework section names this as one of the matters on which Britain expects reciprocal cooperation in return for the cooperation Britain offers.

The targeted draught duty differential is extended to provide real support for pubs, festivals, and licensed venues. Pub-served and venue-served alcohol is supervised social consumption rather than the home and supermarket patterns associated with higher alcohol-related harm. The differential is calibrated to support civic infrastructure — pubs, festivals, music venues — that has value beyond commercial activity, while preserving the public health architecture that has produced declining alcohol harm rates across recent decades. Fiscal cost approximately three to five hundred million pounds annually, within the recurring envelope as part of cultural infrastructure support.

Public investment in cultural infrastructure that supports festivals and venues is sustained alongside the regional renewal commitments. The Edinburgh Festivals operate largely because of sustained public investment in cultural infrastructure across Scotland; the English equivalent has been hollowed by local authority funding cuts. Regional cultural infrastructure allows artists to develop, venues to operate year-round, and audiences to engage with culture continuously rather than only during festival season. Total fiscal cost for the cultural infrastructure commitment approximately £200–500 million annually, modest within the envelope but significant for the texture of British civic life.

Legal System Reform

The Law Reform Commission established in the first parliament reaches scale across the second and third parliaments. Sizeable standing capacity of approximately 1,500–2,000 staff including lawyers, technical specialists, parliamentary draftsmen, and supporting researchers. Statutory authority to propose consolidation, simplification, repeal, and codification with proper parliamentary scrutiny.

The statute book is undertaken systematically. Britain's statute book contains roughly fifty thousand Acts of Parliament if principal Acts are counted, with statutory instruments running to hundreds of thousands. The Commission undertakes systematic review and consolidation across a twenty- to thirty-year programme.

Procedural simplification: comprehensive simplification of Civil, Criminal, and Family Procedure Rules. The digital legal framework: comprehensive rebuilding of the legal framework for digital and electronic technology, replacing the fragmented current architecture.

Access to justice and legal aid: civil legal aid restored in priority categories (family law where domestic abuse is alleged, housing including possession proceedings, immigration where individual liberty and family integrity are at stake, welfare benefits where citizens are challenging the state's decisions). Criminal legal aid rates restored. Annual cost approximately £400–700 million.

Court capacity and infrastructure: large increase in judicial sitting capacity, court estate renewal addressing the worst of the physical decay, court technology modernisation as part of the GAIA programme.

Total annual cost at full implementation approximately £2.5–3.5 billion. Funded through the recurring tax envelope; the capital component funded through the wealth tax investment programme. The full programme runs across multiple parliaments by design.

Pension and Capital Architecture: Maturation

The pension and capital architecture reform reaches operational maturity across the third parliament and continues compounding across the fourth and beyond. The work is generational by nature; what the third parliament delivers is the architecture functioning at scale, with results visible across the horizon.

The National Wealth Fund reaches operating scale. Assets at end of third parliament approximately £150–250 billion on the re-based seed, the range conditioned on the recurring build drawing from within the shared capital allocation, growing towards Norwegian-equivalent scale across subsequent parliaments. The fund's investment income contributes meaningfully to the fiscal architecture — by mid-horizon, the fund's sustainable annual draw — on the Norwegian discipline of spending only the expected real return, approximately £6–10 billion at the asset levels reached — provides a real contribution to state finances that compounds across decades. The fund holds strategic equity in UK infrastructure, providing the patient capital the framework requires for nuclear, grid, transport, digital infrastructure, and the productive economy. By the fourth parliament and beyond, the fund is the principal backstop for the state pension architecture, providing the funded element that British pension architecture has historically lacked.

NEST reaches sophisticated-investor scale. Asset base approximately £400–600 billion by end of third parliament, with investment capability competitive with the Canadian and Australian institutional precedents. NEST's allocation to UK productive infrastructure compounds across the period, providing significant domestic capital for the framework's infrastructure programme.

Pension fund consolidation completes. The fragmented UK pension industry is restructured into a far smaller number of large funds operating at infrastructure scale. Administrative costs across the industry reduce (the consolidation savings compound across decades and represent material additional retirement security per pound contributed). Domestic investment capacity scales accordingly.

Auto-enrolment contribution increase completes. Minimum contributions reach 12% on schedule, with the workforce participating at markedly higher contribution rates than historical UK levels. Retirement adequacy improves for the cohort that has experienced the full phasing across their working lives.

Infrastructure allocation reaches target range. UK pension and insurance allocation to UK productive infrastructure reaches the 10–15% range across the period, providing approximately £300–500 billion of domestic capital available for UK infrastructure investment. The consequence is realised: the framework's nuclear, grid, transport, and digital infrastructure programmes underwritten largely by domestic capital, no longer dependent on international institutional investor appetite. The RAB risk identified earlier in this section's nuclear treatment is materially reduced.

State pension reform stabilises. The double lock provides real protection against erosion while remaining fiscally sustainable across the demographic horizon. The flexible claiming window, anchored to healthy life expectancy and softened by occupational credits, addresses the differential life expectancy across Britain in a way the uniform-age model never could: the citizen chooses, the arithmetic stays neutral, and the early pension follows the work rather than the postcode. The combined effect is a state pension architecture that is adequate, sustainable, and equitable.

The Cura Custodum interoperable pensions established in earlier sections integrate with the pension architecture. Service-based recognition extends to retirement security: covered workers in frontline civic service accumulate pension entitlement portably across covered roles, with employer contributions consistent across the covered workforce, and the architecture providing the institutional infrastructure that smaller frontline services historically lacked.

The significance of the pension and capital architecture reform is not visible in any single parliament's fiscal arithmetic. It compounds across decades. By mid-horizon, Britain is a country whose retirement architecture is adequate by international standards, whose domestic capital works productively for the economy, and whose infrastructure financing

depends meaningfully less on international institutional investor appetite. The reform addresses what is potentially existential across the demographic horizon — the arithmetic of an ageing population in a country whose retirement architecture is underbuilt and whose productive economy is undercapitalised — and provides the architecture that allows the framework to function across the horizon.

This is generational work, dependent on sustained political commitment across multiple parliaments to architecture whose results are largely invisible during the parliament that builds it. The pattern of British politics rewards visible short-term action and punishes long-term institutional investment. The framework commits to the work on the principle that civic obligations of this kind should not be hostage to ordinary political weather, and protects it the only way it can: through the same statutory footing, salience, and structural depth that make reversing the Royal Institute of Statecraft or Cura Custodum a costly and conspicuous act rather than an impossible one.

Climate, Energy, and the Natural World

Climate policy and nature policy are different projects bundled under a single "green" label that obscures both. Separating them clarifies what each requires.

Britain's climate position is stronger than the current political conversation suggests. The country has reduced territorial emissions by approximately 54% since 1990, a larger reduction than most G20 economies have achieved. Britain has world-class capability in offshore wind, with the largest installed capacity in Europe. The technical and industrial base for credible climate leadership exists. The country has been ambivalent about using it.

The position taken here is leadership through action rather than rhetorical caution. The net zero by 2050 commitment is honoured firmly. Britain leads through example, through technology development, and through diplomatic engagement, recognising that climate change affects the country regardless of where emissions occur and that British interests are served by active leadership rather than passive participation.

The cross-cutting connections matter. Climate intersects with defence (climate-driven instability is part of the strategic environment), with industrial strategy (renewables, nuclear, and alternative fuels are major industrial opportunities), with international positioning (leadership versus laggard status), with agricultural strategy (emissions and adaptation), with migration policy (climate-driven displacement over coming decades). The commitment below should be read alongside these other commitments rather than as standalone climate policy.

Renewables Expansion at Pace

Offshore wind continues its expansion as Britain's largest single climate and industrial strategy contribution. The country has the resource, the technical capability, and the supply chain capacity to lead this market internationally. Investment in transmission infrastructure,

port capacity, and the supply chain treats offshore wind as both energy policy and industrial strategy. Onshore wind and solar are deployed where appropriate, with planning reforms (described elsewhere) removing the artificial constraints that have throttled deployment in England specifically.

The fiscal commitment is sizeable — perhaps three to five billion pounds annually in additional capital investment over the decade, funded through the wealth tax capital programme. This is supplementary to private sector investment which the policy framework supports rather than replaces. The principle is that Britain creates the policy and infrastructure conditions in which renewables deployment proceeds at the pace the climate commitments require, with the country positioned as a major beneficiary of the global energy transition.

Nuclear as the Strategic Foundation

Climate policy without nuclear power requires either heavy overbuild of renewables and storage at costs and technical demands that prove unrealistic, or acceptance of fossil fuel continuation incompatible with genuine decarbonisation. Britain commits to nuclear power as the dominant baseload source of British electricity over the next quarter-century — the commitment is described earlier in this section. The climate consequence is that British emissions reduction accelerates sharply as nuclear capacity comes online through the 2030s and 2040s, and Britain becomes a credible climate leader rather than a credible climate-rhetoric-leader.

Alternative Fuels and Energy R&D

Britain commits to major investment in the energy technologies of the next decades, treated as bleeding-edge industrial opportunity alongside the technology strategy developed earlier in this section. Hydrogen as both transport fuel and industrial input. Sustainable aviation fuels. Advanced biofuels. Synthetic fuels for hard-to-decarbonise sectors. Advanced battery storage. Carbon capture and storage at industrial scale. Geothermal where geologically appropriate.

The R&D infrastructure connects to the Catapult Network expansion described elsewhere — energy technology specifically as a Catapult priority, with the scale of investment that produces world-leading research capability, not incremental improvement. The fiscal commitment is approximately one to two billion pounds annually in research investment, supplementary to private sector R&D which the industrial strategy supports.

The principle is that Britain invests in becoming a country that produces the energy technologies of the next decades rather than a country that imports them from those who do invest. The economic and strategic returns from leadership in these technologies are large; the cost of being a follower is also large.

The North Sea Transition

Existing North Sea oil and gas operations continue under existing licensing terms. The economic case for orderly continuation is clear — domestic production displaces imports rather than being purely additional emissions, the tax revenue is sizeable, the skilled workforce is essential to the transition industries, and energy security has strengthened in importance since 2022.

New licensing applications are assessed on the merits in each case — energy security, economic, and climate considerations weighed against each application — rather than ruled out by blanket commitment. The transition to renewables, nuclear, and alternative fuels proceeds at pace through the broad commitments described above, with North Sea production phasing down naturally as transition capacity grows rather than being artificially accelerated by political decision.

The skilled workforce in North Sea operations is considerable and has direct application to offshore wind, carbon capture, hydrogen, and other transition industries. Significant worker support through frameworks adjacent to the Cura Custodum principle — the polity supporting those whose specific employment it renders obsolete through its own policy decisions — manages the human dimension of energy transition. Aberdeen and the North Sea supply chain are not abandoned to market forces; they are supported in transition to the energy industries of the next decades.

Buildings and Households

Building emissions are a large fraction of British total emissions, primarily through gas heating in existing housing stock. The transition to electrified heating (heat pumps primarily, with district heating where appropriate) is necessary for net zero and affects ordinary household life directly.

Heat pump deployment is supported through grant programmes, retrofit financing, building standards reform requiring new construction to be heat-pump ready, and heavy workforce investment in installation capacity. This transition takes decades, affects most households over time, and produces both climate benefit and operational benefit (lower energy costs, better heat regulation, reduced air pollution from gas combustion).

Building standards for new construction are upgraded to require near-zero operational emissions, on the principle that the easiest emissions reductions are those that are not built into new infrastructure in the first place. Existing housing stock is addressed through phased retrofit programmes prioritising the worst-performing buildings and the lowest-income households (where energy costs are most burdensome).

Transport

Electric vehicles displace internal combustion vehicles over coming decades. Charging infrastructure deployed at scale, with the principle that charging access is universal rather than concentrated in affluent areas. Public transport electrified where appropriate. Aviation and shipping addressed primarily through alternative fuels and operational efficiency, not

substitution. Active travel infrastructure (cycling, walking) supported in cities where appropriate.

The policy mostly proceeds through existing mechanisms (vehicle standards, infrastructure investment, taxation on internal combustion fuels) with the contribution here being sustained political commitment rather than novel intervention. The industrial strategy benefits — British manufacturing of EVs, batteries, charging infrastructure — connect to the industrial commitments described elsewhere.

Agricultural and land transition. Agriculture contributes heavily to emissions and the land is the principal substrate for carbon sequestration. The agricultural commitments, set out in full in The Land and the Sea later in this section, commit to redesigned subsidy that rewards both production on strategic crops and real ecological outcomes. The climate dimensions of this — peatland restoration, soil carbon, livestock emission reductions, woodland creation — are part of the agricultural reform rather than separate climate policy.

The wider principle is that British land use serves multiple objectives simultaneously: food security, ecological restoration, carbon sequestration, public access. The three-zone rural vision (intensified productive agriculture, ecological restoration, modest development), developed there, handles the land use question. Climate-specific elements — peatland restoration in particular, given that British peatlands are major carbon stores — are prioritised within the programme.

Marine protection. Britain holds formal designation as Marine Protected Areas over 38% of its waters, but over 90% of these areas lack effective regulation and bottom trawling continues within many. Less than 0.4% of English waters are Highly Protected Marine Areas with ecosystem-level protection. The current arrangement is paper protection that delivers little ecological outcome.

Large-scale expansion of marine protection is committed. Highly Protected Marine Areas expand towards 30% of UK waters — turning the Global Biodiversity Framework target Britain has signed from paper designation into ecosystem-level protection. Existing Marine Protected Areas are enforced properly, including bottom-trawling bans where designations require them. The Blue Belt programme is sustained and expanded across Overseas Territories, where Britain has outsized responsibility for some of the world's most ecologically significant marine areas.

Domestic marine research capacity is rebuilt. The country has historical expertise in marine science that has been allowed to deteriorate; significant investment in research capacity supports both the protection programme and marine industrial strategy (offshore wind, marine biotechnology, sustainable fisheries).

Britain has a long relationship with the sea and can lead internationally on marine conservation. The foundation exists; what's required is enforcement, expansion, and institutional rigour rather than rhetorical commitment. The fiscal scale is modest by the

standards here — perhaps three to five hundred million pounds annually for protection, enforcement, and research — but the ecological returns are considerable.

Terrestrial nature and biodiversity. National parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty currently function primarily as managed agricultural landscapes with limited ecological value. Large parts of these areas are restored to protected status, with active rewilding programmes, native species reintroduction where ecologically appropriate, and management for biodiversity outcomes rather than only for amenity value.

Biodiversity targets are concrete and measurable, not aspirational. The country commits to halting biodiversity decline within a parliament and reversing it within two parliaments, with proper monitoring and accountability. This is hard — the current trajectory is severe decline in many species, and biodiversity restoration is more difficult than emissions reduction because the systems are more complex and the indicators less tractable.

The fiscal commitment is approximately five hundred million to one billion pounds annually for terrestrial nature programmes, complementing the marine protection commitment.

International climate engagement. Britain's international position on climate is sustained leadership through diplomatic engagement, technology cooperation, and existing financial commitments rather than expanded new external commitments while domestic priorities remain unmet. The principle is that international commitments are made from a position of demonstrated domestic competence rather than as substitute for it.

Existing climate finance commitments are honoured through their current cycle. Future climate finance is calibrated to demonstrated fiscal performance and the programme's deliverability. The conditional architecture in Section XI holds this principle visible — climate finance, like other commitments, depends on the conditions for delivering it being met.

Diplomatic engagement is active. Britain maintains active leadership in international climate forums, contributes to international scientific cooperation (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and related bodies), and supports technology transfer where appropriate. The principle is that British leadership is sustained but not unlimited, and that the country contributes through example, expertise, and existing commitments rather than through major new external financial commitments while domestic transformation is being delivered.

The Lifestyle Dimension

The transition affects ordinary life. Heat pumps replace gas boilers over decades. Electric vehicles displace internal combustion. Building standards drive household retrofit. Diet patterns shift modestly as agricultural emissions reduce. Air travel is more expensive as it absorbs the costs it currently externalises. These are not catastrophic disruptions but they are changes the polity is committing to.

The framing matters. Genuine democratic engagement requires the polity to name the implications of its decisions rather than promising no change. Citizens deserve to understand what the transition involves and to make informed democratic decisions about pace, distribution of cost, and the support structures that make transition manageable. The current pattern of climate policy avoiding lifestyle implications produces both worse policy (because the implications are not properly considered) and worse politics (because citizens correctly perceive that they are being told something other than the full picture).

The commitment is that climate transition is delivered with proper attention to distributional effects. Lower-income households receive generous support for retrofit and electrification. Rural communities that depend on private vehicles face proper transition support rather than urban policy assumptions. Workers in fossil fuel industries receive proper support through Cura Custodum-adjacent mechanisms. The transition is firm but humane, and the polity bears the costs of making it humane rather than treating those costs as someone else's problem.

Climate commitments on this scale are expensive. Total climate-related additional spending is probably £15–25 billion annually at full implementation, with capital investment over the decade approximately £50–70 billion funded through the wealth tax allocation in the early years and capital borrowing against productive returns thereafter, consistent with the capital-funding framework in Section XI. The fiscal commitment is large but the alternative — failure to lead on technologies and industries that will define the next several decades — is more expensive in operational and strategic terms.

The transition is hard, sustained over decades, and affects virtually every aspect of British economic life. The polity commits, with open naming of costs, and with the institutional discipline to deliver over the timescales required rather than the political weather of any given year.

Climate change is happening regardless of British policy and the country prepares for adaptation alongside mitigation — coastal infrastructure facing sea level rise, agriculture facing climate variability, public health facing heat impacts, strategic environment facing climate-driven instability in regions Britain interacts with. The commitments to infrastructure, public health, defence, and international positioning include the climate dimensions of each.

The country has done significant work since 1990. The work that remains is harder but more urgent, more directly connected to British industrial and strategic interests, and more achievable than the current political conversation suggests. The framework chooses to lead it.

Waste and the Circular Economy

The framework has just ended the dumping in Britain's rivers; it does not intend to keep dumping abroad or burning at home. The waste system is optimised for disposal rather than recovery, and its failures are structural rather than behavioural. Household recycling has sat on a plateau for a decade while every council runs a different system, so the citizen's diligence is defeated by where they happen to live. The one policy success — the landfill tax that emptied the holes in the ground — diverted the stream into incinerators instead, and the incineration estate, built on decades-long contracts that must be fed, now competes with recycling for the very material it was meant to be the backstop for. And the plastic that is neither burned nor recycled is exported, much of it to countries with less capacity to handle it than Britain has — a dumping ground with a longer shipping lane, ended on a published date for the same reason the rivers were.

The instruments are the framework's usual kind: regulation that makes the polluter build the solution. Extended producer responsibility is enforced at full cost, so the company that designs the packaging pays the true price of its disposal — at which point the packaging redesigns itself, which is the point. The deposit return scheme is delivered rather than re-postponed. Household collection is made consistent nationally, because a recycling system that requires local archaeology to use is not a system. A moratorium on new incineration capacity holds while the existing contracts are reviewed against the recycling they cannibalise. And the repair half of the circle is cultural as much as regulatory: a right to repair with teeth — parts, manuals, and software access — alongside the mending and making the Life Skills curriculum and the outdoor entitlement already teach, so that the next generation regards disposability as the anomaly it briefly was.

One stream is treated as the strategic asset it has quietly become. Electronic waste is Britain's richest ore: the critical minerals in discarded devices — the lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and copper on which the defence, energy, and technology programmes all depend — currently leave the country as waste and return as precarious imports. Domestic recovery capacity is built as industrial strategy, within the existing industrial envelopes and funded in part by the producer-responsibility fees of the goods it processes: the conditional grant applied to the bin. A country rebuilding its industrial base does not export its ore and import its anxiety.

The Land and the Sea

The author is not a farmer, and this section is written knowing it: the directives are set here, the detail belongs to the people who work the land and the water, and the consultation that produces it is part of the policy. Four questions organise everything that follows. How is British farming and fishing supported as the critical industry it is? How is the prodigious waste in the food system turned back into value? How are farms made fit for a future of climate, technology, and ecological change? And how is all of it done without unbalancing the fiscal architecture this framework spent its discipline building?

Support begins with the customer, not the subsidy. The public plate is the largest unused instrument in British food policy: the NHS, schools, prisons, and the forces feed millions daily, and procurement standards that favour British production give farming what subsidy never has — demand, at scale, on contract — with a producer-share condition written into the contracts so the money reaches the farm gate rather than stopping with the aggregators. The supermarket relationship is rebalanced the way this framework treats every concentration of private power: the Groceries Code Adjudicator gains the investigatory reach and penalty weight to make buying-power abuse expensive. And the post-Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payment system continues its move towards public money for public goods — flood management, soil restoration, habitat — with the payment schedules made multi-year and bankable, because a farm cannot borrow against a scheme that changes with each Secretary of State.

Two hard preconditions sit underneath, and both belong to policy areas this framework has already built. Labour: harvests have rotted in British fields for want of pickers, and a farming section silent on that is not worth the name — a named seasonal agricultural route and a fishing crew route operate inside the migration architecture, returner-based and counted within the net target. Standards: every domestic standard raised is a competitive penalty if imports produced below it enter freely, so equivalence requirements stand at the border, which is trade policy this framework already has the spine for.

For the fleet, the settled reality is worked, not relitigated: the veterinary agreement this framework commits to is claimed for the fishermen it serves, because it reopened the European market for the shellfish and fresh catch that border friction had been quietly killing. Within British waters, the sovereign questions are answered in the inshore fleet's favour: concentrated quota holdings are reviewed against a presumption towards the working boats and the coastal communities the renewal programme already serves, the science sets the catch because a fishery managed for the long term is the only kind that has one, and the ports, processing, and safety of the most dangerous peacetime occupation in Britain are funded through the coastal renewal already committed.

Waste is treated as the system failure it is. A statutory class of fit-but-not-fancy food is created: produce and manufactured goods that fail cosmetic or packaging standards while meeting every safety standard, sold at reduced price or routed to redistribution, under good-faith liability protection for the growers, manufacturers, and retailers who supply it — on the principle the French anti-waste law proved workable a decade ago. One instrument, three jobs: the household food bill falls, the waste stream shrinks, and the farmer is paid for the share of the crop that current standards plough back into the field.

The future is met through the three-zone logic that governs land use throughout this framework: intensified productive agriculture on the best land, using precision technology, robotics, and the gene-editing framework already in statute to grow more on less; ecological restoration on the land intensification spares, where the recovery of British wildlife is

treated as infrastructure — flood defence, pollination, soil, carbon — and paid for as such; and modest development where the housing programme needs it, with the land-value instruments capturing the uplift. Agricultural technology joins the technology strategy as a named export strength: a country that must farm a small island well has every reason to sell the tools for doing so.

Conservation is made a second income rather than a first grievance, because the money already exists and mostly needs plumbing. Every development under biodiversity net gain law purchases habitat units — which makes the housing programme itself a standing buyer of restoration on the farms around every new town. The water investment this framework forces through bills funds catchment payments, because paying a farmer upstream to hold nutrients and floodwater is cheaper than treating both downstream. Woodland and peatland carbon codes add verified long-term income, and natural flood management pays the upland farm for the storage the concrete budget would otherwise buy. The state's role is the one this framework gives it everywhere: build the market's core infrastructure — a single natural-capital registry through GAIA, conservative verification codes, clear rules on which payments stack and which double-count — and then let the buyers in.

But this market is granted on conditions, because unregulated it does net harm. Payment follows active management, not bare title: where land is tenanted, conservation income requires the tenant's consent and a defined share of the benefit, so the policy that pays for nature never becomes the policy that evicts the farmer to make way for it. Eligibility is zoned, concentrating conservation payment on the land the three-zone vision assigns it, so restoration income cannot outbid food production on the best ground. Aggregation limits apply to habitat-bank ownership on the framework's standing anti-concentration principle, with the National Wealth Fund underwriting the market rather than owning the countryside. The registry's codes are conservative on purpose — one payment per outcome, a smaller honest market preferred to a larger rotten one — and the public payment floor is protected in statute, so private income supplements the farmer's settlement and never becomes the excuse to cut it.

The fleet's conservation income follows its own nature, because a fisherman cannot sell units off water he does not own; his income is work and rights. Restorative aquaculture — seaweed and shellfish — uses the same boats, the same hands, and the same water knowledge, filters the sea while producing a crop, and fits around the fishing calendar as supplementary income by design. Restoration of seagrass and saltmarsh is contracted to the crews whose boats and seabed knowledge it needs, with the emerging blue-carbon codes behind it. The monitoring that offshore wind and marine science require is purchased from the fleet already at sea. Ghost gear is paid for by the tonne landed rather than retrieved as charity. And where marine protection constrains fishing, the affected fleet holds first refusal on the paid wardening and monitoring the protection creates — the people the closure costs become the people it employs, and the evidence from the early protected areas is that well-designed protection returns better catches at the boundary within a decade.

The fourth directive is the discipline on the other three: this section spends almost nothing the framework has not already counted. Procurement is redirection of existing spend. The waste class and the conservation rules are regulation. The adjudicator runs on fees and fines. The payment reform reshapes an existing envelope, the technology sits inside the funded research architecture, and the restoration money at scale arrives through the climate capital programme already in the ledger — priced there, not here twice. The one tax change travels in Section VII: agricultural relief converted to an earned relief, full for the working successor, clawed back from the tax shelter.

What this achieves is measured at its true scale. Farming and fishing will not transform the national economy; together they are a small fraction of it, and this framework does not pretend otherwise. What they hold is something the ledger cannot price in the ordinary way: the floor under the nation's food in a century when supply chains have become weapons, the loyalty of the countryside and the coast to a programme of renewal that would otherwise speak only to the towns, and the difference between a landscape that recovers and one that is merely mourned. The section buys three kinds of insurance — strategic, political, and ecological — and pays for them almost entirely with intelligence rather than money. A serious country farms its land well, fishes its waters honestly, and wastes neither. That is the whole of the ambition, and it is enough.

The Care Settlement

Social care is the unfinished business of the welfare state, and the framework treats it as a system failure rather than a budget line. Half its cost is working-age adults, not the old, which is why this settlement is wider than elder care alone. The present arrangement is a lottery in which catastrophe is means-tested: a citizen who saves and then sickens can lose everything a working life built, while the workforce who provide the care — over a million and a half people — are paid at or near the legal minimum, with vacancies in the tens of thousands. The failure cascades through two other systems this framework repairs: unfunded care is the largest single pressure breaking council budgets, and unavailable care is the largest single cause of the occupied hospital beds that paralyse the NHS. One repair relieves three systems, which is why it is sequenced deliberately rather than perpetually deferred.

Capacity precedes generosity here as everywhere. Care becomes the second sectoral agreement after early years — the pilot already provided for in the second parliament — bringing registration, a recognised career ladder from care worker through nursing associate into the NHS professions, and pay floors set through the sectoral architecture rather than the minimum-wage default. The migration route for care continues under settlement-by-contribution, with the sponsor-licensing abuses of the present visa regime policed as the exploitation they are. A workforce treated as skilled is the precondition of every promise that follows; the framework declines to promise universal care while paying those who give it as if anyone could.

The funding settlement is the Dilnot architecture, updated and finally delivered across the third parliament: a cap on the catastrophic lifetime costs no family can insure against, a raised means-test floor beneath it, and the universal offer extending as the conditional gates open. Annual cost approximately £8 billion at full implementation, with the workforce floor and standards regime arriving earlier and priced within the sectoral and council settlements; the ledger carries the row and the gate.

The provider market is brought inside the framework's grammar on concentration and the conditional grant. Public fees rise with demonstrated quality and workforce standards — the uplift follows the inspection, not the lobbying. Ownership is made transparent to the regulator, because a care home leveraged through offshore debt is a home whose residents are hostages to a balance sheet; a resolution regime ensures that when a provider fails, the care continues while the company does not; and aggregation limits apply to the largest chains on the same principle the framework applies to water and the press.

Integration is administrative before it is structural: one shared record through GAIA between hospital, general practice, and care provider; discharge-to-assess funded as the NHS flow investment it is; the care plan owned by the person and their family rather than by whichever institution currently holds them. The settlement is measured by the standard this framework sets local government: the satisfaction of the people receiving it, independently surveyed, because the resident and their family are the only inspectors who cannot be managed.

And the coupling pays twice: every pound of care funded properly through this settlement is a pound released from the council budgets it has been silently devouring — the largest single contribution this framework makes to the repair of local government above. The settlement is among the largest recurring additions in the programme and is staged behind the fiscal gates accordingly: standards and workforce first, the cap and universality as revenue certifies. What the framework will not do is what every government since the Royal Commission of 1999 has done — commission, praise, and shelve.

The settlement is also built for the weather coming, because age is on its way to becoming the question beneath every other. The arithmetic is plain: roughly three and a half working-age citizens stand behind each pensioner today and closer to two and a half will by mid-century; some two million Britons are ageing without children at all; and loneliness at that scale is not a soft concern — its toll on health runs in the territory of smoking. The framework declines the comfort of a binary forecast. If the technological horizon arrives in full and work itself grows scarce, care becomes the work that remains — the first place freed human time must flow, if a citizen's income without employment is to mean citizenship rather than warehousing. If it does not arrive, the demographics force the same conclusion from the other side. And in the long middle that is likelier than either pole, automation runs backwards from what the last century planned for: the desk empties before the bathroom does, the paperwork automates while the lifting stays human. So the

design principle is the same in every scenario, and the framework states it once: machines for the logistics, humans for the company. Technology is deployed inside care to strip out the administration that consumes a third of every shift and to extend how long a body — including an older body — can do the work; the hours it frees are returned to presence, not harvested as savings.

What no funding settlement supplies is the person in the room, so the framework builds a contribution architecture for the long age rather than a befriending scheme. The largest pool of healthy adult time in Britain is the young old, and the structures invite it: light, paid, flexible community work on the model Japan's silver work centres have run for decades — designed for variable capacity, dignified by wages rather than gratitude — with the flexible pension window as its ramp and a civic earnings disregard so that usefulness supplements the pension instead of clawing it back. The elders hold precisely what the Children's Settlement needs: its outdoor entitlement runs on growing, making, and mending, and the generation that still knows how becomes its instructor corps — the loneliness of one generation answered by the screen-saturation of another, two problems closed with one instrument. GAIA's assisted human front desk is staffed largely by the people it most serves. Companionship enters the civic service architecture this framework envisages as recognised service. And the building stock stops manufacturing the problem: the new towns and the planning reform adopt intergenerational design as standard — extra-care housing woven into ordinary streets rather than parked at the edge, annexes liberalised so families can live near their old, and homeshare arrangements that trade rooms for hours of ordinary human company.

The case rests first on ownership: a life that was the person's own throughout does not cease to be theirs at its end, and a terminal diagnosis hands that authority neither to the state nor to the disease. It rests on the suffering that the best palliative care cannot always reach — for all that good hospice work achieves, a residue remains where it runs out of answers and only the timing is left to decide. And it rests on a thing the evidence shows that intuition misses: that the choice consoles by merely existing. Where the option is lawful, roughly a third of those who obtain the means never use them — the relief is in the having, not the using, because the dread of a death without control is itself a kind of suffering, and lifting it lets a person stop bracing and live what time remains. The present law abolishes none of this; it exports it. Those with money and strength travel abroad to die — earlier than they would choose, because they must go while still able to travel, and far from home — while those without are left to the very end the law pretends to spare them. A right available only to the affluent and the mobile is not a prohibition but a class privilege, and the framework's instinct here is the one it brings everywhere: what the few can buy, the many are owed under law. The choice stays bounded as it is bounded elsewhere — terminally ill adults of sound mind, deciding for themselves — and the framework leans towards it within those bounds, while the government, as in every matter of conscience, provides the free vote and stands back from the verdict.

One pairing is stated because the framework's integrity depends on it. This programme grants the dying citizen the right to choose the manner of their end; its necessary counterpart is that no one makes that choice out of loneliness or the fear of being a burden. The choice is only free if the alternative is real, funded, and present in the room. The autonomy at the end of life and the company at the end of life are one policy, and the framework expects to be judged on both together.

The Children's Settlement

A society cannot take this framework's name and let its children be anything less than its first priority, and so the test for this settlement is set higher than for any other: whatever the evidence says is right for the child governs, within the budget, the schedule, and the capacity the framework actually has. The diagnosis is not contested, because the state's own investigators wrote it. Britain dismantled the cheap, preventive layer of childhood — the family-help centres whose benefits the evaluations later showed exceeded their costs, the youth services cut by two-thirds — and now buys the expensive, broken-crisis layer instead: early-help spending halved across a decade while crisis spending doubled, and a record number of children are in care. The market that sells that care back to the state was examined by the competition authority and found dysfunctional in terms this framework recognises from the water industry: placements at thousands of pounds per child per week, providers carrying offshore leverage, margins the examiners called higher than a functioning market would allow, and children moved far from everything they know because the buyer has nowhere else to go. A child's home is not a yield-bearing asset, and the framework declines to keep pretending otherwise.

The repair runs in the framework's standing order: capacity, then market, then generosity. Prevention is rebuilt first, because it is the only part of the system that gets cheaper the better it works: family help on the model the evidence already vindicated, in every community, joined to the universal childcare and early-years architecture the second parliament builds, so that the help arrives when a family bends rather than after it breaks. The crisis market is brought to heel with the instruments this framework uses on every captured sector: commissioning consolidated into regional consortia so the buyer finally has the weight the sellers have enjoyed, ownership and leverage made transparent to the regulator, aggregation limits on the largest chains, a resolution regime so a provider's failure is never a child's second abandonment, and public and charitable capacity grown deliberately so the state is never again a captive customer. Profit is not banned by slogan; it is disciplined by alternatives. Kinship carers — the grandmothers and aunts who are most children's best placement and the state's least supported — receive allowance parity with foster care, because the cheapest good placement in the system should not be the one the system starves. And the workforce is treated as the constraint it is: caseloads capped as staffing allows, the agency spiral that drains budgets without adding a single social worker brought under the procurement discipline.

Special educational needs are settled rather than deferred, because the present arrangement fails every party at once: plans doubled in a decade, councils carrying deficits hidden by an accounting override with an expiry date, and parents forced through tribunals the councils almost always lose — a system that makes families fight for what it then concedes, paying lawyers with money that should have paid teachers. The deficits are resolved once, in full, alongside the reform and not instead of it: national standards and banded provision that take the adversarial burden off parents, mainstream schools resourced and trained for genuine inclusion through the education settlement's capital and workforce programmes, and specialist places built where mainstream inclusion is the pretence rather than the provision. Children's mental health follows the same early-layer logic: support teams in every school as the front door, so the clinical services the NHS settlement funds are met by need that was caught early rather than need that was left to compound.

And one provision is made because childhood needs it now in a way it did not a generation ago. Children are growing up inside a connected world they cannot step out of unless someone builds the exit, and so the framework builds it: a universal outdoor entitlement, delivered through the uniformed and voluntary youth organisations Britain already has — the scouting and guiding movements, the cadet forces, the farm and nature groups — funded to offer every child who wants one a place, with residential outdoor education restored as an entitlement of school life rather than an accident of postcode. The content is deliberately old: fieldcraft and fire, growing and making and mending, the traditional skills that are redundant right up until they are the difference between a capable adult and a helpless one, and the unpurchasable experience of being somewhere no notification can reach. The instructor pathways run through the Life Skills programme and the veteran cadres already committed; the restored land of the three-zone vision provides the ground; the civic service architecture this framework envisages will extend it. It expands as the conditional grant does everywhere — with instructor and volunteer capacity, not by announcement — because a promise to every child is the one promise this framework refuses to make hollow.

What the settlement costs is set out in the framework's manner. The market reforms, commissioning consortia, kinship parity, and agency discipline are first-parliament work that largely redirects money the crisis system is currently burning. Family help at national scale and the outdoor entitlement are second-parliament builds of approximately £2–3 billion annually between them at maturity, gated on the revenue arriving and the early-years workforce existing. The special-needs resolution is a one-off settlement in the low billions alongside reform, carried with the local government repair, and the ledger holds the rows. The settlement's ambition is stated in one line and measured against it: a country that does not produce broken children through no fault of their own — and education, throughout, is supreme: every provision in this settlement exists so that a child arrives at the school gate

able to learn, because everything else this framework builds is inherited by the children it raises.

The Long Horizon

What matures across the third parliament and beyond:

Regional renewal showing measurable redistribution of British economic geography. Industrial strategy producing visible competitive strength in chosen sectors. NHS reform fully working through. The housing stock catching up with demand. The civic culture rebuilt. The technology base established as world-class in chosen domains. Defence capacity restored to the level the country needs. The international order partially rebuilt where Britain can contribute to its rebuilding.

This is not utopia. It is what the country could become if its citizens decide, over multiple parliaments, that the work is worth doing seriously.

X. The Architecture: The Fourth Parliament and Beyond

This is the horizon of the fourth parliament and beyond: the furthest reach of the programme, where commitment gives way to aspiration. Commitments divide into the programmatic and the aspirational. Tier 4 commitments are stated as aspirational — the country the framework hopes to build if the programme works and if fiscal performance permits, but not promises that can be made within the discipline the rest of the framework accepts.

This separation is itself a discipline. The pattern of British political programmes promising everything at once and delivering very little is the pattern Civitas Britannica exists to interrupt. Naming the aspirational element is the precondition of treating the rest of the framework as a binding contract.

What Tier 4 Includes

- Higher education funding restoration to full scope (the fee reduction completed to approximately £4,000, comprehensive maintenance support, Cura Custodum priority pathways at full coverage).
- Universal Credit adequacy benchmarking to minimum income standard. The operational reforms in the second parliament address acute harm; full adequacy is a generational commitment dependent on the productive economy the programme builds.
- NHS expansion to full mental health parity at all ages, comprehensive primary-secondary integration, full health inequalities programme. The baseline reform in the second parliament addresses the most acute failures; comprehensive transformation is generational.
- Universal elder care at full Dilnot scope including the architecture peer Western European countries deliver to their citizens. The basic universal entitlement in the third parliament replaces the means-tested postcode lottery; comprehensive provision is generational.
- Climate ambitions above the nuclear-led baseline including significant international climate finance, comprehensive building retrofit programmes at pace beyond current deployment capacity, and carbon capture and storage industrial deployment at scale.
- Comprehensive cybercrime response above baseline. The first parliament's National Fraud Agency and the cyber capability development address the foundational architecture; comprehensive prosecution capacity at scale is generational.
- Comprehensive serious organised crime restructuring beyond NCA reform. The City of London's role in international money laundering is well-documented and badly under-enforced. Comprehensive enforcement is politically and operationally demanding and is treated as aspirational.
- Regional renewal infrastructure beyond what wealth tax allocation funds in early parliaments. The framework commits to the foundational regional architecture;

deep regional transformation across all the post-industrial regions is a generational commitment.

- The British Medical Institute's flagship campus — the integrated clinical-research-training site on the Singapore model. Its governing function begins earlier, as set out in the life-sciences section; the physical build is a generational capital commitment, not a first- or second-parliament deliverable.
- The Life Skills programme expansion beyond the second-parliament baseline.
- Doubling medical school places. The first-parliament workforce expansion is approximately 40–60%; a realistic assessment of faculty, clinical placement, and postgraduate training capacity rules out 100% within the period. Full doubling remains aspirational and would require far longer than a decade.
- Take-up of unclaimed entitlements raised towards full delivery. The common spine built in the early parliaments makes the entitlement reachable and corrects official error at no new cost; the deliberate raising of take-up is recurring expenditure of many billions on the same population as the Universal Credit adequacy commitment, and waits, as that commitment waits, on the productive economy the programme builds.
- A National Academy of Leadership. The capstone of the whole programme rather than a department of it: an institution to forge, from every background and on open merit, the people fit to lead a renewed country. It comes last for a reason, and is set out in full below.

The Fiscal Architecture for Tier 4

Tier 4 commitments are conditional. They proceed as fiscal performance and programme delivery allow. The National Fraud Agency revenue stream from the second parliament onwards, productivity gains from the programme, and any wealth tax revenue above the lower bound case all provide potential headroom for Tier 4 maturation. None of this is committed in advance.

Tier 4 represents the country the programme hopes to build if everything works. It does not commit to delivering it because it cannot credibly commit to delivering it within the discipline the rest of the framework accepts.

This is more useful than promising everything-at-once. Citizens see the framework's commitments separately from its aspirations. The discipline holds the committed programme accountable. The aspirations remain visible as the work continues.

A National Academy of Leadership

If the four parliaments are the civilian architecture of the renewal — the defence of the realm and its place in the world are taken up separately, in the sections that follow — then this is the structure's keystone, and it belongs at the end because it can only come at the end. The framework has argued throughout that a country is served well only when it is worth serving, and that the detachment of the able from the national project is, at root, a

rational response to a state that has ceased to deserve their loyalty. If the preceding work succeeds, that condition changes: the state becomes, once more, a thing worth giving one's life to building. The final aspiration is to mark that change with an institution equal to it — and, as will become clear, to answer a question the rest of the framework raises but does not otherwise resolve.

The idea is a national academy of leadership: a place that takes the able and the ambitious from every background and forges them, through genuine hardship and a serious education, into people fit to lead — in government, in industry, in the services, in any institution that turns on the quality of the people at its head. It is not a school for the well-born. No wealth, name, or connection can buy a place; entry is won in open competition or not at all, and the selection is hard enough that passing it is its own distinction, the way the hardest selections already are. Where a candidate cannot pay, the state pays; where a family can, it does, and its fee buys a seat at the same unforgiving selection as everyone else, never a pass through it. The point is not to manufacture an elite but to ensure that the one the country will always have is drawn from the whole of it, on merit, and bound to something larger than itself by having earned its place rather than inherited it.

Two disciplines would govern it, and both are conditions of its being worth building at all. The first is that it would screen for conduct, not for character: it would not presume to certify virtue, which cannot be measured and ought not to be judged, but would remove, at any stage, those who showed corruption in what they did — the cheat, the thief, the betrayer of a trust — on evidence, never on the impression of an assessor. The second is that it would stand at arm's length from the government of the day. An institution that certifies who is fit to lead is, in the wrong hands, a means of capturing a nation's leadership by degrees; the safeguard is to anchor it not to the ministry but to the Crown, by charter, in the tradition by which the armed forces serve the nation across the changing of governments rather than the administration of the moment. The Crown would reign over it and not run it — the guarantor of its independence, never the director of its choices.

One condition follows from the same logic of earned standing. An academy whose mark certifies that a person and their house have kept faith with the country cannot admit the heirs of those who refused its central obligation; to do so would hollow the very thing the mark is meant to mean. A family that has not paid the levy — not one that cannot yet pay it, and is meeting in good faith the terms of deferral the levy itself provides, but one that has simply declined — forfeits this door for its children. The point is not to visit the parent's default upon the child, but to decline to launder a free-rider's inheritance into a certified servant of the commonwealth. It is, in plain terms, the levy's sharpest point of enforcement, aimed at precisely those whom a fine cannot move: the heir may take the matter up with the parent who closed the door.

It is placed last, and held as aspiration rather than commitment, for the plainest of reasons: it would be premature folly to forge leaders for a state still visibly broken, and its first

graduates would not reach the heights for twenty years or more. It is the capstone, not the foundation — the institution a renewed country might raise once it has become, again, a country worth being led well.

Yet for all that it commits nothing now, the academy answers a question the rest of the framework cannot. Of the three failures named at the outset — decayed institutions, a detached elite, a hollowed civic life — the programme treats the first through the rebuilding of capacity and the third through the slow restoration of the civic settlement, but the second it has, until here, only managed rather than cured: better incentives, sterner accountability, abler recruitment, all of which discipline the symptom and leave the cause untouched. The cause is that the able have had nothing above themselves worth their loyalty. This is the one instrument that acts on it directly — not by binding the elite tighter, but by raising something worth being bound to. And it answers a deeper question still, one a thirty-year programme cannot avoid: who keeps the renewal once those who built it are gone? Every other commitment is raised by the present generation; this is the only one that renews the stock of those fit to steward what was built, so that the work does not decay the moment its founders leave the field. A reform that produces its own future custodians is a reform that can outlast the government that began it — which is the gravest risk the framework runs, and this its longest answer to it. So the framework commits to none of it now, and records it only as the shape of an ambition: that having rebuilt the house, a later generation might see to the raising of those who will keep it standing long after the builders are gone.

XI. The Fiscal Architecture

The framework is built on an explicit conditional architecture: each major commitment is funded by specific revenue, and each is conditional on that revenue actually arriving. This is the discipline that distinguishes serious politics from populist politics. No commitment is funded by hope. The polity sees, in advance, what depends on what.

The Tax Envelope

The British tax take rises to around 40% of GDP, and towards 42% as productivity recovers, to fund the framework set out here. This is moderate by Western European standards. Measured consistently, as taxes and social contributions against GDP, Germany and the Netherlands tax at around 40%. Sweden, Finland, and Italy at 42–43%. France and Denmark at 44–46%. Britain at 40 to 42% sits in the mid-range, in line with the Sweden-Finland-Italy band — in line with peer economies that fund functioning public services.

This is the level required to fund the rebuild that the country needs across the next two to three parliaments. It is not presented as the permanent right size of the British state. Once the foundational rebuild is complete, the envelope is reviewed against the country's then-current needs. It may drop, hold, or rise further depending on conditions at the time. The defence trajectory set out in Section XIII is the live instance of this discipline in practice: a real upward pressure on the envelope, tested against it and held within it rather than allowed to move it. What matters is that the envelope is sized to the work, rather than held at a level that produces the disappointed-promises pattern of mainstream politics.

The Productivity Assumption

The fiscal architecture carries one assumption that warrants treatment in its own right because the rest of the architecture depends on it. The stretch towards 42% is sustainable only if British productivity recovers from its post-2008 stagnation; the planning figure of around 40% is set deliberately below it, so the architecture does not depend on that recovery. The recovery does not need to reach the pre-2008 trend of approximately 2% productivity growth per worker-hour. It needs to reach something materially above the current near-zero trajectory. The framework refuses to put a number on what the productivity outcome will be at horizon, because anyone offering twenty-five-year productivity forecasts with confidence is performing certainty they do not have. What the framework can argue is the direction.

British productivity has stalled since 2008. This is the diagnosis on which there is broad professional consensus. The mechanisms are contested, but seven structural features of the British economy are well-evidenced as productivity-constraining, and each is addressed by a lever in this framework.

Capital stock per worker is low by peer comparison. British investment in plant, machinery, infrastructure, and digital capability has run below peer-economy levels for decades. The sustained capital investment programme — wealth tax allocation, nuclear and grid build, Government IT Architecture, school and hospital estate, regional infrastructure, industrial strategy — directly addresses this through public capital deployment at scale.

R&D intensity is below peer level. British R&D spending sits at approximately 2.8% of GDP, against roughly 3.5% in Sweden and the United States and 3.1% in Germany. The Catapult Network expansion towards Fraunhofer levels, restored and extended public R&D, and the industrial strategy commitments directly address this. The mechanism by which R&D produces productivity returns is slow and uncertain in scale, but the directional evidence is solid.

Skills distribution is bimodal. Britain has strong top-end university capability and weak mid-tier technical and vocational capability. The British Standard Apprenticeship framework, the technical institute expansion, and the education reform programme address this directly. The gap between British and German technical workforce capability is formidable, decades-deep, and at least partly recoverable through sustained institutional investment.

Management practice quality is poor by international comparison. The Bloom and Van Reenen research programme has documented a sustained gap between British and best-in-class management practice across sectors. Policy levers are weaker here than in other domains, but the institutional development the framework pursues — sectoral bargaining requiring employer association capability, the Royal Institute of Statecraft producing senior cadres of institutional designers, management training infrastructure — pushes in the right direction.

Regional concentration limits aggregate productivity. High-productivity activity is concentrated in London and the South East to an unusual degree among advanced economies. The regional renewal programme, distributed anchor institutions, regional banking architecture, and the geographic explicitness of industrial strategy investment address this directly. The mechanism is recovery of productive capacity in regions where economic activity has been hollowed.

The planning system constrains agglomeration and infrastructure deployment. The planning reform programme addresses this directly. The international evidence on agglomeration economies is strong; the British self-imposed constraint on them is severe.

Energy costs are higher than competitor economies. The nuclear-led decarbonisation programme combined with offshore wind expansion addresses this over the long horizon. The mechanism is slow — nuclear capacity arrives across two decades — but cumulative.

Each lever is directionally well-evidenced. None is reliably quantifiable at horizon. The cumulative effect depends critically on delivery quality: industrial-strategy spending is wasted where the state lacks the capacity to deliver it; sectoral bargaining curdles into

conflict where institutional development on both sides is missing; capital investment overruns where project-management discipline is absent. The framework's discipline — Capacity Parliament, conditional architecture, honest sequencing — is what makes the productivity levers operate rather than degenerate into the patterns the document elsewhere diagnoses.

If productivity does not recover, the recurring envelope is constrained accordingly: Tier 3 commitments sequence further, Tier 4 ambitions recede, the contingency menu deploys, and the framework's social ambitions take longer to mature than the planning case implies.

The architecture does not bet on a return to the pre-2008 productivity trend. It bets on something better than the post-2008 trajectory, and that is a weaker and more defensible claim than the political tradition typically makes. The difference between 1% and 2% productivity growth determines the speed of social-ambition maturation across the horizon, not whether the framework is deliverable. The architecture remains deliverable across a wide range of productivity outcomes. It is not deliverable if productivity remains flat for another twenty years, and the framework is clear about that boundary condition. Stated at its plainest: the recurring tax architecture funds the foundations and the floor of the social programme; the maturation of the fuller settlement is funded by the growth that a productivity recovery produces. The taxes secure the base. Growth pays for the ambition.

Costing Methodology

Treasury optimism bias in cost projections is well-documented. British government programmes typically come in 15–30% higher than initial estimates, and the pattern holds across decades and across governments. The framework builds this reality into projections from the start, applying the Treasury's own Green Book optimism bias adjustments in the open rather than burying them.

The cost ranges presented for each commitment reflect a deliberate methodology. The lower bound represents the central planning case — what realistic implementation should cost if the architecture works as designed. The upper bound represents the cost overrun risk that contingency reserves and fiscal slack are designed to absorb. The framework plans against the central case rather than the upper bound; the upper bound is acknowledged as the risk the architecture is designed to handle without breaking.

Contingency reserves of approximately 12–15% of additional recurring spending are held against cost overruns and revenue shortfalls, built into the architecture rather than discovered when overruns occur. The headline numbers below include the contingency provision rather than treating it as additional spending. Every key figure in this framework is held in a single canonical fiscal ledger, with each number classified by what defends it — published source, pending source, declared assumption, or chosen target — and with the internal consistency checks computed rather than asserted. The prose quotes the ledger, never the reverse, and the ledger publishes alongside the document.

Fiscal Rules

The architecture distinguishes current spending from capital spending. Current spending — the recurring operational commitments — is disciplined within the tax envelope and is not funded through borrowing. Capital spending — the one-off investments that produce returns over decades — may be partly funded through borrowing against the productive returns of the investment, within fiscal rules that limit total borrowing to sustainable levels. This distinction resolves what would otherwise be an arithmetic problem. The capital commitments named across this framework — the National Wealth Fund endowment, the NHS and school estate programmes, Government IT modernisation, nuclear and grid, water infrastructure, the new towns programme — sum across the decade to well over a hundred billion pounds, far exceeding the periodic wealth tax's net cash yield of approximately £35–50 billion. The wealth tax is not the sole source and was never intended to be. It anchors the early years and seeds the one-off commitments, the National Wealth Fund endowment chief among them; the multi-decade balance is carried by capital borrowing against productive returns, by recurring capital allocation, and by crowded-in private finance, including the channelled private capital described in Section XII. Where individual programmes anywhere in this document are described as funded through the wealth tax allocation, this is the early-years and seed contribution to a blended capital programme, not a claim on the pool in full.

Public debt is not inherently problematic; debt that finances productive investment producing returns over decades is different in kind from debt that finances current consumption. The fiscal rules reflect this distinction.

The Office for Budget Responsibility's role is preserved and strengthened. Independent fiscal forecasting and public reporting on government performance against fiscal rules is the institutional discipline that prevents gradual fiscal drift.

The Conditional Chains

The recurring tax architecture funds the recurring operational programme. The conditional chains tie revenue to spending: if revenue arrives, spending happens on the timeline committed; if revenue falls short, the architecture responds through a defined sequence of contingencies set out in advance.

The planning case is approximately £45–52 billion additional annually at central revenue projection from the tax architecture, placed deliberately at the conservative end of the modelled range described below. The planning floor is approximately £40 billion. Both are stated against full optimism-bias adjustment on the spending side. At the planning case, the committed programme is deliverable, with the gap to the 42% envelope closed only as productivity-recovery effects arrive and the later, conditional tiers are sequenced behind them. At the favourable case of £75 billion, and the upper-bound stretch of £90–100 billion,

the envelope is met with margin and Tier 4 commitments begin to enter the architecture as fiscal performance demonstrates capacity.

At the floor of approximately £40 billion, the architecture is materially constrained, but the committed core is still delivered: the first-parliament run-rate of £22–33 billion sits inside the £40 billion floor with headroom even before the £8–15 billion of transitional land value tax, so the foundations are funded at the floor. What waits on revenue above it is the second-parliament ambition — the health package, universal childcare, the personal-allowance increase — and these are the later tiers sequenced rather than proceeding on schedule, with Tier 3 sequencing extended across longer timescales and, where necessary, the personal allowance staged across an additional parliament. The order of that staging is itself a commitment: the institutional items — the identity card's capital intensity, the pace of sectoral bargaining's build-out, the phasing of the Cura Custodum extension — slip first, and the personal allowance increase is the last household-facing commitment to be staged, not the first. The cash capital position at the floor is set out just as flatly: the contingency reserve sits inside the £30 billion, the working headroom is therefore nothing, and if the estate programmes overrun, the court estate renewal flexes first — the smallest of the cash items and the least time-critical — before a single school or hospital is descoped. The architecture works in this scenario but does so through declared trade-offs the polity sees in advance rather than through hidden compromise. A sustained programme of disappointed expectations from the second parliament onwards would test the political coalition the programme requires. The architecture therefore names its contingencies in advance rather than discovering them mid-parliament.

The planning figures are established by specific construction rather than by analytical preference. The construction: static summation of the individual measure ranges at mature steady-state produces £46–85 billion from the tax measures alone, with near-term yield lower as the land value tax and other measures phase in behind their transitional protections; an additional £8–25 billion comes from named reform-driven sources (procurement waste recovery, cannabis legalisation, fraud agency yield), giving a combined static range of approximately £54–110 billion. Each of these is counted once: the procurement release is booked as a spending offset — it funds the defence conditionality and capability reinvestment, not the envelope a second time — and the planning case itself rests on the tax architecture alone, sitting within the £36–71 billion net band before any reform-driven contribution is added. Dynamic modelling on comparable tax architectures in OECD economies recovers approximately 70–85% of static yield once behavioural effects are absorbed, giving a realistic dynamic range of approximately £38–94 billion. The framework places its central planning case at the lower-middle of that range, approximately £45–52 billion: the £75 billion the upper-middle of the range would support is the favourable case, not the plan. The floor of approximately £40 billion sits near the bottom of the dynamic range, reflecting aggressive emigration assumptions consistent with the 2025 non-dom abolition data, the compounding sensitivity of multiple measures hitting the same

population concurrently, and pessimistic recovery on transitional protections (LVT) and lock-in effects (CGT). Planning at the conservative end of the range rather than its middle is the discipline the framework imposes on itself; a revenue case that depends on the optimistic placement is not one it will rest on. Below the £40 billion floor would require emigration responses worse than any historical comparable observed in advanced-economy tax architectures, or a political failure to enact the named measures at all; the first is a scenario risk handled through Tier 3 sequencing and the contingency menu, the second a different problem than fiscal arithmetic, addressed in the political viability acknowledgments. The channelling relief set out in Section XII (The City as Partner in Renewal) interacts with this construction in both directions: it reduces the static yield of the capital taxes on deployed wealth, and it reduces the emigration response that drives the conservative floor. A poorly designed relief that leaked yield without changing behaviour would push towards the floor rather than away from it; the enforcement disciplines are therefore part of what holds the realised position above the floor rather than at it.

The periodic progressive wealth tax funds the early-parliament state capital investment programme, sized to the net cash floor of approximately £30 billion and stretched across approximately eight to ten years. Additional private capital of comparable scale is mobilised into the same national priorities through the channelling relief, so the total investment directed towards the renewal in this period exceeds the state figure; the framework plans the state programme against the cash floor and treats the channelled private capital as additional rather than assumed. Tier 4 capital commitments are excluded from the central case allocation and proceed only if revenue exceeds the central case.

The blended capital programme that carries the return-generating items — the Catapult expansion, industrial strategy, defence equipment, regional infrastructure, and housing capital, some £34–62 billion across their ranges — is sized rather than gestured at, because an instrument that funds a third of the capital pipeline cannot remain a description. It has three legs, each named and bounded. First, a productive-capital borrowing envelope of approximately £2.5–4 billion annually over fifteen years — £38–60 billion across the horizon — within the fiscal rules' provision for capital with productive returns, and modest beside the state capital the nuclear programme already carries at its peak. Second, an explicit recurring capital allocation of £3–5 billion annually from the recurring envelope, claimed once, here, and counted against the ambition gap rather than hidden from it: this is money the spending tiers do not receive, and the National Wealth Fund's recurring build draws from within this same allocation, not in addition to it. Third, crowded-in private finance, which supplements the first two legs but is never relied on for a committed item — what private capital declines to fund, the borrowing envelope carries on a longer timetable. Delivery runs across the second to fourth parliaments; nothing in the blended programme is promised at first-parliament pace. And the borrowing is priced, not just permitted: cumulative drawdown at the envelope builds towards a debt service cost of approximately £1.5–2.7 billion annually by the horizon's end, which is a recurring claim under this

framework's own rules and is counted in the recurring arithmetic alongside the capital allocation. The smaller levy base is paid for squarely — in borrowing serviced from recurring revenue, and in time — rather than recovered by assumption.

Specific reforms generate their own revenue or reinvest released waste. Cannabis legalisation funds drug treatment and contributes to mental health provision (£1–2 billion annually). Defence procurement reform releases approximately £5–10 billion annually currently lost to waste, reinvested in capability. State capacity rebuilding produces approximately £4 billion annually in additional spending but releases significantly more through reduced waste across government. The National Fraud Agency generates meaningful contribution from the second parliament onwards.

The GAIA programme has significant fiscal implications across capital and operational dimensions. Capital investment of £35–55 billion over the decade is funded through wealth tax allocation in early years and through capital borrowing within fiscal rules in later years. Operational costs of £8–12 billion annually settle in once systems are in place, replacing approximately the current government IT spend with a markedly different value-for-money ratio — a redirection of existing expenditure, not new money, so that the net addition to the recurring envelope is the capital service, not the operating line.

The Cura Custodum framework has fiscal implications across the covered workforce. Approximately £18–23 billion annually at full implementation, building gradually over multiple parliaments as the administrative architecture is established and benefits flow consistently across the covered population.

Revenue Contingencies

The framework presents a tax architecture sized to the planning case. If revenue arrives below the central case in sustained form, the architecture has a defined contingency menu named in advance. The polity is told upfront what would happen if revenue underperforms, not surprised by it mid-parliament. The menu deploys progressively: the first tier engages when revenue arrives sustainedly below the central case; the second tier engages as revenue falls towards the £40 billion planning floor; further deployment, combined with Tier 3 sequencing and where necessary staging of the personal allowance increase, is what the architecture relies on at or below the floor. Each tier of response is triggered only if the prior tier has been deployed and proves insufficient.

First contingency: additional revenue measures. The architecture holds in reserve several revenue measures not in the planning case. These are deployed progressively as recurring revenue arrives below the central case, in approximately the order shown:

1. A Financial Transactions Tax at 0.1% on equity transactions and 0.01% on derivatives, modelled on the existing French and Italian instruments. Revenue projection £4–7 billion annually. The technical mechanism is straightforward; the political contest is

hard. The reserve status is deliberate: this is a measure the framework is prepared to deploy if needed, not a commitment held back as a hidden ask.

2. Acceleration of corporate loophole closure beyond OECD timetable, capturing revenue earlier than current international agreements require. Additional £2–4 billion.
3. Further VAT base broadening on additional discretionary categories beyond the planning case. Politically sensitive categories (food, children's clothing, domestic energy) remain excluded. Additional £3–5 billion.
4. Tightening of pension tax relief at higher rates, addressing the regressive distribution of current relief which disproportionately benefits higher earners. Additional £4–8 billion. The reserve status reflects the political contest involved; the case for it is strong.

The combined contingency menu adds approximately £13–24 billion annually at full deployment, sufficient to cover a sustained shortfall more than twice the distance from the planning case to the floor.

Second contingency: spending sequencing. If the additional revenue measures are insufficient or politically unavailable, Tier 3 commitments sequence across longer timescales. Universal childcare full coverage extends beyond the second parliament. The civic identity card is implemented at lower capital intensity. Sectoral bargaining institutional development slows. The Cura Custodum extension to non-clinical emergency services is phased more gradually. The framework remains intact but the timetable extends.

Third contingency: capital borrowing within fiscal rules. For capital spending with productive returns over decades, borrowing within fiscal rules expands modestly beyond the blended programme's standing envelope of £2.5–4 billion annually. This is not a route to recurring operational deficit; the principle that current spending matches recurring revenue holds absolutely. Capital borrowing for productive investment is what fiscal rules permit, and the architecture uses this lever for capital programmes only.

What the contingency menu does not permit. The architecture does not permit funding recurring commitments through capital borrowing. It does not permit relaxing the OBR scrutiny mechanism. It does not permit deferring foundational Tier 1 commitments to maintain Tier 3 timelines. It does not permit hidden recurring deficit financing dressed as capital programmes. The discipline holds: if recurring revenue is insufficient and contingency revenue measures are insufficient, Tier 3 commitments sequence rather than the polity being lied to about delivery.

The framework presents an already large fiscal ask. The contingency menu exists because a programme of this scale must be designed to survive revenue underperformance without breaking the coalition. The framework does not pretend the contingencies are costless — the financial transaction tax (FTT) in particular faces sustained opposition from the financial sector — but it commits to deploying them if circumstances require, rather than allowing the core programme to fail through fiscal inadequacy.

Fiscal Credibility and Market Function

Major fiscal programmes affect markets, and markets affect what large fiscal programmes can deliver. The September 2022 episode demonstrated that gilt yields can move sharply when fiscal credibility is questioned. The framework is designed against this constraint rather than in ignorance of it.

Full Office for Budget Responsibility scrutiny of every fiscal element. Clear separation between current and capital spending within fiscal rules that bind. Sequencing of major announcements to allow markets to assess each component before the next; the wealth tax is announced separately from the spending programme it funds, institutional reforms are announced with operational timelines markets can evaluate, and defence increases are announced with the procurement reform that conditions further increases.

The Bank of England's operational independence is preserved and reinforced. The Monetary Policy Committee's mandate is not adjusted. The Bank's role in financial stability, including the powers exercised in September 2022 to prevent forced selling cascades, is preserved.

The cumulative effect of multiple simultaneous tax reforms on capital markets is the principal market risk. LVT + reformed CGT + tightened IHT + corporate measures + 50p band + NI uncapping + wealth tax announced in compressed legislative time would test market confidence in ways September 2022 was a smaller version of. The framework sequences the announcements deliberately to manage this. The wealth tax in particular is sequenced after first-parliament HMRC capacity rebuilding, with the tax architecture reforms preceding it across the parliament, not bundled.

The Visibility Commitment

The architecture is made publicly visible. Annual fiscal reviews show what has been committed, what has been delivered, what is on schedule and what has slipped, with reasons stated. Each major commitment carries its own delivery plan with public milestones. The relationship between revenue and spending is legible in a way British politics generally hides.

If the tax architecture is producing less revenue than projected, the spending side flexes; if more, surplus is committed to the next priority in sequence. The polity is not told everything is fine when it is not. Citizens hold the framework to its conditional commitments.

This is the contract made visible. It is what will be taxed, what each tax funds, what is delivered with what, and what depends on what.

The Bank of England and Monetary Policy

Monetary policy is conducted within the settlement of independent central banking established in 1997 and refined since. The Bank of England's operational independence is preserved. The remit is appropriate to the country's actual circumstances — primary

commitment to price stability with subordinate consideration of employment and growth, on the framework that has served Britain reasonably well through several decades of significant monetary policy challenges.

The relationship between fiscal and monetary policy requires a frank discussion recent British politics has avoided. Monetary policy cannot solve fiscal problems and fiscal policy cannot solve monetary ones; the temptation to confuse the two has produced both inflation episodes (when fiscal policy has overrun monetary tightening) and deflationary episodes (when fiscal restraint has compounded monetary tightness). The framework requires both policy domains operating within their proper spheres, with appropriate coordination on questions where they interact, and democratic accountability for both through proper parliamentary scrutiny.

The Bank's institutional capacity is supported, not constrained — the technical staff supported professionally, the Court reflecting genuine expertise, not political patronage, the Monetary Policy Committee retaining statutory independence with democratic accountability through Treasury Select Committee scrutiny.

The populist temptation to subordinate monetary policy to political convenience is rejected. Several international examples — Turkey, Argentina, the United States during specific episodes — demonstrate what happens when central bank independence is compromised. Britain's economic position depends on the credibility that independence provides, and the cost of compromising it would far exceed any short-term political benefit. This is consistent with the commitment to institutional discipline, not ad hoc political intervention.

Financial Services Policy

The City of London is one of Britain's most valuable national assets and one of its most concentrated sources of risk. The financial services sector contributes greatly to tax revenue, employment, and economic activity; it also concentrates wealth, influences political outcomes through donations and revolving doors, and creates systemic risks that the economy bears. Effective policy requires neither capture (the dominant pattern of recent decades) nor hostile restriction (the dominant pattern in some left-wing alternatives) but proper regulation calibrated to systemic importance.

The commitments are:

- Prudential regulation at the level appropriate to the systemic importance of British financial services, with regulators paid and supported adequately to maintain technical depth equivalent to the firms they regulate.
- Consumer protection at the level appropriate to a country whose citizens depend on these institutions for routine financial life.
- Competition policy that prevents excessive concentration.

- The connection to the productive economy made explicit, through policy frameworks that direct financial-sector activity towards productive investment rather than purely speculative or extractive activity.

The relationship between financial services and the productive economy needs particular attention. Britain's investment shortfall in the productive economy coexists with a financial sector far larger than peer economies'. Some of this is a legitimate consequence of London's international role; some is the consequence of financial sector activity not connecting to productive investment in the British economy. Policy frameworks that improve this connection — through institutional design, tax structures, and regulatory expectations — are part of the productivity strategy.

Labour Market and the Technological Transition

The economic framework acknowledges that technological change, particularly through AI and automation, is reshaping labour markets in ways the country must navigate rather than ignore. The Cura Custodum framework protects the workforce in critical public service roles. Sectoral bargaining provides the institutional framework for collective negotiation about how technological change is implemented across sectors. Education and lifelong learning provide the workforce adaptability that long-term technological change requires.

The principle is that technological progress should benefit citizens broadly rather than concentrating gains in narrow groups. The framework will not accept a labour market in which technological gains accrue entirely to capital while workers bear the costs of displacement. Policy frameworks — including taxation, labour market regulation, and social provision — are calibrated to ensure broad distribution of technological gains. This is not anti-technology; it is the framework that makes heavy technological investment politically sustainable.

XII. The City as Partner in Renewal

The City of London is one of two genuine global financial centres in the world, alongside New York. It generates approximately £200 billion in gross value added, sustains over a million financial services jobs and a further professional services workforce around it, and produces a trade surplus in the order of £60 to £70 billion. It is among the most valuable institutional assets the country possesses, built across generations of accumulated capability that cannot be replicated quickly and would not be recovered if lost. A programme of national renewal does not treat such an asset as a target. It treats it as a partner.

This framework's position is direct. The renewal it proposes cannot be financed by the state alone, and was never intended to be. Nuclear at twenty to twenty-five gigawatts, eighty to one hundred gigawatts of offshore wind, the rebuilding of the grid, the expansion of the defence-industrial base, housing at scale, and the transport programme together constitute the largest sustained pipeline of investable, government-backed, de-riskable projects in modern British history. The City is the natural mechanism to structure, finance, intermediate, and profit from that pipeline. A hostile City makes the whole programme slower and more expensive. An allied City makes it faster and cheaper. The framework therefore sets out to build the alliance.

The Offer and the Return

The deal is straightforward. The programme offers the City the largest business opportunity in a generation, together with the political stability, regulatory clarity, and rule of law that a global financial centre values above almost everything else. In return, the City aligns its capital with national priorities. Both sides gain. The state secures its renewal financed and its productive economy rebuilt. The City secures deal flow at scale, a government that treats it as an asset rather than an adversary, and an actively defended global position. This is not a concession extracted from a reluctant sector. It is a commercial proposition that serves both parties, and it is presented as one.

Wealth That Builds and Wealth That Sits

The framework does not pretend that aggressive wealth taxation and partnership with the wealthy sit together without strain. The tension is real. It resolves through a single principle applied consistently across the tax architecture: tax wealth that sits, and reward wealth that builds.

Capital genuinely deployed into qualifying national-priority productive investment receives favourable treatment under capital gains tax, inheritance tax, and the periodic wealth tax. In each, the underlying charge is assessed in full and stands in its own right; the favourable treatment is a credit against a liability already due. Passive accumulation and rent extraction is taxed as the architecture in the preceding section proposes. The wealthy who wish to extract and hold are worse off under this framework. The wealthy who wish to build are

better off, and are given a tax-advantaged home for their capital inside Britain rather than a reason to remove it. The objective was never to punish wealth. It was to mobilise it productively. This principle aligns private incentive with that objective directly.

The relief is deliberately generous, because the purpose is to change behaviour at scale, not to gesture. Qualifying deployment may reduce the relevant liability by up to roughly two-thirds. It does not reduce it to zero. The partial floor is retained by design. The largest holders always contribute a meaningful residual share, whatever they build. This single feature protects the integrity of the revenue floor set out in the fiscal architecture, and it removes the most damaging line available to the framework's opponents, that the wealthy have been handed an escape route while ordinary earners pay in full. Under this design, the most aggressive builder of British infrastructure still contributes a third of the assessed liability. That is defensible to any audience.

The two-thirds figure is the mature-state ceiling, not the opening rate. Because the relief is the most enforcement-intensive instrument in the architecture — turning on additionality assessment, holding-period monitoring, and tested clawback — its generosity is tied to the demonstrated capacity to police it, on the same principle of capacity built before commitment that governs the framework as a whole. The relief opens at a cap of one-third, low enough that even thin early enforcement contains leakage to deployment that would have occurred regardless. The cap rises — towards one-half, and ultimately to the two-thirds maximum — only as the relevant authority certifies, under Office for Budget Responsibility scrutiny, that the additionality, monitoring, and clawback machinery is demonstrably operating. Where certification is not met, the cap does not rise; the relief stays tight rather than leaking yield against a promise of enforcement not yet delivered. This removes the sequencing risk that the relief might be more generous than the state can administer in precisely the early years when the levy draws on it, and converts the integrity of the relief from an assertion into a condition the state must satisfy before the generosity expands.

The qualifying categories are defined narrowly and tied to the actual pipeline rather than left as an open invitation. They comprise new capital deployed into nuclear and grid infrastructure, offshore wind and the wider energy transition, the defence-industrial base, designated national infrastructure, certified scale-up equity, and qualifying productive business assets. The relief is available only for genuinely new capital deployment, not for the reclassification of existing holdings, which fails the additionality test that determines whether a relief creates investment or merely rewards investment that would have occurred regardless. Deployment must be real and at risk, held for a defined minimum period, with the relief subject to clawback and penalty where capital is withdrawn early or where the arrangement is found to have been structured to qualify without genuine productive purpose. And the certification problem — which vehicles count — is solved by design rather than by policing: qualifying deployment flows through investment vehicles managed or accredited by the National Wealth Fund, so that the Fund's own governance is

the certification, HMRC polices a single gateway rather than ten thousand private schemes, and every pound channelled scales the Fund's capital as it goes. The arrangement does one further thing the levy's critics will not expect: the wealth that chooses to build rather than pay ends up holding a stake in the renewal itself, and a stakeholder argues differently from a taxpayer. The same relation is offered at the other end of the ledger, through the public holding in the fund set out in Section VII; the stake is held at both ends and not one.

The consequence of this design is that the relief reduces the static yield of the wealth tax and capital gains tax on the affected capital. Whether the net effect on the central revenue case is neutral, positive, or negative depends on how well the design holds. Well designed, with additionality tests, clawback, and the partial floor enforced, the static loss is offset through reduced emigration of capital that now has a productive home in Britain, and through the productivity-recovery effects on the existing tax base that the same investment generates. Poorly designed, the relief leaks yield to investment that would have happened anyway and erodes the floor. The framework treats the design disciplines as essential rather than ornamental, and states that the channelling principle is only as sound as its enforcement.

The Instruments of Partnership

The alliance is built through specific mechanisms, each of which serves the City commercially while serving the renewal materially.

The national renewal pipeline is structured as City business. The projects of the renewal programme are financed, intermediated, underwritten, and traded through London, with the City earning across the full value chain rather than observing the programme from outside it. The state's role is to generate the pipeline, de-risk it where appropriate, and let private capital and private expertise do what they do well.

The pension and capital architecture set out earlier in this framework functions as a source of patient domestic capital. The consolidation of workplace pensions, the expansion of the National Wealth Fund, and the escalation of automatic enrolment together generate an estimated two to three hundred billion pounds in additional assets under management across a decade. This capital is managed by the City and carries a mandate for allocation towards British productive investment. The limit of the claim is stated, because this is the largest single figure in the framework and the least commandable: trustees owe their duty to members, not to the nation, and no framework overrides it. The state's instruments are enabling, not directive — consolidation that creates funds large enough to hold illiquid domestic assets, a pipeline of investable projects worth holding, and disclosure that makes the domestic allocation visible. The two to three hundred billion is what the architecture makes possible, not what it commands; the figure is entered in the fiscal architecture as an enabled range, and nothing in the committed tiers depends on its upper reaches. Long-duration liabilities are matched to long-duration national assets, which is the function

pension capital is best suited to perform and has been prevented from performing at scale by fragmentation and short horizons.

Co-investment vehicles multiply the effect of public commitment. The National Wealth Fund takes first-loss positions or provides guarantees that de-risk projects and crowd in private capital at a multiple of the state's own commitment. A single pound of public capital, deployed as a first-loss layer or a guarantee, mobilises several pounds of private capital that would not otherwise accept the risk. This is the efficient use of a constrained public balance sheet, and it is the mechanism by which a programme of this scale is financed without commensurate public borrowing.

The productive-investment tax treatment described above is itself an instrument of partnership, not merely a revenue measure. It gives capital a reason to remain in Britain and to deploy into the national pipeline rather than to seek passive returns elsewhere.

Regulatory partnership replaces regulatory imposition where the public interest permits it. Following the departure from the European Union, the framework invites the City to participate in the design of the regulatory architecture that keeps it globally competitive, in exchange for the capital alignment the renewal requires. Stability and clarity are offered. Predictability is returned. The framework commits to a regulatory environment that is reviewed rather than rebuilt each parliament, because the cost of perpetual regulatory uncertainty falls on exactly the long-horizon investment the country needs.

The City is treated as a national export strategy in its own right. The framework actively backs London's global position in asset management, insurance, green and transition finance, financial technology, and international dispute resolution, as a deliberate export of British services and a source of the trade surplus the country requires. A government that defends and promotes the City internationally is a more valuable partner than one that merely tolerates it.

What the Framework Protects

In return for capital alignment, the framework protects what the City depends upon. The independence of the Bank of England is maintained. The inflation target is preserved rather than relitigated. Sterling stability is pursued through the fiscal discipline set out across this framework, because a credible currency is the precondition of a credible financial centre, and the events of September 2022 demonstrated how quickly that credibility can be lost and how expensively it must be rebuilt. Skilled immigration pathways for financial and professional services are protected within the migration architecture, because a global financial centre cannot operate without access to global talent. The rule of law, the integrity of contract, and the quality of British commercial jurisdiction are defended as national assets in themselves.

The framework also requires of the City the conduct that its international credibility now depends upon. Beneficial ownership transparency, robust anti-money-laundering enforcement, and the rigorous application of sanctions are not constraints imposed against the City's interest. They are the conditions of its continued standing in a world that has, since 2022, grown far less tolerant of opaque capital. A City that polices itself credibly is a City that retains access to the markets and counterparties that matter. The framework treats this as shared interest rather than external imposition.

The Contestable Bet

The partnership rests on a bet that is contestable. The bet is that a City reoriented towards the productive economy, somewhat smaller in its purely extractive segments but larger in its productive ones, contributes more to British strategic position than the City in its current configuration. This cannot be proven in advance. It is a judgement, and the framework states it as one. One tension with the fiscal architecture should not wait for the City's lobbyists to find it: the contingency menu in Section XI holds a Financial Transactions Tax in reserve. An ally whose contingency plan includes taxing your core business is an ally with the instrument on the table, and the framework prefers to name it than to build a partnership on the pretence that the reserve does not exist. The FTT deploys only if the recurring architecture underperforms — which is to say, the surest way for the City to keep it sheathed is for the partnership to work.

Two matters are deferred rather than resolved. The City of London Corporation, with its business-vote franchise and its considerable resources held outside ordinary democratic accountability, is a constitutional anomaly that intersects with the wider constitutional reform agenda treated elsewhere. The framework treats it as a real question and does not pretend to settle it here. The devolved financial services centres, Edinburgh in particular, receive limited treatment in this section and warrant their own, because the renewal of British finance is not solely a London question and should not be addressed as though it were.

XIII. Defence and National Resilience

The framework's position on defence begins from necessity, not preference. The continental defence of Europe is not optional for an island nation whose prosperity depends on the European order. The defence of British shipping and the High North is not optional for a country whose food, energy, and trade depend on safe sea lanes. The credibility of the British nuclear deterrent is not optional in a world where the American security guarantee is no longer reliable.

The strategic position requires it, and it is affordable within the tax envelope. Britain cannot return to being a global expeditionary power on the 1960s pattern; the resources are not available and pretending otherwise produces forces spread too thinly to be effective anywhere. The medium-power posture is the one the country can deliver, and the one it needs.

The deterrent carries the existential threat, and the framework treats it as such. But conflict since 1945 has overwhelmingly been the other kind — proxy war, the grey zone, the attritional regional war that Ukraine exemplifies — in which the deterrent does not reach and in which conventional depth, sustainment, and the ability to generate force faster than it is lost are what decide the outcome. This is precisely where Britain's hollowing is most dangerous, and where the framework concentrates its repair: not in preparing for the war the deterrent exists to prevent, but in being capable in the wars that have actually happened.

Forces Sized for Quality and Designed for Scale

The British armed forces have been hollowed out at exactly the time when they need to be capable of more. The Army is at its smallest since the Napoleonic Wars. The Navy has aircraft carriers without the escorts to protect them or the F-35s to fly from them in numbers. The RAF has fewer than two hundred fast jets and ammunition stockpiles measured in days rather than months. The integrated air defence over the British mainland is limited.

The instinct to grow the forces back to nostalgic numbers is understandable but probably wrong. Recruitment shortfalls are chronic and structural; service conditions have degraded to the point where retention is failing; the fiscal demand of returning to historic numbers would crowd out other essential investments. The model of warfare has also changed, though not in the direction a comfortable reading would suggest. The Ukraine war has demonstrated that small, highly trained, multi-domain forces supported by autonomous systems can impose enormous costs on much larger conventional forces and deny the rapid victory that mass alone once secured. It has equally demonstrated that mass and depth still matter: Russia's attritional weight continues to grind forward, and Ukraine's binding constraints have become manpower and munitions rather than skill or technology. The lesson is not that quality replaces mass. It is that quality, mass, and industrial depth must be

integrated, and that a force optimised for one at the expense of the others fails. Britain cannot field Russian mass and should not try. It can field quality, and it must build the depth — reserves, stockpiles, and industrial capacity — that allows quality to be sustained rather than expended in the opening months of a war it cannot afford to lose.

The British forces are built on this principle. Smaller numbers than nostalgia would prefer, with each soldier, sailor, and airman trained, equipped, and supported to a standard significantly higher than current force structures allow. The regular Army stabilises around eighty to ninety thousand. The Navy and RAF are sized similarly to current establishment but with equipment and training matched to actual operational requirements, not political symbolism. Total deployable combat capability is markedly greater than the current hollow force, despite numbers being similar, because each unit is genuinely capable rather than a shadow of one.

The framework's organising principle for defence is this: guardrails sacrosanct, operational latitude wide. The things that must never bend are held immovable — democratic control of the armed forces, lawfulness, accountability, proportionality, the military justice that runs in both directions, the deterrent held always under political authority. Within those guardrails, the task is to strip away the constraints that decay and neglect have imposed on the forces' ability to defend the country: the procurement that delivers waste rather than capability, the stockpiles measured in days, the hollow establishment, the enabling expertise allowed to lapse, the training time and conditions that have driven experienced people out. The distinction is exact and the framework holds it deliberately. The leash comes off capability; it stays on power. The constraints removed are those that sap competence and effectiveness; the constraints retained — on the lawful and proportionate use of force, on oversight, on the rules under which the forces act — are not loosened at all.

The test the framework sets itself is the one the people at operational rank would set if asked what they need and what stops them doing the job. The answer, across the lessons of recent war and every credible account, is consistent: equipment that works and enough of it; munitions and stockpiles at depth, not days; the training time and ranges to stay sharp; procurement that fields what was needed yesterday rather than a decade hence; the enablers — drones, electronic warfare, logistics, the medical chain — not just the rifle; the latitude to learn from contact and adapt; and the conditions that keep experienced people in the service rather than driving them out. That is the standard against which this section is to be judged: not a headline strength by a headline date, but whether the people who would have to fight would say the framework removed what stopped them and gave them what they need to defeat a capable enemy.

Forces are therefore designed for scale as well as quality, but scale is committed in the real currency — the rate at which trained, equipped, and sustained formations can be generated and regenerated, not a single end-strength promised by a single date. The cadre and training infrastructure that generate formations, the stockpiles and munitions production at

depth, the reservist depth worth the name, and the industrial base that sustains a force rather than expending it in the opening months of a war: these are what mobilisation depth consists of. The first uplift can arrive relatively quickly; the full depth is a construction project in its own right, spanning more than one parliament, and none of it exists at the required scale now. The framework commits to building it, and accepts that it cannot be conjured by a figure on a page.

This means investment per soldier rises sharply, and investment in the institutional capacity to expand rises with it. Modern equipment that works. Training time and ranges adequate to maintain proficiency, with cadre and infrastructure capable of generating and regenerating formations under emergency conditions. Personal kit fit for purpose. Living conditions and family support that match what is asked of those who serve. Munitions, fuel, vehicles, and communications equipment held in reserve at levels that allow sustained operations rather than the current lean stockpiles. Industrial base capable of rapid production expansion. The reservist system, the Life Skills instructor pathways, and the civilian-military relationships designed to convert civilian expertise into military capability rapidly under wartime conditions.

Forces designed with their potential rather than their current establishment in mind.

Integrated Digital Capability

The single most consequential development of the next two decades is the integration of drone systems, electronic warfare, and cyber operations into a single capability. This is the core of how modern conflicts are now decided, and it is where Britain has the greatest opportunity and the greatest current vulnerability.

The components are inseparable. Drones without electronic warfare protection are expensive vulnerabilities rather than capabilities; capable adversaries can ground entire drone fleets through competent electronic warfare. Drones without cyber resilience are computers waiting to be hacked, spoofed, or turned against their operators. Electronic warfare without integrated cyber capability addresses only part of the threat surface. Cyber capability without integration with kinetic operations remains a specialist capability that does not influence the fight. The country that masters the integration has decisive advantages; the country that builds these capabilities separately has expensive equipment that will not survive contact with a capable adversary.

Britain builds itself into a world leader in integrated digital warfare capability within the decade.

The drone capability commitments span every relevant scale. Squad-level commercial-grade drones in every infantry section, with the training and supply chain to use them at the rates Ukraine has demonstrated are necessary. First-person-view attack drones produced at scale, with the manufacturing capacity to replace losses in sustained operations. Loitering

munitions and longer-range autonomous strike systems. Medium-altitude long-endurance systems for surveillance and strike. Counter-drone systems integrated with conventional air defence. Autonomous systems integration into command and control, networked and protected.

The electronic warfare commitments rebuild capability that has been allowed to atrophy. Cold War-era electronic warfare expertise was largely lost in the 2000s and 2010s; the Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated that competent electronic warfare remains decisive on modern battlefields. Heavy investment in electronic warfare units, training, and equipment, integrated with drone capability development from the outset rather than treated as a separate problem.

The cyber commitments build on Britain's existing strengths and address the vulnerabilities. The expansion of GCHQ and the National Cyber Security Centre is treated below; the integration of cyber capability with conventional military operations is a doctrinal commitment, with cyber-and-electronic-warfare units deployable alongside conventional forces, with significant investment in offensive cyber capability that remains entirely classified, and with the institutional mechanisms to coordinate cyber operations with kinetic operations at the speeds modern combat requires.

This is industrial strategy as much as defence policy. Drone manufacturing at the required scale is a major industrial commitment, located in the nuclear hub regions where reliable power, advanced electronics supply chains, and engineering workforce concentration provide the industrial foundation. Tees Valley as the principal SMR manufacturing hub also becomes a centre for autonomous systems manufacturing, with the same workforce, supply chain, and power infrastructure supporting both. Lancashire and Yorkshire combat aircraft and missile capability extends naturally into drone systems. The North West corridor's nuclear plus advanced manufacturing concentration anchors the autonomous systems supply chain. Electronic warfare and cyber capability development draws on the same civilian technology base — AI, telecommunications, advanced electronics — that supports the same technology strategy. Britain becomes a world leader in drone operator training as a deliberate programme, both for military operators and as a civilian capability that supports autonomous systems work, connecting to the Cura Custodum pathway and the civilian education system.

Intelligence, Signals, and the Strategic Asset

Britain has, in GCHQ, demonstrated that it can build and sustain world-class capability in a critical strategic domain. The same approach applied more broadly produces similar results. Intelligence and signals capability is a primary national strategic asset, not a supporting function, and a country with smaller military forces but world-class intelligence has different strategic options than the country with larger military forces and weaker intelligence.

Major expansion of intelligence and signals capability across the community is committed.

GCHQ is expanded markedly over the parliament, with the National Cyber Security Centre's remit broadened to provide direct support to critical national infrastructure operators with mandatory standards and active assistance. The cyber-defence posture of the public sector and critical national infrastructure is brought up to the standard the GCHQ core capability has long maintained — addressing the gap that has allowed repeated breaches of British infrastructure despite world-class signals intelligence capability. Counter-influence operations against foreign disinformation and information warfare are properly resourced and coordinated. Offensive cyber capability is expanded, remaining entirely classified at the operational level with parliamentary oversight through the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).

The Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service receive proportionate expansion. MI5's counter-terrorism and hostile-state-activity workload has grown faster than resources for two decades; the gap is closed and capability built for the operational tempo the strategic situation now demands. MI6's foreign intelligence collection becomes more important as the partial decline of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing dividend makes indigenous British capability more important than at any time since the Cold War.

Total intelligence community funding rises by fifty to eighty per cent across the parliament, with specific allocations developed through proper review and security-cleared scrutiny rather than published in detail. Operational specifics remain classified; the budgetary and structural commitments do not.

Parliamentary oversight is expanded proportionately, and the sequence is part of the grant: capability grows with the oversight that watches it, not ahead of it. The Intelligence and Security Committee is properly resourced with technical staff capable of meaningful scrutiny, given timely access to operational information at the level required for meaningful oversight, and treated as the constitutional check on capabilities that would otherwise drift towards unchecked expansion. Expanded capability without expanded oversight would be a problem; expanded capability with expanded ISC scrutiny is the constitutional condition on which it is accepted.

Intelligence and cyber personnel are treated on the same footing as uniformed military personnel. The Cura Custodum framework applies to them. The veterans implementation of Cura Custodum applies to them. The reservist system includes cyber and intelligence reserves drawing on civilian expertise in technology, languages, and analysis. The career pay and conditions are made competitive against private-sector alternatives that currently strip top technical talent from public-sector intelligence work.

This is treating Britain's existing excellence as the model for how first-rate national capability is built — sustained investment, world-class talent, institutional independence, technical depth, long time horizons. The model works, and is applied more broadly.

Procurement Reform as the Precondition for Everything

Without procurement reform, defence spending buys failed equipment programmes that swallow resources and yield no capability. The British record over the last twenty years is poor. The Ajax fighting vehicle programme was planned for delivery in 2017 and reached only initial operating capability eight years late. The Watchkeeper drone programme delivered platforms with significantly reduced capability against original specification. The Type 26 frigate programme is years behind schedule. The Carrier programme delivered ships without adequate complement of aircraft, escorts, or support vessels. The Nimrod MRA4 programme was cancelled after spending billions for no operational capability.

The pattern is consistent. Programmes specified for capabilities that are aspirational, not achievable. Specifications changed repeatedly during development. Contracts favouring incumbent suppliers, not open competition. Programme management lacking the technical depth to challenge contractor claims. Political accountability lapsing between specification and delivery. The same firms continuing to receive new contracts after delivering badly on previous ones.

Reform must be substantive, not procedural. The Defence Equipment & Support model needs deep technical capacity, not bureaucratic restructuring. Programme managers must have engineering backgrounds capable of informed judgement on contractor claims. Contracts must include real consequences for performance failures. The pattern of permanent reorganisation must end.

Specific procurement reforms are committed as the precondition for sustained defence investment. Defence spending reaches 2.5% of GDP in the first parliament. This is continuity rather than novelty: it consolidates the trajectory existing governments had already committed to, and the framework claims no credit for the headline figure itself. What is distinctive is the discipline applied beyond it. The increase towards 3% in the second parliament, en route to the 3.5% alliance commitment, is conditional on procurement reform demonstrably working — additional money producing additional capability rather than additional waste. This conditionality binds, and it, rather than the percentage, is the framework's actual contribution to defence policy: the refusal to commit further money until the existing money is shown to be well spent.

Defence as Industrial Strategy

Defence spending is one of the largest single levers for industrial renewal available to government, and is treated as such. Total UK defence procurement is around twenty to twenty-five billion pounds annually within current spending. Where that money goes shapes British industry directly, and the commitment is to direct it strategically.

British defence industry is concentrated in specific places that the regional renewal commitment treats as strategic capacity. Barrow-in-Furness for submarines. Lancashire and Yorkshire for combat aircraft, fighting vehicles, and missile systems. The South West for naval vessels and helicopters. Scotland for shipbuilding, complex weapons, and emerging

space capability. Northern Ireland for aerospace components. The Midlands for engines and components.

These are major employers in their regions, sources of high-skill engineering work that anchors industrial activity, and strategic capabilities the country cannot afford to lose. Procurement is directed deliberately to British industry where the capability exists or can credibly be developed, with structured development programmes for capabilities currently dependent on foreign suppliers. The Catapult Network expansion includes drone systems, autonomous platforms, electronic warfare, and advanced manufacturing as major focus areas.

The aerospace sector is the model. Rolls-Royce in Derby exists at world-class scale because the British state has been a long-term, predictable, large-volume customer for engines, and that customer relationship has anchored regional industrial capacity for decades. The same dynamic is applied across other defence sectors with deliberate intent.

Specific industrial commitments tied to defence:

Drone systems and autonomous platforms manufactured at scale in Britain, with the supply chain and skills base to support rapid production expansion under wartime conditions.

Marine industries — autonomous marine systems, naval shipbuilding, marine engineering — placed in coastal regions that already have the skill base, connecting to the offshore wind industry and the maritime strategic positioning.

Sovereign and resilient space capability developed steadily over twenty years. The current dependence on US space infrastructure is a strategic vulnerability that the post-American-guarantee world makes increasingly problematic, and it is treated as one to be reduced rather than eliminated, because full independence across the entire space value chain is neither affordable for a medium power nor necessary. The posture is therefore selective: sovereign manufacturing of the satellites on which critical military systems depend, sovereign ground infrastructure, and real redundancy and hardening so that the critical space-based services — positioning, navigation, timing, secure communications, and intelligence — can be maintained in degraded or contested conditions. Independent launch capability at scale is not pursued; the posture relies instead on assured access through allied and commercial providers, particularly the European and French relationship developed elsewhere in this section, with sovereign launch held as a selective rather than a comprehensive ambition. Annual cost of around two to three billion pounds rising, treated as both defence and industrial investment, matches this selective posture. Full-spectrum sovereignty including independent launch would cost several times that, and is judged not worth the trade against other defence priorities — the same medium-power discipline the framework applies to land mass and to the nuclear deterrent.

Britain's South Atlantic territories are held at present as three separate responsibilities rather than treated as what they are: a single thin line of presence across an ocean in which

little else flies the flag. Ascension carries an airfield of real strategic worth; St Helena has an airport and a position astride the mid-Atlantic routes; the Falklands hold a garrison, an air bridge, and the waters that sovereignty brings with it. Considered together they are a theatre — a chain for staging, surveillance, maritime patrol, and resilience, and an assured British presence in a region where presence is itself the deterrent. The framework treats them as one, and invests in the airfields, harbours, fuel, and communications that turn three isolated outposts into coherent strategic depth. The cost is modest against the reach it secures, and the reach matters more, not less, in a world where the sea lanes can no longer be assumed safe and the American presence can no longer be assumed constant.

Munitions production capacity rebuilt to levels that can sustain prolonged operations rather than running out within weeks as Western stockpiles did during Ukraine resupply.

Electronic warfare and cyber capability development as a deliberate industry, drawing on the civilian technology base and creating spillover benefits for civilian cybersecurity and telecommunications sectors.

Strategic supplier dependency assessment becomes routine policy. Where dependence on foreign suppliers is a strategic vulnerability, development programmes for indigenous capability follow. Where dependence is acceptable — particularly within allied supply chains — it is maintained without unnecessary duplication. The principle is realism rather than autarky.

Personnel and the Service Relationship

The British armed forces are failing to recruit and retain the people they need. Recruitment has missed targets across all three services for most of the 2010s and 2020s. Retention is in crisis, stripping the forces of the senior NCOs and middle-rank officers that operational capability depends on.

The reasons are not mysterious. Service accommodation has been allowed to deteriorate to scandalous standards. Compensation is uncompetitive against the private sector for technical roles. Family support has been hollowed by base closures and the difficulty of two-career families managing service postings. Mental health support is patchy. Equipment that does not work undermines both operational capability and the dignity of service.

Reform across each is necessary. Service accommodation brought up to standards the polity would tolerate for any other public sector employee, with independent inspection and timely repair. Compensation for technical roles raised to be competitive, accepting that this costs real money. Family support rebuilt with proper provision for spouses' careers, children's schooling, and continuity of healthcare across postings. Mental health support adequate to the demonstrated need, with full screening, full treatment, and full continuity into post-service care. Equipment issued at the troop level fit for purpose, ending the embarrassment of British service members buying their own kit.

The current pattern of expecting service personnel to bear the costs of inadequate provision is incompatible with the commitments here.

The Service-and-Mobility Pathway

Beyond the regular forces, a broad service-and-mobility pathway is committed opening the route to skilled employment, higher education, and home ownership through service to the country. The model is the American GI Bill, scaled and adapted for British circumstances, and integrated as the military implementation of the Cura Custodum framework set out in Section VI.

Citizens completing a defined service period — typically four to six years for full benefits, with partial benefits after shorter periods — receive an integrated package designed to make service a real route to opportunity. The content is the Cura Custodum package applied to military service:

- Housing support accumulating with service.
- Full funding for higher education or vocational training, including living costs.
- Lifelong specialist healthcare access, including mental health support.
- Vocational qualifications recognised in civilian employment, with explicit credit towards apprenticeship completion and chartered status.
- Accelerated citizenship for those serving from naturalising backgrounds.

A reservist commitment of typically four years after regular service.

The pathway applies across the services and across military and intelligence personnel. Cyber and intelligence work, signals operations, and the technical specialisms within the defence community qualify as Cura Custodum service on equivalent terms to conventional military service. The polity does not distinguish between those who served in uniform and those who served in equally demanding capacities elsewhere within the defence community.

The fiscal cost of the military implementation is part of the Cura Custodum commitment set out in Section VI — the £12–15 billion annual baseline cost across military and NHS clinical scope includes the military implementation rather than counting it separately. The framing matters. This is opportunity provided by the polity to those who served it, not the disposal of those without other options. The pathway is open to citizens of all backgrounds, including those who could otherwise pursue university or technical training conventionally; what it offers is a different and equally honourable route. The principle is that those who serve the polity directly receive real standing for that service.

The Reservist System

Britain currently maintains a trained reserve force across all services of under forty thousand. This is a fraction of what comparable peer countries maintain and far below what

the strategic situation requires. Finland, with a population of five and a half million, can mobilise around two hundred and eighty thousand troops for wartime service from a total reserve pool of approximately nine hundred thousand trained citizens; Israel maintains a reserve of around four hundred and sixty-five thousand. Both figures rest on universal or near-universal conscription, which this framework does not adopt. The comparison therefore sets the strategic benchmark, not the British method. Britain must build reserve depth through voluntary service, which is both harder to achieve and lower in ceiling than the conscript model that produces the Finnish and Israeli numbers, and the framework's targets are set accordingly rather than against figures the British method cannot reach.

Significant rebuilding of the reserve is committed. The trained reserve doubles over a decade to around eighty thousand across all services, with the proposition made attractive enough that recruitment and retention work. Statutory employer protection enforced in practice, with paid leave for training and deployment, job security on return, and protection against career penalty for service. Specialist reserve units drawing on civilian expertise — cyber reservists from the technology sector, medical reservists from the NHS, engineering reservists from construction and manufacturing, language and intelligence reservists from academia and the private sector. Regional reserve units embedded in their communities, rebuilding the regional reserve infrastructure that has been hollowed across most of the country. Integration with the service-and-mobility pathway, with reserve commitment after regular service maintaining the relationship Cura Custodum makes real.

The fiscal cost is moderate compared to regular forces — probably one to two billion annually for large-scale expansion. The capability gain is significant. A country with sizeable reserves has options that one without does not, and the scalable force design discussed earlier requires reserves at this scale to function. The target of eighty thousand is set at the realistic ceiling of what voluntary recruitment can sustain even with strong employer protection and attractive terms; it is not a way-station towards conscript-scale mobilisation, which the framework does not adopt and which the voluntary model cannot reach. Reserve depth is therefore one of the harder commitments in the defence programme to deliver in full, and is treated as such rather than assumed.

Veterans and the Continuing Civic Relationship

The relationship between the polity and those who served it does not end at discharge. The current British arrangement treats it largely as if it does, with limited continuing infrastructure for veterans beyond charity work and underfunded support services. The veterans framework is the post-service implementation of Cura Custodum, providing continuing recognition through the unified framework rather than as separate veterans-specific provision.

The Cura Custodum benefits continue beyond service:

- Lifelong specialist healthcare access, including mental health support adequate to demonstrated need, not postcode lottery.
- Statutory housing support for veterans facing homelessness, with priority access and dedicated transition support.
- Educational and vocational support continuing beyond the active service period for those who need it.
- Specialist provision for veterans with service-related conditions, properly resourced.
- Recognition in citizenship pathways for foreign-born service members and their families.

Veterans completing service have significant standing to contribute to the Life Skills programme, the cadet forces, and other educational and youth-work roles. A formal pathway with fast-tracked qualification is committed, paid placement during training, and statutory employment with adequate pay and conditions. The pathway is matched to the skills service equipped them with, with proper safeguarding and training overlay, deliberately deployed in regions where civilian recruitment for educational support is weakest. Veterans bring discipline, leadership, and technical skills the programme needs; the programme provides veterans a continuing meaningful role drawing on what service prepared them for.

This is the relationship Cura Custodum makes real. Service is not a discrete transaction; it is entry into a continuing relationship with the polity that includes recognition, support, and continued opportunity to contribute.

Data-Led Integration

How force structure, doctrine, and equipment decisions are actually made matters as much as what those decisions are. The traditional British model has been hierarchical and political — senior officers and politicians decide doctrine, doctrine flows down to implementation, feedback flows up through formal channels. This model fails in well-documented ways. It produces doctrine that is politically convenient rather than operationally effective. It filters out inconvenient information through layers of seniority and political management. It adapts slowly to changing operational realities.

A different model is committed.

Doctrine and force structure decisions are informed by structured operational feedback from current and recent operational personnel. Not just senior officers, not just political-military relationships, but the patrol commanders, the section commanders, the technical specialists, the people who have done the work recently and know what equipment fails, what tactics work, what the adversary actually does. The Israeli forces have built real adaptive capability through this approach. The US Marines under Force Design 2030 are deliberately moving this way. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated radical adaptation under fire by operating at speeds traditional hierarchical doctrine cannot match.

Integration with non-political stakeholders is structural. Industrial partners with relevant technical capability. Academic researchers with relevant expertise. Civilian specialists in cyber, AI, and autonomous systems whose knowledge is essential and whose institutional position is outside the military hierarchy. International partners — in NATO, in the Australia—UK—US partnership (AUKUS), in bilateral defence relationships — who have learned things Britain has not.

The institutional mechanisms are structured, not ad hoc. Regular operational reviews with feedback channels that bypass normal hierarchy. Standing technical advisory panels including serving operational personnel, recent veterans, civilian specialists, and academic researchers. Doctrine cells that integrate this input rather than producing doctrine top-down. Procurement decisions informed by operational experience rather than only by political and contractual considerations.

The political-military relationship remains distinct and bounded. Politicians and senior commanders set strategic direction and accept accountability for outcomes. Doctrine and force structure decisions within those parameters are informed by operational reality rather than political convenience. This is harder than it sounds — political pressure to produce particular doctrinal conclusions has been a persistent feature of British defence policy — and the discipline holds.

This connects to the framework here. The commitment to evidence-led governance applies as much to defence as to anything else. The state capacity rebuilding committed to elsewhere supports it: civil servants and military officers with technical depth, procurement processes that work, parliamentary technical capacity for oversight.

Military Justice in Both Directions

The polity owes military justice that cuts both ways. Firm in defending those wrongly accused or prosecuted under unfair frameworks. Firm in holding accountable those who genuinely committed crimes. Both are essential, and conflating them — either by treating all prosecutions of service members as illegitimate, or by treating all military operations as presumptively criminal — produces injustice in both directions.

The principles:

Soldiers serving under legitimate rules of engagement, in ambiguous combat situations, are entitled to the protection of those rules of engagement and to the assumption of good faith unless specific evidence shows otherwise. The state that orders them into combat carries the moral weight of those orders. Lawfare against soldiers acting in good faith is corrosive of the relationship the polity owes those who serve. Where the state has failed in its duty to investigate properly — leaving cases hanging for years, denying accused service members adequate legal support — that is itself a state failure requiring redress.

Soldiers who commit war crimes — murder of civilians, killing of detainees, torture, sexual offences — are prosecutable regardless of orders, regardless of unit, regardless of how long ago. Following orders has not been a valid defence under any credible legal system since Nuremberg, and that principle cannot be abandoned without abandoning the polity's claim to act under law. The polity must prosecute genuine criminal conduct because not doing so makes the country complicit in what was done in its name.

Command responsibility binds. Leaders who knew or should have known of criminal conduct under their command, and who failed to prevent or investigate it, bear distinct accountability for what was done in their name. This is part of military justice, and the framework affirms it.

The Northern Ireland Troubles veterans question is approached on these principles. Veterans who served under legitimate operational rules of engagement, in conditions of extraordinary difficulty, are protected from prosecution for actions taken under those rules. Genuine criminal acts — murder of civilians outside any legitimate engagement, torture, sexual offences — remain prosecutable, because rule of law cannot be abandoned for any category of citizen. The careful drafting required to honour both principles is what is committed, replacing the current oscillation between attempted blanket protection and full prosecution exposure.

The same principles apply to the ongoing inquiries into UK Special Forces conduct in Afghanistan. The inquiries are the kind of process the polity owes both to those who served properly and to those who were harmed. The framework supports their work without prejudging their conclusions.

The Legal Framework for Digital and Electronic Technology

Effective defence policy in the digital age requires a legal framework that has been allowed to atrophy. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 was written before the internet became consumer technology and remains mostly unchanged. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is more recent but already showing its age. The legal status of autonomous systems liability, AI-generated content, digital evidence, and data sovereignty sits in a patchwork that has accreted rather than been designed coherently.

The defence and industrial implications are direct. Companies operating in autonomous systems, AI, and advanced electronics navigate legal uncertainty that competitor jurisdictions have resolved. Defence procurement is complicated by unclear liability frameworks for autonomous systems. Cyber operations defending critical national infrastructure operate under frameworks that were not written with their activities in mind.

The fuller treatment of legislative framework rebuilding is in the state capacity commitment elsewhere. It is named here because the defence application is direct: comprehensive review and rebuilding of the legal framework for digital and electronic technology is treated

as a priority within the programme of clearing bureaucratic sediment. The defence and industrial considerations are integral to the priority.

The Island Nation

One thread runs through this framework so consistently that it deserves to be gathered and named, because Britain has spent two generations forgetting it. The border this framework controls is a maritime border. The deterrent is a submarine. The fisheries settlement, the offshore wind that anchors the climate programme, the South Atlantic commitment, the trade architecture across the Pacific, the cables that carry virtually all of the nation's data beneath the sea — every one is sea power in working clothes. Ninety-five per cent of British trade by volume arrives by water, and almost none of it exists in public consciousness. The naval establishment has a name for this — sea blindness — and the symptoms are concrete: warships laid up for want of sailors, a merchant fleet and the seafarers who crewed it reduced to a remnant, eight hundred crew sacked by video link and replaced below the minimum wage with barely a law disturbed, yards lurching between feast and famine, and the most deprived towns in England standing, almost without exception, on the coast. This passage adds little new money to the framework. It names the thread, and adds the few instruments the thread was missing.

A National Maritime Academy is established on the regional skills-academy model already built, sited deliberately in the coastal towns that need anchor institutions: merchant officers and ratings, shipbuilding and marine engineering trades, offshore energy technicians, fisheries science. It stands alongside Dartmouth, not in imitation of it — the Royal Navy has trained its officers since 1863; it is the merchant and industrial sea that Britain stopped training for. And it is grown as a conditional grant in the strictest form: capacity expands only against contracted cadet berths and yard order books, because an academy training seafarers for ships that do not exist would be a monument, and this framework does not build monuments. The Merchant Navy's standing is restored with its training: the convoys cost the merchant service proportionally more than they cost most fighting arms, the country called it the fourth service when it needed it, and the framework sees no reason the recognition should have lapsed with the need.

The instruments around it pull levers that already exist. The tonnage tax — the favourable regime under which shipping companies elect to be taxed — becomes a conditional grant: its benefits tied to British cadet berths, ratings employment, and crewing share, so the regime that costs the Exchequer little finally buys the seafaring base it was always meant to. A seafarer employment floor closes the lawful gap the P&O affair sailed through, set within the sectoral architecture, so that operating from British ports means meeting British standards of employment. The subsea cables and pipelines are designated critical national infrastructure in full — surveyed, monitored, and patrolled by the capability the defence sections fund — because the lesson of the Baltic is that the seabed is now contested ground. And shipbuilding moves to a published cross-government drumbeat, naval and civil orders

smoothed so that the yards keep their skills between frigates: the procurement reform this framework stakes everything on, applied to the industry that feast-and-famine has hollowed longest.

The celebration is done through participation, not pageantry. Water competence and sail training fold into the Life Skills programme through the Sea Cadets and the voluntary maritime organisations the programme already partners rather than displaces. The fleet review tradition is restored when there is a fleet worth reviewing — the framework prefers the condition to the ceremony. The maritime museums and the working historic ports join the cultural offer. And the half of the maritime story that never declined is claimed without embarrassment: London remains the world's capital of maritime services — the insurance, the law, the institutions that govern the sea internationally — and the offshore wind industry is a world-class marine achievement Britain built within living memory. The repair is aimed where the hollowing is: ships, steel, and seafarers.

The limits are part of the passage, and so is the opportunity. The mass deep-sea employment of the imperial age is not returning; the economics of open registries concede most of the world's tonnage to flags this framework cannot and should not chase, and the conditionality buys margins, not miracles. But the merchant service is not done — one layer of it ended, and four remain alive and worth the having. The world is short of ships' officers by the tens of thousands and the British ticket is respected in every ocean: training officers is the production of an exportable profession, not an act of remembrance. The City's maritime crown — the insurers, the adjusters, the surveyors, the maritime lawyers who make London the capital of the governed sea — runs on people who went to sea first, and a seafarer base allowed to wither starves that cluster a generation later; the partnership with the City and the renewal of the merchant service are the same policy at twenty years' distance. Strategic sealift is a proven and current hole: the Falklands task force took up more than fifty merchant ships from trade, British-flagged and British-crewed, and the country could not repeat the feat today. And the entire fleet of the world is about to be rebuilt for the end of oil — a once-in-a-century order book in green tonnage, alongside an offshore energy fleet whose demand sits in British waters and cannot be offshored. Britain will not out-build the Pacific yards, and does not need to: the specialist and green niches are open, the first movers will take them, and the window does not stay open. What the instruments secure is the floor an island requires: enough trained seafarers to crew what matters, enough yard capacity to build and repair what the nation cannot afford to queue for, sovereign knowledge of the seabed it depends on, and coastal towns with an institution to organise around. And the proudest naval history in the world is put, at last, to the only work history is fit for: not a claim in the ledger, but the reason the recruiting hall fills — a country that remembers what it was at sea finds it easier to become something at sea again. The sea is not Britain's past; it is the infrastructure of its present, and the framework treats it as both.

Civil Defence and National Resilience

Modern defence is not just uniformed forces. The pandemic response demonstrated the gaps in British civil defence infrastructure. Energy security, food security, infrastructure resilience, and civil response capability are part of the defence picture, and Britain has largely abandoned them since the end of the Cold War.

Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland provide instructive examples of what is possible. Sweden's Civil Contingencies Agency coordinates resilience planning at national, regional, and local levels with sustained investment in shelter capacity, supply stockpiles, and trained civil response. Finland maintains comprehensive civil defence as a normal feature of public administration. Switzerland's combination of universal service obligations, infrastructure resilience, and population-level civil defence preparation is the most extensive in Europe.

Britain does not need to replicate any of these exactly, but the principle of taking civil resilience seriously is one that holds here. Strategic reserves of food, fuel, and medical supplies adequate to absorb supply shocks for sustained periods. Infrastructure resilience for energy, water, telecommunications, and transport, with redundancy designed in rather than assumed away. Cyber resilience for critical national infrastructure, recognising that the boundary between civil and military cyber is increasingly meaningless. Civil response capability that can be mobilised rapidly for natural disasters, pandemic response, and large-scale emergencies. Population-level resilience including basic emergency preparedness, first aid training, and community-level response infrastructure.

A civic service programme — envisaged by this framework, though not committed within it — would carry significant civil defence and emergency response capacity. The reservist system likewise. The principle is that civil resilience is a national capability built across military, civilian, and community institutions together, not an optional extra to be discovered when crisis arrives.

One source of this capacity is already being built and need only be turned to the purpose. The covered workforce of Cura Custodum — the veteran, the retired nurse or paramedic, the former police or fire officer — is a population already trained for emergency, already vetted, already held on a single record. A standing civil-resilience reserve drawn from it, on the model of the reservist system and integrated with it, raises surge capacity for pandemic, flood, and infrastructure failure at a fraction of the cost of building it new, because the training and the vetting are done. It draws too on the experienced retired of the Life Skills corps (Section IX), for whom it is one more way to remain in the common life rather than be set aside from it. The reserve is voluntary, recognised within Cura Custodum as qualifying service like any other, and answers the lesson the pandemic taught clearly enough: the capability a country has not built before the crisis, it cannot conjure during it.

How such a reserve is called upon matters as much as that it exists, for the single record that makes it cheap to raise could, mishandled, become a register of the country's former

soldiers and officers — the standing list an authoritarian government would most like to hold. The framework does not build that list. The reserve is summoned, not surveyed: in an emergency the call goes out through ordinary public channels, naming the standing it needs — current trauma medicine, heavy transport, nuclear-technician qualification — and those who choose to answer present their card, which confirms against the federated record what they have earned and routes them to work they are genuinely trained for. The verification runs only on the holder's own presentation. The state queries no population, keeps no roll of who holds Cura standing, and compiles no reservist register; the card's location-blindness and its federation, set out in Section VIII, are what let a country call on its trained people without keeping a surveillance list behind them.

The Nuclear Deterrent

The strategic deterrent is grim necessity rather than choice. Continuous-at-sea deterrence is maintained through completion of the Dreadnought programme and operation of the resulting force. The strategic logic is straightforward: in a world where the American security guarantee is no longer reliable, an independent British nuclear capability is the ultimate backstop against coercion. The deterrent works precisely because it would never be used; its function is to keep the rest of the world out of decisions about Britain's existence.

The cost is heavy. The Dreadnought programme is around forty-one billion pounds in capital, with operating costs of two to three billion annually, and lifetime cost over the programme of two hundred billion or more. The cost is named openly and accepted knowingly. The alternatives — abandoning the deterrent, downgrading to a less credible posture, or attempting to develop entirely indigenous warhead and missile programmes — each fail on their own terms.

The framework does not commit to developing tactical or sub-strategic nuclear capability. The case for extending the deterrence ladder has weight, but the costs — additional tens of billions in capital, escalation risk, treaty complications, and the reasonable concern that tactical weapons make use more likely rather than less — outweigh the benefits in the framework's judgement. Britain's nuclear posture remains strategic only. This judgement is held against present conditions and is open to revision. It rests on the assumption that the American extended-deterrence guarantee, while less reliable than it was, has not wholly collapsed, and that the strategic deterrent plus allied posture covers the sub-strategic rungs adequately. A world in which the American guarantee fails entirely, or in which European allies move to sub-strategic capability and Britain alone does not, would change the calculation, and the framework commits to reopening the question if those conditions arrive rather than treating a present judgement as a permanent one.

The operational sovereignty question is worth being clear about. The Trident missiles are leased from the US. The warheads use US designs. The dependence has been managed for decades and is fundamentally compatible with independent operational control, but it is a

dependency, and the post-American-guarantee world makes the dependency more visible than it was. A realistic assessment of where the dependencies are critical and where they could be reduced is committed, accepting that complete independence is neither affordable nor strategically necessary.

Alliance Structure in Uncertain Times

NATO remains the institutional centrepiece of British defence. But NATO under uncertain American commitment is structurally different from NATO with reliable American backing, and the framework does not pretend otherwise. The admission is not left to stand on its own: it is precisely why the defence commitments that follow — the spending set on the alliance trajectory, the continuity of the deterrent, the deliberate weight placed on the European pillar and on bilateral capability — are sized to a Britain that may have to hold its position with less American backing than the post-war order assumed. The exposure is named here; the response to it is the build-out set out below.

The European pillar of NATO deserves real British engagement. France, Germany, Poland, and the Nordic states are developing capabilities that anticipate operating within NATO without American operational leadership in specific scenarios. The strategic situation requires Britain to engage in earnest, accepting that bilateral and multilateral European defence arrangements may sometimes proceed without American participation and that British defence policy must operate in that reality.

AUKUS is sustained and developed. The Indo-Pacific is not Britain's primary theatre, but the alliance with Australia and the United States in submarine technology and advanced capabilities is valuable in itself and as a hedge against American uncertainty.

Bilateral defence relationships with France, Germany, Poland, and the Nordic states deserve far more weight than they have received historically. France in particular shares both nuclear status and a tradition of independent strategic thinking that maps closely onto British circumstances. German rearmament since 2022 is reshaping European defence in ways British policy needs to engage with rather than observe.

The Five Eyes intelligence relationship is sustained as a valuable arrangement, preserved regardless of strategic shifts.

The Costs and the Sequence

Defence spending rises to 2.5% of GDP in the first parliament, with major new capability development beginning. This is around five to eight billion pounds annually above current spending, used for procurement reform implementation, drone and integrated digital capability development, intelligence community expansion, personnel conditions improvement, beginning of the Cura Custodum military implementation, and large reservist expansion.

The new fiscal commitment is the rise in core defence itself, in the order of fifteen billion pounds annually above the framework's prior trajectory at full implementation. This sits within the envelope at planning case. The procurement-reform conditionality is retained and is not loosened: additional core spending tracks demonstrated procurement reform, because money into a procurement system that produces waste rather than capability buys nothing. Movement up the trajectory is gated on the reform working, assessed through annual defence review with Treasury Select Committee and Defence Select Committee jointly scrutinising the assessment, so the polity sees what level is being committed and why.

The fiscal position is stated rather than smoothed. At planning-case revenue the trajectory is funded with the programme intact. At the revenue floor it is funded by holding defence as the protected commitment and slowing the maturation of Tier 3 and Tier 4 social commitments accordingly — the higher defence number is bought, in that scenario, partly at the expense of how quickly the social programme matures. This is the trade the strategic environment imposes, and the framework names it.

The framework does not raise the tax envelope to escape the choice. The envelope holds, on the principle that a structural rise in the right size of the state must be argued on its own terms and consented to, not reached for whenever a commitment becomes difficult. The defence increment is funded within the envelope, or its timetable yields to it — the envelope itself is not quietly moved to make the arithmetic easier.

Total additional defence spending at full implementation reaches the order of thirty-five to forty-five billion pounds annually above the current baseline, depending on the point reached on the trajectory and on GDP at the time. The spending is sequenced because procurement reform is the precondition for the larger increases and because the personnel and institutional reforms cannot all be delivered in a single parliament. Should the security environment deteriorate beyond the alliance planning case — sustained European war beyond Ukraine, operational collapse of the American guarantee, comparable major deterioration — defence rises further through explicit parliamentary process, and the question of the envelope is reopened at that point rather than pre-empted now.

What This Section Commits To

The defence commitment is large because the strategic situation requires it. Britain faces a more uncertain external environment than at any point in living memory, with hollow forces inadequate to the demands likely to be placed on them. Civitas Britannica refuses to continue the polite fiction that the current posture is adequate, and refuses equally the populist temptations of either rhetorical militarism without genuine investment or pacifist disengagement that ignores the actual world.

The result is a credible medium-power defence posture, sized for quality and designed for scale. Equipped with world-class capability in the integrated digital warfare technologies

that decide modern conflicts. Supported by intelligence and signals capability built on the existing GCHQ excellence and expanded widely across the community. Organised by procurement that works. Anchored in industrial strategy that treats defence spending as the lever for renewal it is. Served by personnel whose conditions are worthy of what is asked of them. Built around the Cura Custodum framework that makes defence service a genuine route to opportunity, sustained by a reservist system worthy of the name, and honoured through the veterans implementation of Cura Custodum that means it. Disciplined by data-led integration that learns from operational reality rather than political convenience. Justice-bound through military justice that cuts both ways. Resilient through civil defence and national resilience built across institutions. Backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent maintained because the world makes it grimly necessary. Embedded in alliance structures engaged with realistically.

XIV. The International Position

A country that cannot defend itself has no foreign policy worth having. Britain has been told for a generation that defence is a matter for technocrats and accountants. None of that was true even when it was being said.

The strategic position underlying the framework's foreign policy is set out in Section XIII (Defence and National Resilience): Britain as a credible medium power whose primary security commitment is to European defence, whose distinctive strength is maritime, and whose global reach comes through alliances rather than independent expeditionary capability. The international architecture that follows is calibrated to that posture.

The Concentric Architecture

The framework organises British foreign policy around concentric circles of priority rather than the post-2016 default that has treated relationships as competing, not layered. The circles, in order of priority and proximity:

Ireland. The closest neighbour, where Britain commits to moving the relationship from normalised to close, as a priority in its own right.

The Anglosphere. The family of Commonwealth democracies including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with the United States as the principal but complicated case given current strategic uncertainty.

The European democratic core for the long horizon. Germany, France, and the Nordic states as the partners with whom Britain shares the deepest civilisational, economic, and strategic interests across the coming century.

The European Union more broadly. Engagement on terms of mutual respect, with the question of any return governed by the demanding bar this section sets, and by nothing softer.

East Asia. Economic engagement with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region as part of the global economic architecture that British prosperity depends on.

The wider grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and middle powers. Constructive engagement with India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and the middle-power expansion, on terms of mutual interest with values not abandoned.

The Commonwealth as latent opportunity. Held as something the project may earn the right to develop if levelling-up succeeds at home, not as platform claimed by current standing.

The strategic judgement underlying this ordering: the twenty-first century is settling into a small number of superpower blocs and a long tail of middle powers. The European

democracies face a choice between coordinating into a coherent bloc capable of strategic autonomy or accepting permanent dependence on either the United States or the rising powers. Britain's interests are best served by being inside a coherent European bloc rather than outside one, provided the bloc that emerges is one Britain can be inside on terms of mutual respect. The Anglosphere relationships remain valuable and are preserved; in cases where Anglosphere and European interests pull in different directions over the long horizon, the framework leans European on the strategic judgement that this is where Britain's natural home lies. The judgement is open about itself rather than disguised as something else.

The framework therefore treats Britain's domestic programme and its European posture as the same project. Rebuilding state capacity, productive economy, demographic stability, and a credible defence contribution makes Britain a country the European democratic core wants closer to, and ultimately may make Britain a country the European Union wants back on the terms a genuine negotiation could produce.

Ireland and the Bilateral Priority

Ireland is the closest neighbour with which Britain has unique historical, economic, cultural, and personal ties. The framework treats the bilateral relationship as a diplomatic priority in its own right, distinct from the European architecture and pursued with sustained investment regardless of how the European question resolves.

Specific mechanisms include shared infrastructure investment — the Belfast-Dublin economic corridor, energy interconnection at meaningful capacity, transport integration where it serves both economies. Reciprocal cultural and educational programmes with real funding, not token gesture. Structured ministerial-level coordination on shared interests across climate, border management, security cooperation, and digital infrastructure. The British-Irish Council and the institutional architecture maintained at the senior level it deserves, with the framework rejecting the pattern of treating Ireland as a sub-component of European policy.

Significant normalisation of the relationship requires frank engagement with the unresolved questions of recent history. Britain approaches this with the gravity the relationship deserves rather than the avoidance that has characterised much of recent British practice. The Good Friday Agreement is honoured as the constitutional foundation; the settlement is treated as a living relationship requiring continued investment.

The goal across the horizon is the closest possible bilateral relationship with Ireland that Irish sovereign judgement will accept. Britain proposes; Ireland decides what it wants the relationship to become. Britain commits to making the offer worth accepting.

The Anglosphere and Five Eyes

The Anglosphere relationships remain valuable and are preserved. The Five Eyes intelligence relationship — Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States — is a valuable arrangement of long standing, preserved regardless of strategic shifts. The intelligence-sharing architecture has functioned across decades of changing political conditions and the framework treats it as institutional asset rather than as conditional arrangement.

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand receive close bilateral attention as the Commonwealth democracies whose values, institutions, and strategic interests align most closely with British. Cooperation runs across defence (AUKUS sustaining the deeper Australia relationship and the submarine technology programme), science and technology, education, immigration architecture, and economic integration where appropriate.

The United States is the major but complicated case. The historical alliance runs deep, and the institutional infrastructure (intelligence, defence, financial markets, scientific cooperation) is valuable. The strategic culture has diverged sharply across recent decades; American commitment to the European security order is no longer reliable in the way it was between 1949 and 2010. Britain treats the United States as a key partner where interests align without pretending the unconditional alliance still operates. Cooperation continues on the basis of actual mutual interest rather than assumed primacy. Britain does not break the relationship; Britain does not stake its strategic posture on assuming the relationship will remain unchanged across the horizon.

AUKUS is sustained and developed. The Indo-Pacific is not Britain's primary theatre, but the alliance with Australia and the United States in submarine technology and advanced capabilities is valuable in itself and as a hedge against American uncertainty. The submarine programme delivers strategic capability Britain cannot easily produce alone and provides institutional ballast for the trilateral relationship across changing political weather.

The European Democratic Core

The framework names Germany, France, and the Nordic states as the partners with whom Britain shares the deepest long-horizon interests. The aspiration: best friends for the next hundred years. The investment required to make this real is committed.

France in particular shares both nuclear status and a tradition of independent strategic thinking that maps closely onto British circumstances. The Lancaster House framework for Anglo-French defence cooperation is developed well beyond its current scope: shared capability development, integrated training and exercise programmes, coordinated industrial base for defence equipment, joint expeditionary capability where strategic interests align.

Germany is the principal economic and institutional partner whose interests increasingly diverge from American strategic culture and whose European leadership role is structural.

Britain develops sustained bilateral cooperation across industrial strategy (German manufacturing capability informs British rebuilding), institutional design (the German institutional model offers real lessons for British state capacity), energy transition coordination, and the European strategic architecture.

The Nordic states — Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Iceland — are the cluster of democracies whose institutional models, social architecture, and strategic posture align most closely with the framework's aspirations. Bilateral relationships with each are developed in earnest. The Joint Expeditionary Force, the Nordic-British defence architecture, and shared maritime and Arctic interests provide existing institutional foundation that the framework develops further.

Poland is the strategic partner whose continental defence role has become structurally important to European security and whose bilateral relationship with Britain warrants considerably more weight than it has received historically.

The framework treats the European democratic core not as alternative to the EU relationship but as the bilateral architecture that operates regardless of the EU question's resolution. If full UK membership is restored across the horizon, these relationships become the foundation within. If full membership is not available, these relationships become the principal European architecture Britain operates through.

The EU Relationship

Brexit was a democratic decision, and the framework treats it as settled. What it takes from the episode is a lesson of process, not a verdict on the outcome: constitutional decisions of that magnitude should pass through broad majorities and proper deliberation rather than bare-majority referenda followed by interpretation contests, and any future decision of comparable weight — in either direction — will be held to that standard.

On the question of return, the position is this. Britain is not, in the context of Europe, just any country: a permanent member of the Security Council, a nuclear power, the continent's foremost military contributor since the war in Ukraine, and a founding pillar of its security order. A country of that standing does not reapply on an accession candidate's terms. The framework would not countenance rejoining, or any settlement approaching it, for anything less than the full restoration of Britain's former rights and standing — the opt-outs, the financial settlement, the institutional weight — and, beyond them, terms compatible with the border and migration settlement this framework establishes, which it will not trade for membership of anything. And so the price is hidden from no one: membership on any terms carries the common commercial policy and with it departure from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). If the European Union should one day offer terms that clear that bar, the question would go to the British people by referendum, on the actual terms offered. Until then, the relationship is built below membership, and built deep.

In the short term, the deepest practical associated relationship within the existing Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) framework:

- A veterinary agreement to ease agricultural trade.
- Full rejoining of Horizon and Erasmus.
- A negotiated youth mobility scheme.
- Sector-by-sector alignment and mutual recognition where available.

In the medium term, open public debate about single market and customs union membership on the basis of accumulated evidence on economic impact and democratic consent. Full rejoining is held open as a long-term option requiring a future referendum on actual terms rather than hypothetical ones.

Bilateral returns arrangements with France and other safe-third countries are part of this relationship. They are useful supplements to the asylum policy described in Section VII rather than integral components of it; the architecture is built on unilateral capability that does not depend on partner cooperation, with cooperation welcomed where available. The diplomatic work required to make bilateral arrangements function is part of what relationship investment buys, and the framework pursues it accordingly.

East Asia and the Economic Pivot

East Asia is treated as an economic priority, not purely defence theatre. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are democracies of considerable economic and technological importance whose engagement with Britain has historically been thinner than their importance would warrant. The framework reverses this through sustained diplomatic investment, deep trade architecture, and recognition of the East Asian democratic cluster as a strategic priority in its own right.

Among these, Japan is not one partner of four but the anchor of the whole engagement, and a relationship that belongs nearer the inner ring than its distance on the map would suggest. The alignment is unusually complete: two island democracies set at the edge of their regions, both of the G7, both advanced-manufacturing economies, both meeting the same demographic ageing ahead of their neighbours, and both holding a defining stake in an open and rule-bound order. The depth is not aspirational but already shown, in the joint development of a next-generation combat aircraft alongside Italy — the building together of about the most sensitive technology a state possesses, which Britain undertakes with almost no one else. A country does not share the design of its frontline air power with a partner it keeps at arm's length; the programme is itself the measure of the trust, and the framework treats it as a foundation to build outward from rather than a ceiling.

Japan is also the natural partner for the renewal this framework most concerns itself with. It is a country that built advanced-manufacturing strength and, unlike Britain, largely kept it — the very discipline of keeping what one builds that the industrial strategy is trying to recover

— and so it is at once the model to learn from and the partner to build with: in advanced manufacturing, in robotics and materials, in the civil-nuclear cooperation that historically supported British development, and in the answers to a shared old age that the framework borrows already. It is, in the language of the First Principles, the clearest case of the partner with whom openness is safe and returns more than it costs — a relationship leaned into without anxiety, because the counterpart's model is the building of strength rather than the extraction of it. The bilateral architecture is developed to match: trade, technology, defence-industrial, and institutional cooperation, given the diplomatic resources its rank now warrants rather than the thin attention of the past.

And if Britain lost the holding of Arm, the fair accounting puts the fault at home. Japanese capital came where British capital would not; what was lost was domestic will and patient money, not something done to Britain from abroad. To read that episode as a foreign acquisition to be resented, rather than a British failure to be corrected, would be both a misreading and a discourtesy to a friend. The web of Japanese investment already woven through the country — the group that now holds Arm, Nissan's long industrial presence in the North East, and a good deal besides — is better seen as ballast already in place than as ground lost, a foundation a serious partnership builds upon rather than a wound it returns to. The framework's answer to the Arm episode is accordingly not to begrudge the investor but to keep the single chokepoint governed from Britain, through the jurisdictional lock set out in the technology section, while widening every other channel that connection opens: more co-investment, more joint venture, more Japanese industrial capital making a home here and more British capability finding its way there. The relationship is to be deepened, not policed.

Korea is treated as the technological partner whose industrial capability complements British strategic interests, particularly in nuclear (Korean KEPCO as named alternative supplier in the nuclear architecture), shipbuilding, and advanced manufacturing.

Taiwan's position is honoured carefully. Britain supports the democratic order on the island, opposes coerced unification, and works within the strategic ambiguity that has preserved the peace. Economic and technological cooperation runs alongside diplomatic care about formal status.

Singapore is the foremost institutional partner whose state capacity, sovereign wealth fund architecture, and recruitment of senior institutional talent provide precedents the framework draws on closely. The bilateral relationship is treated as strategic asset.

The ASEAN engagement is developed through CPTPP membership (sustained and developed in earnest, as set out below) and through bilateral relationships with Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines as appropriate.

BRICS and Constructive Engagement

The framework rejects the treatment of BRICS as a hostile bloc. The expanded BRICS architecture — India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, alongside the recent additions — represents the middle-power expansion of the twenty-first century international order. British interests are not served by treating constructive engagement as concession. The framework distinguishes carefully between the BRICS members rather than treating them as uniform.

India receives priority. India is the world's most populous democracy, on trajectory to be a top-three economy by mid-century, with deep cultural and historical ties to Britain and a large diaspora community within the United Kingdom. The framework develops the bilateral relationship through trade, technology, education, defence cooperation, and immigration architecture that reflects Indian importance. The complications of recent decades — Kashmir, religious tensions, occasional democratic backsliding — are engaged rather than ignored, but they do not displace the priority.

Brazil is the leading Latin American partner whose democratic recovery, environmental significance, and economic scale warrant deep engagement. South Africa is the main African partner whose democratic standing and economic importance similarly warrant engagement. Indonesia is the key Southeast Asian partner whose Muslim-majority democratic character and economic trajectory make it strategically important.

China is engaged on terms of mutual interest with explicit limits. The framework rejects both the Cold War framing that treats China as permanent adversary and the unconditional engagement that treats Chinese state activity in the West as acceptable cost of doing business. British citizens, residents, and territory are protected from Chinese state activity — intelligence operations, cyber attacks, harassment of diaspora communities, election interference. This is non-negotiable. Technology transfer in sensitive domains is restricted. Critical infrastructure dependencies on Chinese-controlled capability are reduced over time as a matter of sovereignty. Within these constraints, engagement on climate, trade, global governance, nuclear risk reduction, and pandemic response proceeds without performative hostility.

Russia is engaged differently. Britain maintains support for Ukraine until a durable settlement is reached on terms Ukraine accepts; premature normalisation with Russia while aggression continues is rejected. After a durable Ukraine settlement, the framework anticipates cooperation on shared interests — Arctic governance, nuclear risk reduction, climate, scientific exchange — proceeding on terms that reflect Russia's status as a permanent feature of the European security order.

British values inform British foreign policy without dictating intervention. Plain speech when asked and when it matters. No performative moralising. No pretence that values are neutral. Values not allowed to substitute for strategy, and strategy not allowed to substitute for values.

The Commonwealth as Latent Opportunity

The Commonwealth is taken as latent opportunity rather than current platform. The institution has been allowed to drift across recent decades; revitalising it would require both major British investment and real partner buy-in that cannot be assumed.

Britain approaches the Commonwealth question with appropriate humility. Britain has not yet earned the right to lead an architecture of fifty-six member states; that right is earned by becoming a country worth following. If the project succeeds at home — state capacity rebuilt, productive economy restored, demographic stability achieved, a credible defence contribution delivered, civic confidence rebuilt — Britain may have the standing across the horizon to propose credible Commonwealth revitalisation that partners might accept.

Until then, the framework commits to sustained engagement with individual Commonwealth members on terms of mutual respect, treating each bilateral relationship on its merits rather than as expression of historical hierarchy. The institutional Commonwealth architecture is preserved and supported; the revitalisation is held as opportunity the project may earn the right to pursue.

The ECHR Position

Britain remains within the European Convention on Human Rights, and works from inside it to reform the Convention's bearing on migration — which since Brexit, and the loss of the returns arrangements that once shared the European burden, leaves the United Kingdom carrying more than any host state should reasonably bear. It remains on a particular footing. The Belfast Agreement incorporates Convention rights into the Northern Ireland settlement and the UK-Ireland treaty relationship that underwrites the peace; while that holds, the Convention is part of how Britain is governed. To step outside it would breach the Agreement, draw a legitimate Irish response, and reach into the Windsor Framework — not a thing Britain would do lightly, or without those most bound up in it. That is the ground the membership stands on, and the reform is pursued from within it.

The disagreement is with the instrument, not the commitment. Where particular Convention provisions, or their interpretation by the Strasbourg court, have fallen behind the conditions a modern state of migration and asylum must manage, the framework pursues reform through the proper channels — domestic legislative refinement within the Human Rights Act, sustained engagement with the Council of Europe on the interpretation of relevant articles, and where appropriate the negotiated revision of specific provisions, in cooperation with other Council of Europe members who share the concern. The aim is to bring a settled commitment to rights up to date with the world it now governs, not to weaken it.

The framework also pursues active engagement with the Council of Europe, the Strasbourg court, and partner democracies on the development of Convention jurisprudence. Britain is

a leading contributor to the European human rights order, and it is from that standing that it presses for the reform the instrument needs.

The Trade Architecture

Trade is treated as a strategic instrument alongside defence and diplomacy rather than as a separate technocratic domain. The post-Brexit trade negotiation capability has been thin and produced agreements that mostly replicate prior arrangements at marginal additional cost. Britain rebuilds trade negotiation capacity within the reformed civil service, with senior trade negotiators developed through the Royal Institute and the international recruitment pathway.

CPTPP membership is sustained and developed in earnest. The Indo-Pacific dimension is valuable both economically and strategically as part of alliance architecture. The framework treats CPTPP not as nominal membership but as active platform for British engagement with the Asian growth economies.

Bilateral trade architecture is developed across the priority relationships. India bilateral trade architecture pursued with significant resources reflecting the strategic priority. United States — pragmatic engagement on sector-by-sector arrangements rather than the comprehensive UK-US free trade agreement (FTA) that has remained elusive across multiple administrations. Gulf states — energy and security cooperation with a clear position on values where they intersect. African trade architecture developed in earnest as part of the Commonwealth and middle-power engagement.

Trade leverage is used where strategic interests require it; trade openness where the benefit is genuine. The framework rejects the post-Brexit pattern of pursuing trade agreements primarily for political symbolism without real economic content. Agreements are pursued where they serve British interests and not pursued where they do not.

Two truths complete the trade architecture, one about what Britain sells and one about what it cannot do without. What Britain sells, above all, is services: the second-largest services exporter on earth — the finance and insurance of the City partnership, the law that governs half the world's contracts, the maritime services of the Island Nation, the universities whose students are exports counted properly, the creative industries — and yet the trade machinery has been built for goods it moves less of. Services market access becomes the first ask in every negotiation rather than the annex, with export promotion rebuilt on the same capability footing as negotiation itself. And what Britain cannot do without is mapped rather than discovered: a standing critical-import register — semiconductors, pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, the enriched fuels of the nuclear programme — maintained as resilience infrastructure, with each dependency answered by some deliberate mix of stockpile, ally, substitute, or the domestic recovery the circular economy now feeds. The food floor of The Land and the Sea and the seafarer floor of the Island Nation are entries in the same register; the register simply finishes the thought.

Alliance Structure

The NATO and alliance architecture — the European pillar under uncertain American commitment, AUKUS, and Five Eyes — is set out in full in Section XIII. The point to carry here is that the bilateral European relationships above and that multilateral architecture are complementary, not alternative: the bilateral ballast holds where American leadership can no longer be assumed.

XV. The Battles Ahead

A framework that does not describe its difficulties is dishonest. The framework set out here will face sustained resistance — from interests that have defeated reform attempts repeatedly over the past forty years, with resources and entrenchment that ordinary politics cannot easily overcome. The fights are named here.

Land and Housing

Planning reform on the scale required has defeated every British government that has attempted it for forty years. The opposition includes a majority of homeowners whose wealth depends on housing scarcity, councillors of every party whose power flows from discretionary planning, conservation organisations who will frame Green Belt reform as countryside destruction, and the legal profession which profits from process. The land value taxation programme, the renter rights reform, and the Right to Buy repeal will face additional opposition from landlord interests, property developers, and the political tradition that has treated property ownership as the principal route to wealth accumulation.

The case for land reform is not radical but conservative. Concentrated ownership combined with housing scarcity combined with declining mobility produces resentment that, over time, threatens the political legitimacy of property rights. The polity that fails to address concentrated ownership through gradual reform creates conditions in which property rights themselves become contested. The reforms here are designed to preserve what makes Britain safe and desirable for property ownership by ensuring the country's population sees the system as broadly legitimate.

The Press

The press, or part of it, may still resist. The framework does not regulate what the press reports — it strengthens the freedom of the press and leaves the content of journalism untouched — and on that ground the working journalist has nothing to fear from it and something to gain. What it does is limit the concentration of ownership and the foreign control of titles, and a small number of proprietors who have grown used to both will not welcome it. They hold the political class in a fear that has suffocated milder reforms before now, and the movement should expect the titles they own to be turned against it. But that fight is with a handful of owners over the structure of the press, not with the press over its liberty — a narrower and more winnable contest than the one a movement reaching for control of content would have brought upon itself.

Asylum and the International Legal Order

The deterrence regime will face sustained legal challenge. The detention-with-return architecture is more legally defensible than the offshore-third-country approach previous governments attempted, but it will still be tested in domestic courts and at the European

Court of Human Rights. Bilateral returns arrangements with France and other safe-third countries turn on diplomatic outcomes Britain cannot command alone — which is why the architecture does not rest on them. The territorial backstop needs no partner's consent, and cooperation is welcomed where it comes rather than depended upon. The slow legal and diplomatic work that makes the policy real is committed to.

Whitehall

State capacity rebuilding is internal and unglamorous and harder than any of the external fights. The civil service's senior management will resist the technical-talent intake the framework requires. Treasury will resist patient capital allocation on cash-flow grounds. The Cabinet Office will resist procurement reforms that threaten its consultancy supplier base. The cultural shift required — from generalist administration to real technical depth — is a generational one and the people who must lead it are the people whose careers were made under the old culture. Without victory here, none of the rest can be delivered.

Public Finances

Shifting the tax burden from work to wealth, property, and capital will be opposed by the financial sector, the property industry, the legal and accounting professions whose business depends on the current system's complexity, and the wealthy donors who have funded both major parties for a generation. Council tax revaluation alone has defeated multiple governments because the political pain is concentrated and immediate while the gains are diffuse and delayed.

The contributors are not adversaries of the project; they are among its principal beneficiaries when the country it builds is the country they live in. The fight will be hard. It is sustained by the recognition that the country produced by reform is one current contributors will be glad their grandchildren inherit.

Sectoral Bargaining and Economic Standing

Restructuring the British economy around sectoral bargaining will be opposed by employer associations whose business models depend on individual contract negotiation, by parts of the financial sector concerned about wage growth's effects on margins, by industries (hospitality, agriculture, social care) whose profitability depends on low-wage labour, and by the political tradition that has treated unions as antagonists since 1979.

Building the institutional capacity on the union and employer-association sides, where decades of decline have left both weaker than their continental counterparts, will require sustained patience that British politics rarely permits. This is a generational project, committed to accordingly.

Regional Renewal

Real political devolution to English regional bodies, distributed anchor institutions, and the redirection of public investment away from London concentration will be opposed by the political and administrative class whose careers, networks, and personal lives are organised around London. Treasury will resist; Whitehall will resist; the cultural infrastructure of British political life will resist. The answer is that other countries have done this and Britain has not.

The Coalition

The framework's policy commitments do not align with the left-right axis that has organised British politics for a century. Fiscal seriousness and institutional competence belong to the centre and to the reform-minded right. Redistribution from wealth towards work belongs to the left. The asylum and immigration architecture belongs to the right, and to the communities the major parties have treated as safely ignorable. The defence and nuclear commitments cut across. The refusal of elite detachment draws on a popular sentiment that has no settled party home. This is not incoherence. It is the description of a constituency.

That constituency is large, and it is presently homeless. It is patriotic without being nostalgic, economically interventionist without being statist, institutionally serious, socially moderate, and united above all by the sense that it is governed by people who hold it in contempt. It is the realignment electorate of the past decade — the voters who have moved between the major parties and into abstention because none of them holds together the economic and cultural commitments this constituency holds. Neither major party can house it, because each would have to abandon half its existing coalition to do so. The framework is built for this constituency, because it is the largest unrepresented bloc in the country, and because a programme of national renewal requires a base broad enough to sustain it across decades rather than a faction narrow enough to be defeated in one.

The movement's preferred path is adoption, not displacement. The doctrine set out here is offered first to the parties that already exist: any of them that takes it up inherits the constituency it describes. That is the better outcome for them. The constituency exists whether or not it is organised, and a homeless plurality of this size does not remain homeless indefinitely. If the established parties decline the doctrine and a new formation must be built to carry it, the cost falls first on them, in the votes they lose to a movement that occupies the ground they vacated. The framework would rather renew the country through the instruments that already exist. It is prepared to build a new instrument if it must. The existing parties have the first refusal, and the most to lose by refusing.

A final word on the names. The Latin in these pages — Civitas, Cura Custodum — is the author's preference, drawn from a framework comprehensive enough to still serve at this most distant of Rome's reaches: citizenship as mutual obligation, care of the guardians, roads before monuments. It is offered as resonance, not required as livery, and it is not something to be fought over. None of this has to be called what it is called here. A party that

adopts the covenant and names it something plainer has adopted it; a critic who fights the Latin has conceded the argument underneath it. The movement carries the name Fight Forward; the framework carries its Latin. Both are paint; the architecture is the offer.

The Democratic Process

A new political formation in Britain faces a system designed to suppress new entrants. Whatever political vehicle emerges from this movement may have to break through under the existing first-past-the-post system, which has produced governments with parliamentary majorities on minority votes for a generation. The path may run through local government, through accumulated parliamentary seats, through alliances with reform-minded existing politicians who recognise the failure of their own parties. The constitutional convention committed to here is partly a reform of this very system. The irony is acknowledged: the rules under which it must be won are the rules the framework proposes to change.

The apparent circularity — that proportional representation requires power to deliver, while power comes under the very system proportional representation would replace — resolves once the sequence is stated correctly. Proportional representation is not the route to entry. It is the means of durability. The movement, or the party that adopts its doctrine, wins once under the existing rules: through the capture of an existing party's direction, or through the realignment that a sufficiently severe crisis produces. It then changes the rules, so that the long programme never again depends on a single party holding power for thirty years. The first victory is won under first-past-the-post; the constitutional reform that follows ensures it need neither be the last nor stand alone. This is the same logic that runs through the modular architecture set out in the acknowledgements: the foundations are built broad enough to survive a change of government, the plural politics that protects them is established early, and the sequenced reforms follow as the coalition sustains them.

One battle stands behind all of these, and it is the hardest: re-election on a record of foundations. Everything from the second parliament onwards requires winning a second mandate after a first term of higher taxes, an identity card, a reconstruction levy, and bills that change only late in the term. The visible early work — the asylum settlement, the Cura covenant, the land value tax relief in the regions, the welfare mercies — exists precisely for this hinge, and the framework does not pretend it is enough on its own. The Capacity Parliament's electoral proposition is the truth told and the work shown as it happens; if the country will not re-elect that, the modular architecture limits what is lost, but the programme as a sequence ends there. The framework stakes itself on the judgement that a polity lied to for a generation will reward the first government that declines to lie to it — and names that as the wager it is.

The Long Horizon

Most of the reforms compound over decades. The benefits of universal childcare appear in school performance figures over fifteen years and in workforce participation over twenty. The benefits of state capacity rebuilding appear in the quality of every other reform that follows. The political opponent of all of this is the electoral cycle, which rewards short-term visible action and punishes long-term invisible work.

The reforms must therefore be embedded so deeply that the governments which follow cannot easily undo them — built like Attlee's NHS, which Conservative governments inherited and chose not to dismantle, rather than like the Heath economic strategy or the Cameron Big Society, which were unpicked the moment their authors left office.

The most demanding work comes first by design. Capacity built early enlarges every benefit that follows — the plate built before the meal — so the front-loading is a multiplier, not a cost. A benefit built now cannot be lost to drift; one deferred to a third parliament depends on every government between now and then choosing not to abandon it.

What Victory Requires

These are not separate battles. They are one battle fought on multiple fronts, and a movement that wins on three fronts and loses on four has not won. The framework requires winning the planning fight and the press fight and the asylum fight and the Whitehall fight and the tax fight and the sectoral-bargaining fight and the regional fight and the democratic-process fight, sustained across multiple parliaments, against opponents who individually are formidable and collectively constitute much of the detached-elite condition the diagnosis section describes.

This is daunting because it should be. Restoring a country is not light work. The generation that built the postwar settlement faced a comparably wide range of fights and won most of them, sequentially, with discipline and clarity, and the country they built lasted. Their work is now decaying because successors lacked the same discipline and clarity. Restoring it requires picking up the same instruments — patience, sequencing, alliance-building, willingness to sustain combat over years rather than weeks, refusal to be distracted by the urgent into neglecting the important.

Winning, in the end, is not permanent power. A battle fought across so many fronts can sound like a demand for it, but the measure of success is not that one movement holds office across four parliaments without a break. It is that the approach set out here becomes the ground on which the country is governed — the settled assumption a successor works within rather than against, whatever rosette that successor wears. The postwar settlement is again the model: its authors lost office in 1951, and it endured for a generation because those who replaced them chose to govern inside it rather than tear it down. A victory of that kind does not need the electorate's permanent consent to one party. It needs work sound enough, and useful enough to whoever inherits it, that undoing it costs more than keeping it. Whether the country takes the path is not for this document to compel; a coherent and

costed route, set down where those in power have offered none, is the whole of what it can put forward.

XVI. The Concessions

The Probability of Full Implementation Is Low

The framework is highly ambitious, dependent upon rebuilding forms of administrative capacity Britain presently lacks, and vulnerable to political resistance, institutional inertia, fiscal limitation, electoral churn, cultural fragmentation, and simple human exhaustion. Many proposals may fail, require revision, or prove politically impossible under present conditions. Completion in full is not assured.

The purpose of stating this is to distinguish what the framework is from what it is not. It is not a guaranteed programme of national salvation. It is an attempt to map a plausible route by which a democratic society experiencing long-term institutional decline might begin reconstructing state capability, civic resilience, and strategic continuity over time. Political will cannot be manufactured by a document alone, and societies may ultimately choose drift over reconstruction. But low probability of full completion is not high probability of nothing: because the framework is modular in its achievements, partial completion leaves durable value — the capacity built and the revenue already spent in building it endure whether or not the later tiers arrive.

What the framework offers is the conditions under which reconstruction becomes more likely than under the status quo, and the discipline to acknowledge openly when reforms underperform rather than continuing to claim success against reality. That is not certainty of delivery. It is the most credible response a reform programme can offer to a problem that no political programme has ever fully solved.

The Internal Tensions

The framework's commitments to full participation, equal citizenship, and the refusal of hereditary administrative caste run into genuine tensions with specific operational commitments. The two-tier structure within Cura Custodum creates differentiated civic benefits within a framework committed to equal civic standing. The asylum architecture creates a legal category of presence-without-mainland-membership, sharpened by the absolute prospective closure of unauthorised settlement and by territorial resettlement of the unremovable residual on St Helena, in a framework whose foundational commitment is the citizen as full participant. The Royal Institute of Statecraft cultivates institutional capability through structured elite formation within a framework suspicious of elite detachment.

The asylum tension is the sharpest of the three. The architecture protects people it will not admit to mainland membership: the unremovable residual is resettled on St Helena, with full civic and political standing within that community and a funded departure open at any time, but with no route to settlement in Britain itself. The closure bars Britain, not departure from it. This sits in tension with what the participation commitment elsewhere argues a

polity should construct — a protected class who are nonetheless not citizens-in-waiting. The defence offered is that conditional closure produces a system in which the deterrent does not work, which produces greater harm to greater numbers including to those it purported to protect, and that the absolute deterrent is what makes the legitimate routes credible.

These tensions are held rather than resolved. The position taken here is that the alternatives — undifferentiated benefits that fail to retain critical workforce, conditional asylum closure that produces sustained border failure and corrosion of democratic trust, ad hoc institutional design that produces consistently poor outcomes — produce worse failures of its commitments than the structured commitments with safeguards in place. The tensions do not fully resolve. The framework states this rather than pretending otherwise.

The Implementation Capacity Question

The framework addresses the implementation capacity question through three reinforcing pathways: the Royal Institute of Statecraft producing senior domestic cadres across decades, the military pathway transitioning senior officers into civilian institutional reform roles, and the international recruitment pathway bringing senior institutional builders from peer democracies on time-limited contracts with contractual knowledge transfer obligations. The combination is the most credible response available to a problem no British government in living memory has solved.

Even with three pathways operating in parallel, the first-parliament programme is at the edge of what is deliverable. The international recruitment yield is finite and competitive — Britain is one buyer in a market that includes other countries trying to recruit the same people, and the planning case of 100–200 senior international recruits assumes the framework can compete successfully against alternatives. The military pathway depends on senior officers choosing civilian reform work over the private alternatives that currently absorb most of them. The Royal Institute's production of domestic cadres compounds across decades but contributes little to the first parliament's immediate need.

The conditional architecture handles the residual uncertainty. If implementation underperforms on specific reforms because the senior capability is not available at the pace required, the affected reforms slip in timescale rather than producing failed delivery against fixed deadlines. The polity sees this through annual fiscal reviews showing actual delivery against planned timescales. Some first-parliament commitments may therefore extend into the second; what the framework commits to is not pretending otherwise when it happens.

The Fiscal Arithmetic

The cumulative tax architecture produces large compounding behavioural effects at the top of the distribution. The 2025 non-dom abolition has produced early indications of emigration in HMRC and Companies House data, contested in scale and treated cautiously here; the wealth tax and the package compound rather than initiate this. The framework

plans against a tax architecture central case of approximately £45–52 billion additional recurring revenue annually — the conservative end of its modelled range — with a floor of approximately £40 billion, and a defined contingency menu of additional revenue measures (Financial Transactions Tax, accelerated corporate loophole closure, further VAT base broadening, pension tax relief tightening) named for progressive deployment as revenue arrives below the central case. The 42% of GDP envelope is comfortably met only at the upper-bound stretch of £90–100 billion; at the central case the envelope reaches approximately 40% of GDP unless productivity recovery on the existing base closes the gap. The polity is told the menu exists rather than discovering it mid-parliament.

The architecture is materially constrained at the floor. With second-parliament spending reaching towards £68–98 billion above baseline if everything proceeds, against a floor of approximately £40 billion, the committed core is delivered while the later tiers wait on revenue — through large contingency deployment, Tier 3 sequencing extended across longer timescales, and where necessary staging of the personal allowance increase. This is acknowledged: a sustained programme of disappointed expectations from the second parliament onwards would test the political coalition the programme requires, and the contingency menu exists precisely because a programme of this scale must be designed to survive revenue underperformance without breaking that coalition. The defence trajectory compounds this strain at the floor: defence is the protected commitment, so the slower maturation falls on the Tier 3 and Tier 4 social programme, and the framework names that as the trade rather than disguising it.

The Regulated Asset Base model for nuclear is decisive for the funding architecture. If private capital share falls below approximately 60%, the state has to absorb more with corresponding pressure on the recurring envelope. The conditional architecture handles this.

The capital programme for Government IT modernisation, climate transition, and institutional renewal extends beyond the five-year wealth tax horizon. The funding model for later years combines continued capital allocation from recurring revenue, capital borrowing within fiscal rules against productive returns, and significant private finance enabled by policy framework. None of this is certainty; all of it is the architecture the framework commits to operating within.

Open Questions

The document addresses, within the appropriate sections, the major areas a programme of this scope must cover: pension and capital architecture, AI governance, climate adaptation, water infrastructure, trade policy beyond the EU, and net migration scale. It does not pretend any of these treatments is final or definitive; each will benefit from subsequent development as the policy work continues. What it commits to is that none of them is silent ground.

The remaining gaps are named.

The City of London's specific economic role and what happens to it under the cumulative tax architecture is underdeveloped. The framework needs a fuller position on financial services regulation, the international competitiveness implications of the tax architecture, and the integration of the City with the wider productive economy the framework seeks to rebuild.

Northern Ireland receives minimal treatment beyond what appears in the ECHR position and the Union question within the Constitutional Convention's remit. The Northern Ireland framework — economic, institutional, and constitutional — requires its own development, including the engagement with the Irish bilateral relationship set out in Section XIV.

Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are treated sparingly in these pages, and the boundary is drawn on purpose rather than by neglect. The framework's preference is stated once: continued Union. The deepening of English regional government on something closer to the Länder model changes what the Union is over time — a state of meaningful regions and nations is a different proposition from the unitary centre the present arguments were forged against, and a federal evolution is the natural long-horizon reading of the architecture this framework builds. With Ireland the position is neighbourliness, nothing more and nothing less: two countries sharing an archipelago, a sea, and more history than either chose, who could do better by one another and have every practical reason to — the bilateral priority in Section XIV is where this framework does that work, and it presumes nothing beyond friendship. Beyond that, the place of any nation in the Union is a political question for its people, not a policy question for this document, and the framework holds it to the standard it set at Brexit: decisions of constitutional magnitude pass through large majorities and proper deliberation, in either direction, with the consent principles of the Belfast Agreement standing untouched throughout. The author's own judgement — that separation would be a mistake on much the same arithmetic that made Brexit one — is recorded and then set aside, because Civitas Britannica is a programme for governing well, and governing well is the strongest case for the Union anyone has yet made.

A civic service programme is envisaged at several points — the care settlement, the children's settlement, civil resilience — and remains undeveloped here: an ambition the framework names without yet committing.

The Administrative Load

The framework creates new institutions, and the obvious objection is that it therefore adds to the very administrative weight it complains of. The answer is that they are built to consolidate rather than to accumulate: GAIA replaces a sprawl of incompatible systems with a common spine, Cura Custodum replaces a dozen fragmented service schemes with one, and the recruitment and procurement reforms exist to reduce duplication, not to add a layer on top of it. The discipline is that a new institution is justified by the complexity it removes, not by the functions it performs; a reform that leaves frontline staff filling more

forms and doing less of their actual work has failed by its own measure, whatever it achieves on paper. The residual is stated, not buried: consolidation is disruptive before it is simplifying, and the transition will, for a period, run the old arrangements and the new ones at once. The net reduction does come, but after the overlap, not during it.

The Human Factor

Institutions are run by people, and people are ambitious, self-interested, complacent, and tribal; in time these tendencies erode whatever is built. The framework does not answer this by assuming better people. It assumes ordinary ones, and tries to build structures in which their ordinary motives run with the public interest rather than against it: powers that are visible, decisions that can be contested, bodies that audit one another, offices that can be removed, and standing that must be renewed rather than possessed. Good institutions do not require saints; they require arrangements that make useful behaviour easier, harmful behaviour visible, and capture difficult, and the anti-detachment safeguards on the Royal Institute are one instance of that wider design rather than an exception to it. The residual is that no such arrangement is proof against human nature: informal networks form, incentives are gamed, and capture is reduced rather than abolished. The framework's wager is not that this can be prevented, but that an institution built to expect it lasts longer than one built to trust in virtue.

The Authoritarian Reading

There is a hostile reading of this framework, and it should be met assembled rather than piecemeal: former officers moved into the institutions of the state, an identity card, intelligence budgets rising by half or more, an expanded detention estate, an island resettlement, and a movement organised in small working circles. Each element carries its safeguard where it is proposed — the military pathway bounded in scale and embedded among civilian, judicial, and academic cadres under democratic norms; the card statutorily use-limited, federated, location-blind, and watched by the citizen it identifies; the intelligence expansion bound to proportionate expansion of the Intelligence and Security Committee; detention time-limited, judicially reviewed, with an absolute ceiling; the settlement a civil community under civil law with a funded exit; the movement subordinate to argument, its authority resting in principles rather than persons. But scattered safeguards answer a scattered reader, and the attack will not arrive scattered. So the answer is given here in one place: every power this framework proposes is visible, contestable, time-limited or removable, and overseen by a body that does not wield it. The framework invites its critics to test each of those claims against the sections that make them — which is the only answer to the authoritarian reading worth anything.

It would be a mistake, though, to answer the charge with too much confidence, because the charge contains a truth. A programme that sets out to rebuild the capacity of the state is, by its nature, a programme that makes the state more capable — and a more capable state is a

more dangerous one in the wrong hands. There is no version of this work that does not walk that line. The same identity system that closes the shadow economy could, repurposed, track the lawful citizen; the same intelligence capability that defends the country could, unleashed inwards, watch it; the same decisiveness that builds could, redirected, suppress. This framework does not pretend otherwise. It claims only that the dangers are met where they arise — named in the open, fenced by statute, time-limited, and watched by bodies that do not themselves wield the power — and that a state which has lost the capacity to act at all is not therefore safe, but merely differently endangered, vulnerable to the slow ruin that incapacity brings. The choice is not between a powerful state and a harmless one. It is between capacity governed and capacity forsworn, and the framework chooses the first while conceding, without flinching, how much rests on the governing.

Load-Bearing Instruments

Some instruments in this framework carry more than their own section admits, and the couplings are claimed here so that no part of the architecture is judged alone. The identity card is the precondition for three flagship policies, not a convenience beside them: settlement by contribution is unadministrable without a lifelong, portable record of what has been contributed; the closure of the irregular route gains its humane half from the card, because ending illegal working removes the pull factor that cruelty was always the wrong tool for; and Cura standing, earned across a career and carried for life, needs the same spine. The card's defence is therefore not that it is harmless, but that it is what makes the decent versions of these policies possible at all.

The capital architecture closes a larger loop. The channelling relief flows through National Wealth Fund vehicles, which certifies the relief and scales the Fund in a single design (Section XI); the Fund's renewal assets — the new towns, the grid, the water system — are exactly the long-dated holdings the consolidated pension capital seeks, so the scaffolder's retirement and the financier's channelled levy stand co-invested in the same national fabric. The political consequence answers the hardest battle this framework faces: a country in which millions of ordinary pensions own the renewal has a structural reason to re-elect the governments that continue it. Consent is not only argued for in these pages; it is capitalised. Smaller couplings follow the same grammar: the drug policy reform decongests and partly funds the courts whose backlog the justice programme repairs; the civil and naval nuclear programmes draw on one reactor-skills pipeline, each making the other cheaper; and the arduous-occupation credits of the pension window and the accrued standing of Cura Custodum are a single earned-credit system administered once. The framework asks to be read this way throughout: the instruments are load-bearing walls, not a list of rooms.

Modular Implementation and Partial Resilience

No framework of this ambition can guarantee full delivery across thirty years and multiple parliaments. The framework therefore identifies which elements form the irreducible

architecture — those whose value does not depend on the rest being delivered — and which are sequenced enhancements that build on the foundational work.

The irreducible architecture consists of:

- The Capacity Parliament discipline as method, deliverable even in a single parliament under a single government.
- State capacity rebuilding and the Royal Institute of Statecraft, deliverable as institutional reform within first-parliament timescales.
- Procurement reform across defence, NHS, and infrastructure, deliverable without the wider fiscal architecture.
- The pension and capital architecture reforms — NEST consolidation, National Wealth Fund expansion, auto-enrolment escalation — which are largely revenue-neutral and deliverable independently.
- The energy security elements, particularly the existing nuclear new-build pipeline and grid investment.
- The defence-industrial strategy reorientation, including the European pillar of NATO commitments.

These elements have positive value even in isolation. A government that delivers only the irreducible architecture and stops has nevertheless materially improved the British state's capacity to govern. The framework is designed such that partial implementation is not partial failure but partial success — slower and less complete renewal than the full programme aims at, but real renewal nonetheless.

The sequenced enhancements — the tax architecture, the social provisions of the second and third parliaments, the universal childcare expansion, the major expansion of devolved capacity — depend on the foundational work being in place. They cannot deliver without it. If the foundation is laid and the sequencing fails for political reasons, the country retains the foundation. If the foundation itself fails, the programme was never deliverable in the first place.

This modular structure is not a fallback. It is the architectural logic of the framework: the programme is sequenced in what it sets out to do and modular in what it leaves behind. Each tier supports what follows, so a shortfall early constrains what comes later — but what is actually built at each stage remains valuable whether or not what was to follow is completed, because rebuilt capacity, once it exists, is durable inheritance that does not depend on the rest of the sequence arriving.

Suppose the first parliament's work is done, and the government is then turned out at the first opportunity, replaced by one hostile to the entire design. What survives? The rebuilt revenue service keeps collecting; no successor hands free money back to evasion. The procurement reforms keep the state buying at lower cost, a saving no government has reason to surrender. The Fraud Agency pays for itself and more. The reconstruction levy, once assessed and collected, cannot be un-collected, and the capital it raised already stands

in the hospital wings and school buildings it paid for. The asylum settlement is kept because it is popular. The pension and digital-identity foundations persist by the inertia of systems too embedded to unpick. What a hostile successor can undo is narrower: the Royal Institute and the international pathway can be wound down, and the unbuilt social settlement of the later tiers can be declined. But these are things foregone, not things destroyed — a future not taken, rather than a past torn up. The ledger of that worst case is, almost exactly, the postwar settlement's own history: the builders lost power, and the building stood.

The framework does not pretend to comprehensive coverage of every policy question; it commits to the foundational architecture and identifies the areas where further development is required.

XVII. The Discipline of the Movement

Discipline

The early work falls to a small number of committed people. The history of movements teaches that the early decisive actors are never a mass; they are a minority of unusual seriousness. The framework does not pretend to a mass following it has not built. It needs members who do the work.

The work is written before it is organised. A movement that cannot articulate itself does not exist except as sentiment. This document is the minimum. It will be followed by papers, essays, and arguments, produced in public, signed by their authors, defensible in debate.

Recruitment is for character, not volume. A movement is the average of its members. Ten citizens of unusual seriousness will advance the cause further than a thousand sympathisers whose sympathy is a form of personal branding.

The movement will not engage in the politics of online performance. Social media is a useful tool and a ruinous master. It is used to distribute the work, not to manufacture the appearance of a movement that has not yet been built.

Method

Opponents are steelmanned. Every position rejected — reactionary, activist-left, managerial — is stated in the strongest form its best defenders would recognise before it is attacked. A movement that attacks straw men produces supporters who cannot survive contact with the real arguments.

The framework accepts that it will be wrong about things. It is a movement founded to improve the country, not to perform its certainty. When events teach the movement that a position it held was incorrect, the position changes, publicly, with the reasoning stated. This will cost members. The movement lets it cost members.

The movement is not confused with any of its early figures. Movements that become personal vehicles do not survive their personalities. Authority rests with the principles, the argument, and the collective discipline of the members.

Measurement is by outputs, not feelings. Has a paper been written? Has an argument been won? Has a person been persuaded? Has a reform advanced by even an inch? These are the questions that matter. The rest is noise.

Governance

Duty is the governing principle. Not party advantage. Not the next news cycle. Not the personal careers of ministers. These things exist and cannot be pretended away, but they

are not what government is for, and they are not what a government acting on this framework will organise itself around.

A government operating on duty behaves differently from one operating on political advantage. It appoints on competence rather than loyalty. It welcomes cross-party working on problems that transcend parties — defence, energy security, constitutional questions, long-horizon infrastructure. It takes advice it does not want to hear. It reverses its own positions when evidence warrants, publicly, with reasoning stated, accepting the short-term political cost. It accepts the service of people who do not vote for it. It treats the civil service as a partner in the national project, not as an obstacle to be outmanoeuvred. It tells the public things the public does not want to hear, because the alternative is misleading the citizens it claims to serve. And when a national capability benefits the country and the party alike, it puts the country first.

None of this is novel. It is how British government often worked between 1945 and the mid-1970s. The culture was lost through specific decisions over subsequent decades — the adversarial Commons as theatre, the 24-hour news cycle, the managerial parties organised around message discipline, the hollowing of the civil service, the rise of political advisers over professional officials. These were choices, and they can be unchosen.

Showing the Work

A government that asks citizens to back a reform programme owes them honesty about what is being reformed and why. The elite detachment diagnosis is a general claim; the policy sections show it in specific instances. A government acting on these commitments will keep showing this work throughout its tenure, publicly and in detail.

When the planning system blocks housing that citizens need, the specific mechanisms and the specific interests that have defended them will be named. When press regulation is being resisted by a handful of proprietors, the proprietors will be named and the figures published. When NHS reform meets resistance from the consultancy firms who profit from permanent reorganisation, the firms will be named and the contracts published. When the asylum system fails because France refuses a returns agreement, that will be acknowledged. When policies committed to here fail to produce promised results, that will be said too, publicly, with reasoning stated.

This is not performative. It is structural. Self-government holds when citizens can see the forces that shape their country, and state secrecy about its own workings is one of the core mechanisms by which self-government is eroded. A government that hides why reform is hard produces citizens who assume reform is impossible. A government that shows its work produces citizens who can judge its progress for themselves.

XVIII. What Is Asked

One comes to the end of a document of this length with a certain hesitation. So much has been argued, so much built up sentence by sentence, that the moment of direct address feels almost intrusive — as though the framework, having made its case in the careful third person, ought to maintain that discipline to the last.

It cannot. The work that comes after the writing of a document depends upon citizens. Not in the abstract, not as the polled aggregate of opinions, but as named individuals who read the diagnosis, judged it largely correct, and concluded that something more than the wringing of hands was owed in answer. That conclusion is not arrived at lightly, and those who reach it carry a particular weight afterwards. The country is in trouble. The trouble is largely unaddressed. And one's own response to that knowledge becomes, after a time, a question one cannot quite put down.

What we ask of such a reader transcends party. It transcends the question of which faction holds the next election. It transcends the calculation of immediate advantage. Britain is older than any of its parties, older than the franchise that produced them, older than the politics that organises our quarrels. The duty owed to it is older too, and is owed by every citizen who lives upon its soil, regardless of how they came to it or for whom they voted last. And it is owed first. To every party that might take up this work, or inherit it, the question is the same. The partisan habit of Westminster demands obedience to creed and colour, blue and red alike; yet a country rebuilt to be more capable serves you whichever way the next election falls. And so, weighing such obligations, one must ask whether one's loyalty runs first to one's party, or to one's country.

We cannot offer you status. We cannot offer you a job. We cannot offer you the consolations of the tribe, or the quick feedback of the algorithm. We can offer you argument, work, and the company of others who have read the same diagnosis and come to the same conclusion — that cynicism is the last luxury of a people about to lose their country, and that we are not so rich as to afford it.

To those who have prospered under arrangements the rest of the country can no longer sustain: the case made here is not against you. The question is whether the country whose stability and standing have allowed you to prosper will continue to provide that stability and standing across the long horizon — or whether, slowly and then suddenly, it will not. A country in decline does not protect the prosperity of anyone in the end. It consumes its beneficiaries together with its victims, more slowly perhaps, more politely perhaps, but no less surely. What is proposed here is renewal from a position of strength, while strength remains, rather than the harder reckoning that comes when the position of strength has been spent.

We ask you to bear higher taxes, in the company of every serious country in Western Europe, so that Britain may have what those countries have: childcare that supports families

rather than punishes them, social care that treats the elderly with the dignity their lives have earned, an NHS rebuilt rather than rationed, a defence force the country can be proud of, public services that work in the way our parents and grandparents took for granted. We ask this because the alternative is the country we now have, and the country we now have is not good enough for the people who live in it.

We ask you to accept that decisions will sometimes take longer, because the decisions are being given back to citizens who have been excluded from them. The price of devolution is that more parties have a say. The price of sectoral bargaining is that wages are settled through real negotiation rather than imposed by managers who answer to nobody. The price of a constitutional convention is that change comes through deliberation rather than ministerial decree. These are not inconveniences to be apologised for. They are what self-government feels like.

We ask you to commit to work that compounds slowly. Universal childcare will visibly pay for itself in twenty years, not in five. Regional renewal will shift the geography of British life across a generation, not a parliament. The institutions Civitas Britannica proposes to rebuild will outlast the governments that begin the work, and the proper measure of those governments is not what they completed in their term but what they founded for their successors to inherit.

We ask, finally, that you commit to one another. To the citizens you share these islands with, of every background that lawful settlement and birth have produced — for it is from such mixing that the country has long drawn its strength. Alloys are stronger than the metals from which they are made. Britain has been forged across centuries from Saxons and Danes, Normans and Huguenots, Irish and Jewish, Caribbean and South Asian, Polish and Ugandan, and many more besides — and is stronger, not weaker, for the long working of these elements into a common civic life. The Britain of the coming century will be more mixed still, and this framework is built on the conviction that this is a source of national strength and not a problem to be administered.

This island has been continuously at the work of self-government for longer than almost any country on earth. The common law, the parliamentary tradition, the slow accumulation of liberties, the resistance to tyranny abroad and at home — these are the inheritance of a polity that has not been conquered on its own soil in nearly a thousand years, that withstood the Armada, that broke Napoleon's hold on Europe, that endured two world wars, and that emerged from each shaken but not broken. The tradition of British resilience is not myth. It is recorded history. It is the achievement of citizens no greater than ourselves, sustained across centuries by their willingness to take the work seriously.

The generation that came home from the trenches and built the universal franchise asked themselves what they had fought for, and answered by extending the country to those who had been kept outside it. The generation that came home from the second war, hungrier and poorer than we have been in living memory, founded the National Health Service, the

welfare state, and the Atlantic alliance that kept Europe at peace for three generations. They did not have more than us. They did not know their work would last. They committed anyway, because they had decided that the country was worth the effort, and they were proven right.

That settlement is now ours to defend, restore, and extend. The work is not finished, and we are not the smaller people who must therefore decline it. We are the inheritors. The country has been carried this far by citizens no greater than ourselves, and it will be carried further only if we choose to carry it.

If this is your diagnosis too, write. Read this document again, with a pen. Mark where you agree, where you disagree, where you think the framework is wrong. Write your own arguments. Find others who are doing the same. Meet. Talk. Write more. Produce better arguments than this one, and the framework will adopt yours and throw its own away, because the project cares about the country, not about its own sentences.

We are not asking for belief. We are asking for work.

Let it not be said of this generation that we inherited a country built across a thousand years and let it slip from us through nothing more demanding than apathy. Let it not be said that we were the decadent heirs who had everything our forebears fought to leave us, and could not be bothered to keep it. Let it not be said that Britain ended, after all this history, with a whimper. The tradition does not have to die with us. The choice is ours, and the time for the making of it is now.

> *Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho'We are not now that strength which in old daysMoved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are —One equal temper of heroic hearts,Made weak by time and fate, but strong in willTo strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.* — Tennyson, Ulysses

With thanks to the readers who supported this work in its serialisation — subscribers and founding supporters, whose backing came before the proof. The work is freely given, and the backing gratefully received.

The Framework at a Glance

Condition and method

- Relative decline across institutions, infrastructure, and civic confidence; the cause institutional before economic.
- Capacity built before commitment; sequencing held in the open; a thirty-year horizon; candour about what cannot yet be promised.
- Foundations: integrity, the concord of the orders, stewardship across generations, standing earned by contribution, and strength as the condition of the good. Movement: Fight Forward.

The six priorities, in order

- Rebuild the capacity of the state.
- Reform recruitment and retention of those who serve in it.
- Restore the long horizon to British governance.
- Stabilise the strategically decisive sectors.
- Rebuild productive and technological capability.
- Broaden social ambition once competence and resilience are recovered.

The four parliaments — the plan in time

- First — Capacity: rebuild the machinery of government.
- Second — Foundation: begin the policy reform a competent state can deliver.
- Third — Maturity: industrial strategy, energy, the fuller social settlement.
- Fourth and beyond — the aspirational horizon.

The Four Tiers: Priority and Funding

- Tier 1 — foundational capacity and revenue.
- Tier 2 — the foundational functions of the state.
- Tier 3 — substantial reform of high value.
- Tier 4 — what the country hopes to afford once the rest works.

The five institutions

- Royal Institute of Statecraft — trains, oversees, designs, remembers.
- Cura Custodum — one covenant for the frontline workforce (£18–23bn at full scope).
- GAIA — one identity, one payments layer, one data standard.
- National Wealth Fund — a sovereign fund with a public citizen stake.
- National Fraud Agency — integrity proven early.

The money

- Tax envelope towards 40% of GDP, 42% as productivity recovers.
- \~£45–52bn additional recurring revenue at planning case; floor \~£40bn.
- A once-in-a-generation wealth levy seeds the capital programme.
- Current spending matched to revenue; capital borrowed only against return.
- Every figure in one published ledger; delivery reported yearly.

Summary of Commitments

This register lists the framework's commitments for reference. Each carries a number for citation (cite as "C14"), grouped by the section it lives in, with its tier and indicative cost shown where the document states one. Ranges are the document's own; the canonical fiscal ledger holds the authoritative figures. Diagnostic and argumentative sections (I—IV, XV—XVI, XVIII) make no enumerated commitments and are not listed.

The list is longer than the programme. Many entries are components of a single commitment — the Royal Institute and its functions, the Cura covenant and its parts, the asylum and migration settlement and its stages — and several are not spending commitments at all, but the framework's operating rules (the fiscal disciplines, the conditional-grant doctrine, the contingency menu) or its standing diplomatic relationships. Read for distinct deliverable undertakings, the programme is roughly sixty, not the raw count below. By tier that is, in round terms, about a dozen capacity foundations the first parliament builds and on which everything else stands; some eighteen committed reforms the competent state then delivers; about twenty that are explicitly conditional, sequencing behind revenue and productivity above the central case; and a handful that proceed only on surplus. The tiers are the true shape of the thing: what is promised outright is the foundations and the committed core, while what is offered as the prize for the programme working is named as conditional rather than dressed as certain.

§V — The Royal Institute of Statecraft

- **C1 Royal Institute of Statecraft.** Established under Royal Charter and statute, reporting to Parliament with protected funding and term-limited cross-party governance; principal site outside London with regional branches. Functions: training the senior public service, oversight of institutional performance for Parliament, the design of new institutions, and institutional memory. Safeguarded against detachment by published composition floors (state education, outside the South East, mid-career entry), a circulation requirement, and external review empowered to dissolve. First cohort taken into training in the first parliament. Tier 1 · \~£200–400m/yr · §V, VII
- **C2 Institutional-builder recruitment.** The military transition pathway (200–500 senior officers in the first parliament, rising thereafter); international institution-builders on fixed-term, knowledge-transfer contracts with outcome-conditional pay; technical recruitment, reformed regulator pay, and parliamentary technical capacity. Tier 1 · \~£4bn/yr, incl. the international pathway at \~£200–400m · §V, VII

§VI — Cura Custodum

- **C3 Cura Custodum covenant.** A single covenant for the frontline workforce — military, NHS clinical, police, fire, prison, Border Force, Coast Guard — providing service-accruing housing support, lifelong role-specific healthcare, career-development funding, enhanced pensions, guaranteed citizenship for foreign-born

members, and lifelong care for service-related conditions; carried on a unified, transferable service record (the diploma model; standing once earned is permanent), read in aggregate as firewalled workforce intelligence, with core terms on a statutory footing answerable to Parliament. Includes the veterans framework, the military service-and-mobility pathway, and a Life Skills programme drawing instructors from the Cura population and the experienced retired. Baseline (military + NHS clinical) Tier 2; extension to other services Tier 3 (§IX). £12–15bn baseline → £18–23bn full scope · §VI, IX, XIII

§VII — The First Parliament: Capacity

- **C4 GAIA — founded.** Designs the common government-technology spine; a consolidation of government technology the state already runs in fragments. Tier 1 · §VII
- **C5 Cura Custodum Authority — founded.** Builds the unified frontline administration; a consolidation of schemes that already exist. Tier 1 · §VI, VII
- **C6 Regional skills academies and technical institutes — founded.** First cohorts in nuclear/grid and advanced engineering. Tier 1 · §VII
- **C7 Tax architecture (envelope).** Take rises from \~37–38% of GDP towards 40%, and to 42% as productivity recovers; sized to the work and reviewed once the rebuild completes. The named measures below compose the architecture and are itemised for transparency. Tier 1 · §VII, XI
- **C8 Land value tax.** Replaces council tax; collected locally, equalised nationally. £8–15bn → £15–25bn · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C9 Capital gains tax reform.** Base broadening, death-uplift closure, rebasing to real gains; rate-alignment on passive gains with the risk-capital channel carved out and policed. £4–8bn · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C10 Corporation tax — held and stabilised.** A competitive rate locked for the programme, permanent full expensing, and a patent box conditioned on intellectual property kept in Britain; not a major revenue lever by design. Tier 1 · §VII, IX
- **C11 Inheritance tax and trusts tightened.** Agricultural relief converted to an earned, clawback-backed relief. £5–10bn · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C12 Corporate loophole closure.** Beyond the enacted OECD Pillar Two baseline. £8–15bn · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C13 50% income-tax band.** Above £150,000. £1–3bn · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C14 National Insurance uncapping.** Above the upper earnings limit. £8–12bn · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C15 VAT base broadening.** Financial-services intermediation and discretionary categories; food, children's clothing, and domestic energy excluded. £5–12bn · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C16 Channelling relief.** Capped relief across the capital taxes (one-third rising to two-thirds as enforcement certifies) for capital deployed into national-priority investment, certified through National Wealth Fund-accredited vehicles. Mechanism · §VII, XII

- **C17 Periodic progressive wealth tax.** 1% / 1.5% / 2% per year for five years above £2m / £5m / £20m; once a generation, capital reconstruction only. Liability fixed at announcement; no household forced to sell a home or working business. Proceeds to social capital — NHS estate (£12–18bn), schools (£10–15bn), courts (£2–3bn), contingency (£6–10bn). Net £35–50bn (floor £30bn) · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C18 Procurement reform.** Defence first, then government-wide; real technical capacity on the buyer's side and enforced consequences for failure. Releases \~£5–10bn/yr · Tier 1 · §VII, XIII
- **C19 National Fraud Agency — founded.** A fiscal exception to the Capacity Parliament, justified because earlier establishment produces earlier net revenue. Net £2–4bn by P2, £3–7bn by P3 · Tier 1 · §VII
- **C20 Welfare remedies (early).** End of the five-week Universal Credit wait; reformed sanctions. Tier 2 · §VII
- **C21 Right-to-die legislation.** Cheap in money, costly in parliamentary time. Tier 2 · §VII
- **C22 Asylum settlement.** Protection always; mainland settlement only by a consented route. The lawful route fully resourced (offshore and at-mission processing, decisions in weeks; a one-time amnesty for the long-resident undocumented); absolute prospective closure of the irregular route from announcement; accountable, time-limited detention (12 months first instance, 18-month maximum, full inspection and legal access); and Saint Helena territorial resettlement, staged to certified capacity (capital £3–6bn; running £0.5–1.5bn/yr early). Tier 2 · §VII, XIII
- **C23 Migration architecture.** Net migration managed to \~150,000–250,000/yr at steady state, tapering up from below the band through the first two parliaments as integration capacity (housing, school places, primary care) is rebuilt; reported to Parliament annually and bounded by that capacity; visa levers (skilled-worker thresholds against genuine need, strategic-sector allocations, post-study and family routes tightened); and settlement by contribution — residence → settlement → citizenship as distinct earned stages, with an evidenced-misfortune safeguard. Tier 2 · §VII
- **C24 Pension and capital architecture — six legislative mechanisms.** Including NEST expansion (CPPIB model) and the National Wealth Fund scaled into a sovereign fund (£10–15bn seed) with a public citizen stake. Tier 1 · §VII, VIII, IX, XII
- **C25 AI governance foundations.** The legislative base; algorithmic decision-making brought under GAIA; the AI Security Institute placed on a statutory footing. Tier 1 · §VII
- **C26 Constitutional Convention convened.** Outputs implemented in the second parliament. Tier 1 · §VII

§VIII — The Second Parliament: Foundation

- **C27 NHS baseline reform.** Settled architecture, a Frontline Advisory Council, pay restoration, training expansion, dentistry/GP/diagnostics. £12–15bn → £18–22bn; estate £15–20bn + £5bn mental health · Tier 2 · §VIII

- **C28 Prevention settlement.** Health levies, walkable planning, a Life Skills curriculum — demand bent, not only funded. Tier 2 · §VIII
- **C29 Universal childcare.** From \~age one, rolled out across the parliament. £8–10bn net · Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C30 Universal Credit reform.** First payment in days, gentler taper, adequacy benchmarking, a redesigned disability assessment, a child-element uplift. £3–5bn · Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C31 Personal allowance raised.** To £16,000–18,000. \~£20–30bn cost · Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C32 Drug policy reform.** Cannabis legalisation (£1–2bn), Portuguese-model decriminalisation, Swiss-model supply, a resentencing panel. Tier 2 · §VIII
- **C33 Defence trajectory.** To 2.5% of GDP early, then 3.5% on the alliance timeline, conditional on procurement reform; the Cura military baseline £12–15bn. +£15–20bn · Tier 2 · §VIII, XIII
- **C34 Planning reform.** Rules-based zoning, Green Belt reform by value, a strengthened national-infrastructure regime, a grid-connection fast lane, and a single coordinated consent for major investment. Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C35 Housing programme.** Right to Buy repealed for new tenancies, renter rights and indefinite tenancies, new towns (£6–10bn), retrofit (£3–5bn/yr). Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C36 Civic identity card.** Verified identity at economic chokepoints, repaying the citizen in friction removed; firewalled against scoring. Capital £3–5bn · Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C37 Sectoral bargaining.** Social care first, building towards 30–40% workforce coverage over the horizon. Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C38 Water infrastructure.** An ownership review with binding consequences, £60–80bn of overflow remediation, a strengthened economic regulator, personal liability for deliberate dumping. Tier 3 · §VIII
- **C39 Pension architecture implementation.** NWF accumulates, NEST operationalises, scheme consolidation, auto-enrolment 8%→12%, infrastructure allocation, triple→double lock. £2–4bn/yr · Tier 2 · §VIII
- **C40 Criminal justice.** Rehabilitation as the purpose for lesser offences, the whole-life tariff expanded for the gravest, capital punishment rejected, system capacity rebuilt. Tier 2 · §VIII
- **C41 Crime and public order.** Police capacity sustained, bodycams standard issue, specialist units. Tier 2 · §VIII
- **C42 Sexual violence response.** Specialist units and court tracks, complainant-disclosure reform, advocacy. \~£200–500m/yr · Tier 2 · §VIII
- **C43 Single-sex provision.** Protected in law. Tier 2 · §VIII
- **C44 Free press and the informational commons.** Safeguarded. Tier 2 · §VIII

§IX — The Third Parliament: Maturity

- **C45 Industrial strategy at scale, Britain's Renewal of Advanced Industrial Development (BRAID).** Catapult Network towards Fraunhofer levels (£3–4bn/yr),

restored public R&D, strategic-sector support, a strategic-asset retention test, and a quality-manufacturing posture with a statutory British-made mark. Tier 2 · §IX

- **C46 Technological sovereignty in artificial intelligence.** Resilience through sovereign compute, open-weight fallback, diversification, and retained weights; the Arm chokepoint locked by jurisdiction; the assurance lead deepened; a frontier stake pursued opportunistically and pinned to no single company or country. Tier 2 · §IX, XIV
- **C47 Life sciences settlement and the British Medical Institute.** Anchored by the chartered British Medical Institute, the standing hub that holds the nation's scattered health-science advantage together and keeps it British. NHS data put to work as a strategic asset on the licence-not-ownership principle, with a public dividend and a costless opt-out; value-based medicine pricing; the advertising ban, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) independence and prescriber independence kept; modern and novel medicines manufactured onshore on resilience and retention grounds, commodity drugs sourced abroad; NWF co-investment and the retention test applied to lab and factory. Settlement and the Institute's early governing function Tier 2; its flagship clinical-research-training campus Tier 4, surplus-conditional · §IX, X
- **C48 Creative industries settlement.** A creator's work licensed, never expropriated — training-by-default refused, a collective licensing market built, transparency bound to market access, personality and replica rights enforced; screen and games credits kept, stabilised, and conditioned to reach the worker; a contributory floor under the freelance creator. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C49 Space settlement.** A committed floor: resilience of position, navigation, and timing — timing first — set beside energy security and defence; the Overseas-Territory ground network held and equipped; sovereign launch sustained on minimal support; spectrum and orbital slots reserved and the retention test applied; ESA membership the multiplier. Floor Tier 2, wider capability Tier 3 · §IX
- **C50 Nuclear power as a strategic pillar.** A build programme of reactor pairs and Rolls-Royce SMR manufacturing towards \~24 GW. Capital £450–600bn/25yr; state peak £12–16bn/yr · Tier 2 · §IX
- **C51 Fusion.** STEP committed as a national priority. £2–3bn/yr · Tier 3 · §IX
- **C52 Offshore wind.** To 80–100 GW operational by 2050, with supply chain and grid. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C53 Education reform.** SEN reform (£2–3bn) and wider school reform; a science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) curriculum spine with mathematics to eighteen and a named post-sixteen pathway; estate renewal (£18–22bn). £15–22bn recurring · Tier 3 (the shortage-subject teacher pipeline pulled forward into Tier 1) · §IX
- **C54 The Teaching Settlement.** Shortage-subject entry funded as a gift earned through service; the reciprocal half a reformed job — workload cut, the single high-stakes Ofsted grade ended, expert peer review, support before punishment. Tier 3 · §IX

- **C55 Universities settlement.** Research to full economic cost on strategic priorities; teaching-grant and maintenance restoration. £2–4bn · Tier 3 · §IX
- **C56 Cura Custodum extension.** To the other emergency services. → £18–23bn full scope · Tier 3 · §IX
- **C57 Regional renewal.** Post-industrial regions made viable; distributed anchor institutions and infrastructure. £3–5bn · Tier 3 · §IX
- **C58 Cultural and civic offer.** Support for cultural infrastructure and festivals; a restored night-time economy; a draught-duty differential for pubs and venues. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C59 Legal system reform.** Law Reform Commission to scale; comprehensive statute reform. £2.5–3.5bn · Tier 3 · §IX
- **C60 Pension architecture maturation.** NWF to £150–250bn, NEST to £400–600bn, infrastructure allocation at 10–15%. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C61 Climate and energy.** Renewables at pace, North Sea transition, buildings and transport on the nuclear-led baseline. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C62 Marine protection.** Highly Protected Marine Areas expanded towards 30% of UK waters. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C63 Waste and the circular economy.** Reformed. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C64 The land and the sea.** Three-zone land use, a policed biodiversity-net-gain market, a single natural-capital registry through GAIA. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C65 The care settlement.** Integration on a shared record, paid flexible work for the young old, direction towards full Dilnot scope. Tier 3 · §IX
- **C66 The children's settlement.** An outdoor entitlement and intergenerational provision. Tier 3 · §IX

§X — The Aspirational Horizon (Tier 4)

- **C67 Tier 4 commitments.** Higher-education funding to full scope, UC adequacy to the minimum income standard, NHS full mental-health parity, climate above the baseline, universal elder care at full Dilnot scope, comprehensive cybercrime response, deeper regional renewal, medical-school doubling, and full delivery of unclaimed entitlements — conditional on the programme working and fiscal performance permitting. Tier 4 · §X

§XI — The Fiscal Architecture

- **C68 Fiscal rules.** Current spending matched to revenue; capital borrowed only against productive return; the OBR strengthened. Mechanism · §XI
- **C69 Conditional chains.** Every commitment tied to named revenue; shortfall met by sequencing, not deficit. Mechanism · §XI
- **C70 Contingency menu.** Held in reserve — a financial-transactions tax (£4–7bn), corporate-loophole acceleration, VAT broadening, pension-relief tightening. Mechanism · §XI

- **C71 Blended capital programme.** A borrowing envelope (£2.5–4bn/yr), a recurring capital allocation (£3–5bn/yr), and crowded-in private finance. Mechanism · §XI
- **C72 Visibility commitment.** Annual public reviews of what is committed, delivered, and slipped. Mechanism · §XI
- **C73 Bank of England independence.** Preserved and reinforced. Mechanism · §XI
- **C74 Financial-services regulation.** Calibrated to systemic importance, directed towards productive investment. Mechanism · §XI

§XII — The City as Partner in Renewal

- **C75 Public stake in the National Wealth Fund.** Citizens given direct ownership of the renewal. Mechanism · §XII, VII
- **C76 Protections for productive wealth.** What the framework guards in return for the contribution it asks. Mechanism · §XII

§XIII — Defence and National Resilience

- **C77 Defence capability.** Forces sized for quality and designed for scale; integrated digital capability; intelligence and signals sustained and expanded; defence as industrial strategy, with equipment spend anchored to domestic capability. Tier 2 · §XIII
- **C78 Reservist system.** The trained reserve doubled to \~80,000, with statutory employer protection. \~£1–2bn/yr · Tier 2 · §XIII
- **C79 Civil defence and national resilience.** Strategic reserves, infrastructure redundancy, community response; a civil-resilience reserve drawn from the vetted, trained Cura Custodum population. Tier 3 · §XIII
- **C80 Nuclear deterrent.** Continuous-at-sea, Dreadnought completed. Tier 2 · §XIII

§XIV — The International Position

- **C81 Alliance structure.** NATO as the centrepiece, with European bilateral ballast against uncertain American backing. Posture · §XIII, XIV
- **C82 Concentric architecture.** Relationships ordered by priority, not treated as competing. Posture · §XIV
- **C83 Ireland.** Bilateral investment in close relations as a priority in its own right. Posture · §XIV
- **C84 Anglosphere and Five Eyes.** Sustained as a core intelligence and security relationship. Posture · §XIV
- **C85 European democratic core.** Deepened bilateral defence and political ties. Posture · §XIV
- **C86 EU relationship.** The deepest associated relationship within the TCA: a veterinary agreement, Horizon participation, practical alignment. Posture · §XIV
- **C87 East Asia.** An economic priority: Japan the anchor partnership, Korea a relationship to develop, alongside Taiwan and Singapore. Posture · §XIV

- **C88 India.** A priority partnership; a bilateral trade architecture with real resources. Posture · §XIV
- **C89 Ukraine.** Support sustained until a settlement Ukraine accepts. Posture · §XIV
- **C90 Commonwealth.** Sustained bilateral engagement on terms of mutual respect. Posture · §XIV
- **C91 ECHR.** Britain remains within the Convention, pressing reform from inside. Posture · §XIV
- **C92 Trade architecture.** Developed across the priority relationships. Posture · §XIV

§XVII — The Discipline of the Movement

- **C93 Discipline.** The movement bound to the method it asks of the state. Mechanism · §XVII
- **C94 Method.** Honest diagnosis, sequencing, capacity before commitment. Mechanism · §XVII
- **C95 Governance.** Internal accountability matching the external kind. Mechanism · §XVII
- **C96 Showing the work.** The canonical ledger and this register published alongside the document. Mechanism · §XVII
- **C97 National Academy of Leadership.** The programme's capstone: a voluntary, open-on-merit national institution to forge, from every background, people fit to lead a renewed country — state-funded for those who cannot pay, full-freight for those who can, the fee buying a seat at a hard selection and never a pass through it. Screens for evidenced corruption, not for character; established by Royal Charter under Crown patronage, at arm's length from the government of the day; barred to the heirs of families not in good standing on the levy. Held as conditional aspiration, committed to by none of the earlier work, and placed last by design. Tier 4 · no cost booked · §X